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 INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis endeavours to trace the body in Bracha L. Ettinger’s oeuvre and to 
investigate the humanising potential of this rich category. Born in 1948 in Tel Aviv to 
the Holocaust survivors Bluma and Uziel Lichtenberg, Ettinger is a clinical 
psychologist, psychoanalyst, visual artist, and theoretician of the matrix. In my thesis, 
I focus on her matrixial psychoanalysis and artistic practice in an attempt to take a 
closer look at corporeality – the notion which constantly resurfaces in these two areas 
but has never occupied a central position in Ettingerian criticism; as I believe, the 
status of the matrixial body needs to be studied, clarified, and foregrounded as it may 
be read as a primary ethical site in a psychoanalytical sense. 
The first pillar of this thesis is the work of Ettinger as a matrixial theorist. The 
underpinnings, assumptions, and major concepts of the matrixial theory are explored 
in detail in the first chapter, but let me briefly contextualise this system beforehand. 
The founding concept of Ettinger’s psychoanalysis is the matrix, a signifier of non-
phallic and non-gendered difference inspired by the prenatal / pregnancy encounter-
event in the womb. Instead of being grounded upon separation, cut, or loss, this type 
of difference embraces connectedness, shareability, and hospitality of an intimate 
encounter between several becoming-subjects; this does not, however, mean that it 
forms an opposition to phallic paradigms. Rather, the matrixial borderspace theorised 
by Ettinger functions as a supplement to Jacques Lacan’s and Sigmund Freud’s 
psychoanalysis. Namely, while the matrix as a concept questions the phallus and 
castration as the only means of subjectivity formation, it does not challenge their 
significance in the postnatal period. In her proposition of a supplementary 
subjectivising realm, Ettinger scrutinises the postulates of Lacan with regard to their 
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possibly male-centred structure as well as re-reads Sigmund Freud (among others, she 
returns to Muttersleibphantasien, a term somewhat abandoned by Lacan); such 
analyses allow her to rethink the space for femininity at the threshold of phallus-
oriented psychoanalysis. Calling for the co-existence instead of the rejection of 
paradigms, Ettinger expands the Symbolic order onto the logics of between / and and 
both / and alongside that of either / or. As a result, Ettinger questions the primacy of 
the binary stratification and singularity of the subject, and stresses the value of 
matrixial severality (which should not be mistaken with subjectless or meaning-less 
symbiosis or fusion). While Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalysis provides the major 
point of reference in the discussion of the matrixial theory, Ettinger is also indebted to 
other thinkers and areas. Her next crucial inspiration is derived from schizoanalysis of 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari; although Ettinger’s approach is not anti-Oedipal, it 
is focused on such notions as becoming, affect, and connectedness, which instantly 
redirect us to Deleuze and Guattari’s propositions. Finally, Ettinger also turns to 
Emmanuel Lévinas’s ethics of the Other and Julia Kristeva’s conceptualisation of the 
chora. In addition, in the course of this dissertation I collate the matrixial domain with, 
among others, Grosz’s postulates of corporeal feminism, Judeo-Christian theology, 
and the Holocaust studies. All of these contexts make it possible to provide a more 
complete picture of Ettinger’s multi-layered – yet evanescent – notion of corporeality. 
Importantly, even though Ettinger’s focal point is the prenatal / pregnancy 
phase and thus – the female body, this theory should not be misidentified as exemplary 
of French cultural feminism. First of all, French cultural feminism’s treatment of the 
feminine corporeality is in proximity to essentialism; secondly, this current considers 
the potentiality to overthrow the discourses grounded upon the male body. Both of 
these aspects hint at possible aspirations towards a sui generis cult of femininity. 
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Ettinger, in contrast, endeavours to dissociate herself from essentialism, which is 
discussed in detail in this thesis. Also, as I have already mentioned, her aim is not to 
jettison the phallus-based systems. Even though femininity and the female body play 
a defining role in the matrixial theory, this realm does not exclude males; Griselda 
Pollock puts it bluntly: “This theory is not just about women for women, but for all of 
us, for we are all born of woman.”1 There is, however, one undebatable influence of 
French cultural feminism on Ettinger’s oeuvre; in her theoretical writings, she uses 
écriture féminine, a literary strategy devised by Hélène Cixous.2 
In her reading of Ettinger’s theory, Pollock provocatively argues that it 
commits “blasphemy”3; what I would like to propose is a notion that supplements such 
a view on this system. When considering blasphemy, Pollock refers to two basic 
assumptions of the matrix: one on the prenatal period as a formative time-space for the 
becoming-subject, and the other on severality as a subjectivising quality that precedes 
separation. In psychoanalysis, as she notes, both thinking of the subject-before-birth 
and thinking of the subject indispensably linked with its intimate Others are 
impossible, or even “psychotic and perverse.”4 Feminism, in turn, is claimed to fear 
falling into essentialism or biological determinism whenever the issue of the female 
body is raised. Nevertheless, Ettinger’s intention is not to antagonise or disregard these 
two fields, but to contribute to and thus expand them. As I would like to add, different 
                                                 
1 Griselda Pollock, “Introduction. Femininity: Aporia or Sexual Difference?,” in: Bracha L. Ettinger, 
The Matrixial Borderspace, ed. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota 
Press, 2006), p. 29. 
2 See: Griselda Pollock, “Mother Trouble: The Maternal-feminine in Phallic and Feminist Theory in 
Relation to Bracha Ettinger’s Elaboration of Matrixial Ethics/Aesthetics,” Studies in the Maternal, Vol. 
1, No. 1 (2009), p. 13, http://www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk/back_issues/issue_one/GriseldaPollock.pdf 
(access: 29 November 2013). 
3 Pollock, “Introduction,” p. 12. Pollock uses the notion of blasphemy after Donna Haraway’s A Cyborg 
Manifesto. There, blasphemy is a creative act that has to be differentiated from apostasy. See: Donna 
Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-feminism in the Late 20th 
Century,” in: International Handbook of Virtual Learning Environments, eds. Joel Weiss, Jason Nolan, 
Jeremy Hunsinger, and Peter Trifonas (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), p. 117. 
4 Pollock, “Introduction,” p. 13.  
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difference is an Ettingerian notion that seems to embrace the essence of the relation of 
the matrixial theory to both areas delineated above. Different difference cannot be 
conceived of in terms of exclusion or opposition; rather, it constitutes a border-Other 
to the classical psychoanalytical theorisation of binary + / - difference. Similarly, 
Ettinger introduces the system that neither has to be rejected nor expects its 
predecessors to withdraw since it works within and near the borders of 
psychoanalytical paradigms. Moreover, even though the matrixial theory does not 
refrain from using the female-maternal flesh as a departure point for further 
investigations, it does not question feminism or women’s rights, again placing itself as 
different rather than definitive difference to them. The matrixial realm, therefore, 
builds the relation with psychoanalysis and feminism upon mutuality, proximity, and 
correspondence, but also upon a pinch of “blasphemous” challenge. 
Not only a matrixial theorist and psychoanalyst, Bracha L. Ettinger is also a 
visual artist. The second pillar of my dissertation, Ettinger’s artworking constantly 
intermingles with theoretical considerations. We read: “While painting produces 
theory, theory casts light on painting in a backward projection. […] For me, painting 
and theory are not different aspects that attest to the same thing, but are rather 
differentiated levels of working-through.”5 The experience of creating and witnessing 
art thus becomes one of the grounds for the emergence of the matrixial theory and its 
indispensable companion. Emphatically, Ettinger’s aesthetic practice cannot be 
reduced to one genre or medium. This thesis focuses mainly on her paintings, but it 
also refers to several works on paper, drawings, sketches, and notebooks; apart from 
these, Ettinger’s artistic output includes, among others, video works, installations, and 
photography. 
                                                 
5 Bracha L. Ettinger, “The With-In-Visible Screen,” in: The Matrixial Borderspace, p. 94. Emphasis in 
the original. 
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While the techniques of the particular artworks analysed are explored in detail 
in the course of the thesis, I find it essential to outline the underpinnings of Ettinger’s 
most famous series, Eurydice, as these paintings recur in all five chapters. The majority 
of Eurydices are based on a historical black and white photograph from 1942 which 
depicts women and children from the Mizocz ghetto waiting to be executed. Naked, 
the victims stand in a row; among them, we can see women of different ages, one of 
them visibly pregnant, some holding babies, and a little girl. We can also spot male 
soldiers behind them. As this thesis is devoted to ethics, I decided not to include this 
image in the appendix – I feel neither ethically secure nor entitled to do so. The 
photograph is, however, available online.6 In the series, the Mizocz picture functions 
as a background which Ettinger re-works. She begins by using a photocopy machine, 
suspending its work before the full copy is produced; the final effect is never 
predictable whereas the copy remains unfinished, which testifies to the 
abovementioned between / and logic. Then, Ettinger engages in further manipulations, 
for instance covering the image with layers of paint or adding other pictures to the 
canvas. This procedure, the usage of the photograph, and other themes present in these 
pieces provide us with numerous implications which require a further analysis and – 
as I am convinced – contribute to the proposed reflections on the proto-ethics of the 
matrix. 
The primary point of interest in this thesis – the body – occupies a paradoxical 
position in Ettinger’s oeuvre. To start with the theory, the notion of the matrix is based 
on the womb, but it serves as a psychoanalytical model; consequently, the body in this 
system ought not to be understood via essentialism or biological determinism as it is 
                                                 
6 The original photograph can be accessed in the online archives of the United States Holocaust 
Memorial Museum; the Museum website also provides more information about the photograph. 
Reference number of the photograph: #17877, available at: 
https://collections.ushmm.org/search/catalog/pa1065461 (access: 7 February 2019). 
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argued to be used in a non-ideological manner. Omnipresent in the matrixial domain, 
the (female) corporeality becomes rather a metaphorical than an actual site here. 
Namely, it may be read as a space of relations between the subject and the Other(s), or 
between the becoming-subjects; it may also be theorised as an origin of (proto-)ethics. 
Simultaneously, in critical examinations of Ettinger’s theory, the significance of the 
body appears to be treated either as unquestionable and obvious, or as an element that 
ought not to be spoken of, that is, a dangerous territory. As a result, it is not analysed 
sufficiently, which leaves numerous blank spaces and inadequacies. In art, the 
presence of the female body appears to be more straightforward. To start with, 
Ettinger’s artworks frequently feature feminine tropes and associations; secondly, 
women are points of reference in the titles themselves (among others, Eurydice, Saint 
Anne, Medusa, and Ophelia). Finally, the artworks host actual women, for instance, 
those from Mizocz, Ettinger herself, and Bluma Lichtenberg. In my view, the body – 
especially female – constantly resurfaces in Ettinger’s thought and art and yet is 
virtually absent, never reaching the status of the main subject in Ettingerian critique. 
In this dissertation, I endeavour to prove that the body – a sui generis hiatus in 
Ettingerian studies – can be identified as both the origin and the potential of matrixial 
ethics, grounded upon the correspondence of theory and art. In order to organise the 
support of this thesis, I have established a number of objectives. In general terms, I 
aim at investigating the ethics of the body in Bracha L. Ettinger’s psychoanalysis; 
simultaneously, I intend to explore the trans-connectedness of theory and aesthetics 
with reference to corporeality and its ethical dimension. More specifically, I examine 
the relationships of bodies (especially I / non-I, mother / child), differences arising 
between them, and their possible implications; also, I exercise the potentialities of the 
body in the system that is claimed to be neither essentialist nor biologically 
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determined. The related goal is an analysis of the Ettingerian corporeality with regard 
to the gender distinctions it is argued to evade, and, in the process, an assessment of 
the validity of this claim. Finally, I turn to the chosen thinkers engaged in the Holocaust 
studies and Judeo-Christian theology as these two fields provide an indispensable 
context for both the theory of the matrix and Ettinger’s artistic activity. When 
combined, the outlined aims work in favour of foregrounding the body, that is, 
emphasising its inherent significance in Ettinger’s oeuvre and opening its scope. 
The approach I adopt is predominantly a hermeneutic reading of Ettinger’s 
thought and art. It strives to be both descriptive and critical. In other words, the method 
embraces confrontations of systems and analyses of corporeal tropes, aspiring not only 
to highlight the undermined – yet foundational – notion of the body but also to discover 
its implications in the contexts and spaces in which it has been merely noted (if so) yet 
not studied in detail. Simultaneously, in my encounters with Ettinger’s art, I frequently 
allow myself to go further – towards a more affective interpretation. One of the 
inspirations for such an approach is a notebook entry, the scan of which was available 
at the exhibition Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger: Eurydice – Pieta in Muzeum Śląskie, 
Katowice (7 July – 2 September 2017, curated by Anna Chromik). It was dated May 
2013, and one of the inscriptions read “My thinking results from this feel-know-seeing. 
[…] [I]t is paradoxical and looks sounds illogical – but it has another kind of logic.” 
The triad of feel-know-seeing can be acknowledged as a set of principles that guide my 
interpretative practice, in which the theory (know) and observation (see) are 
accompanied by affect and sensation (feel). Focusing only on formal elements would 
be reductive because of both the character of Ettinger’s artworks and her theoretical 
reflections, which put an emphasis on non-normative transfer of knowledge. As I 
expect, the path I have chosen may provide a deeper insight into the discussed issues. 
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The dissertation is divided into two parts. In the first part, comprised of three 
chapters, Ettinger’s works are the central theme; they are contextualised, introduced, 
and explored in terms of relationships between corporeality and ethics. The second 
part, which embraces two chapters, is devoted to two encounters with the matrixial 
realm – the partners of Ettinger in these encounters are theology and the Holocaust 
studies, respectively. Together, both parts testify to the body as a humanising space. 
Chapter 1, The Matrix: Concepts – Tropes – Implications foregrounds the 
elementary unit of Ettinger’s thought. The matrix and the notions directly linked to it 
(co-naissance, severality, communicaring, subjectivity-as-encounter, and hospitality) 
are scrutinised and juxtaposed with Freud’s, Lacan’s, and Kristeva’s propositions. 
Such analyses help me reveal the corporeal roots and humanising implications of 
Ettinger’s concepts. The chapter also takes a closer look at Ettinger’s paintings from 
the Eurydice and the No Title Yet (Saint Anne) series that are united by their womb-
connotations; I try to identify their entanglement in aesth/ethics and to understand their 
peculiar hospitality. 
While the first chapter is governed by the sub-thesis that the matrix and the 
related notions both are grounded upon corporeality and allow for an ethical 
interpretation, Chapter 2 takes this idea further, enquiring whether the Ettingerian 
notion of the body can be established as the root of matrixial ethics and reflecting on 
the potential of such a statement. Human(e) Origins: The Female Body as an Ethical 
Site begins with the recognition of female corporeality as a primary space where the 
becoming-subjects meet; this reading is supported by Lévinasian ethics and 
schizoanalysis. Thereafter, this chapter covers the possibility of knowledge and 
meaning of / in the body, and the humanising implications of this Ettingerian postulate; 
what is tackled are the questions of tracing sense beyond language and of experiencing 
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the trauma (instead) of the Other. Finally, bodily encounters and trans-historical 
human(e) linkages will be observed in the chosen “Eurydicial” artworks. 
The closing chapter of the first part, The Perplexing Feminine: 
Gender(lessness) of the Ettingerian Body faces the questions concerning the universal 
character of the theory of the matrix and the arguably privileged status of women in 
Ettinger’s oeuvre. It not only examines to what extent the matrix and the matrixial 
feminine difference are universal, neutral, and / or gendered, but also asks about men’s 
access to the matrix. In the chapter, I touch upon such issues as essentialist and 
biologically determined interpretations of the system, women’s rights, and different 
treatment of males and females in the matrixial theory and Ettinger’s art. Furthermore, 
I propose the notion of the “Ettingerian mythos” and look into its two variants – the 
theoretical mythos (including biblical and mythological figures) and the private one 
(Ettinger’s family members in her art) – in order to seek potential gender patterns. 
Chapter 4, entitled Through / with / in the Body: Theological Resonances of the 
Matrixial Specificity, is devoted to a dialogue of Ettinger with Judeo-Christian 
theology, mediated by such philosophers as Lévinas, Giorgio Agamben, and Jacques 
Derrida. To be more precise, the chapter studies theology-based concepts (incarnation, 
transcendence, separation, and Lévinasian encounter) in the context of the logic of the 
matrix, and scrutinises the matrixial notions (com-passion, covenant, and the 
Ettingerian interpretation of sacrifice) with regard to their religious connotations. In 
my search of biblical traces and openings in the matrixial corporeal aesth/ethics, I also 
look at an encounter with Ettinger’s Eurydices through the prisms of revelation and 
messianic time. 
The final chapter of this dissertation encompasses the issue that is inherent in 
the discussed oeuvre, Ettinger being a member of the Second Generation after the 
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Holocaust. In-appropriate(d): Art, Humanism, and the Body after Auschwitz is the 
only chapter in which art prevails over the matrixial theory, becoming the most 
important point of interest. Hosting the Mizocz women and thus being sui generis 
embodiments of the feminine experience of the Shoah, Ettinger’s paintings are collated 
with such issues as appropriation / appropriateness, Hirsch’s Nazi gaze, Agamben’s 
homo sacer, Lévinasian face of the Other, Derridean hauntology, and psychoanalytical 
gaze along with its matrixial revision. In the chapter, I recognise the dangers of 
Ettinger’s art in the context of the Holocaust, and simultaneously exercise its ethical 
potential in the face of this unthinkably tragic event. My objective is to prove that, 
despite certain ethical risks this kind of art inevitably carries, Ettinger’s marriage of 
theory and aesthetics makes a promise of re-conceptualising humanism by means of 
corporeality and the embodied encounters. 
 Part 1 
WITH-IN(TER) THE MATRIXIAL REALM
 Chapter 1 
THE MATRIX 
CONTEXTS – TROPES – IMPLICATIONS 
 
[I]t is the Several, the more-than-one or 
less-than-one, the ‘Un-en-moins” (One-
less), and the not-all that become a 
transgressive borderline, never all-
encompassing, never limitless.1 
 
1. Remnants of the Other 
What is left of Eurydice after Orpheus’s deadly gaze? When encountering 
Bracha L. Ettinger’s Eurydice paintings created between 2000 and 2010, the viewer 
does not find the photograph serving as a background for the whole series – the picture 
of naked women and children from the Mizocz ghetto taken in 1942 just before their 
execution.2 Instead, one is left with the smears of paint that make any points of 
reference indiscernible. In Eurydice, No. 47 (2001–2006), one may – or may not – see 
the female figures standing as if in a row; one might recognise shades of faces, hair, 
and bodies.3 If one does not, one can at least observe and experience colour, rhythm, 
and pulse of the image. Indeed, pulsating reds and purples in a sense pierce the viewer 
with their intensity. The red colour connotes passion and love, but also blood and 
danger. As the colours of bruises, both purple and red are, in turn, related to the wound. 
If we choose to follow this trope, red and purple turn out to be reminders of the past 
                                                 
1 Bracha L. Ettinger, “The Matrixial Gaze,” in: Bracha L. Ettinger, The Matrixial Borderspace, ed. 
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2006), p. 69. Emphasis in 
the original. 
2 The picture is discussed in the Introduction since it will recur as a point of reference throughout the 
whole dissertation. 
3 Bracha L. Ettinger, Eurydice, No. 47, 2001–2006, oil on paper mounted on canvas, 23.3x27.7 cm, in: 
Art as Compassion: Bracha L. Ettinger, eds. Catherine de Zegher and Griselda Pollock (Brussels: ASA 
Publishers, 2012), p. 169. See: Appendix, p. 221. 
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trauma or its traces. Moreover, as Brian Massumi notes, in the Eurydice series in 
general there is “less the image than the sensation of its remaining in its fading, re-
arising: rhythm,”4 which within psychoanalytical and feminist readings indicates Julia 
Kristeva’s notion of the chora.5 Therefore, perhaps there is nothing left to see when it 
comes to the women from the photographs; yet, what Eurydice, No. 47 leaves us with 
is simultaneously bodily and maternal reminiscence of the Other unknown to us. 
This chapter will explore the model of relations in the triad of the matrix, body, 
and ethics found in Bracha L. Ettinger’s theory and art. As I will endeavour to prove, 
the matrix – the basic unit in the Ettingerian system – and the related notions originate 
in the materiality of the body and are open to ethical reading. This sub-thesis serves 
the purpose of preparing the ground for examining the ethical potentiality of the 
Ettingerian notion of corporeality. Thus, the scrutiny of the first level of Ettinger’s 
thought will both allow me to map the territory for further research and provide the 
necessary terminology. 
In the following section, the notion of the matrix will be explored. Having 
established its relation to the womb, I will compare this twofold schema to the phallus 
/ penis dyad. The matrix will be portrayed in the context of not only the elements in 
the theories of Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, and Julia Kristeva to which Ettinger 
turns as sources of inspiration, but also those notions which are redefined or questioned 
by the matrixial theorist. It is, however, important to note that the aim of this chapter 
is not to provide an all-encompassing critical study of the concepts of the penis, the 
phallus, and the chora in the aforementioned theories, as they have already been 
                                                 
4 Brian Massumi, “Afterword. Painting: The Voice of the Grain,” in: The Matrixial Borderspace, p. 
203. 
5 Julia Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, trans. Margaret Waller (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1984), p. 26. 
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commented upon extensively.6 Rather, the goal here is to emphasise the main 
assumptions underlying these terms which are relevant as the background for the 
analysis of Ettingerian tropes. The next section will be devoted to the study of such 
concepts as co-naissance, severality, communicaring, and subjectivity-as-encounter, 
so as to prove their corporeal connotations and, thereafter, to reveal the ethical aspects 
of the maternal sphere of the matrix. The significance of hospitality within the 
matrixial borderspace will also be discussed here. Finally, Ettinger’s womb-like 
paintings from the Eurydice series and the No Title Yet (Saint Anne) series will be read 
as corpo-Real works of art which demonstrate the work of aesth/ethics. The return to 
the maternal / material and to the traumatising hospitality of the matrixial sphere will 
be revealed through Ettinger’s artistic practice, which is inextricably linked to her 
theoretical intervention in psychoanalysis. 
 
2. Not Only the Phallus 
In both Sigmund Freud’s and Jacques Lacan’s accounts of psychosexual 
development, the penis is a biological entity, which becomes a basis for reconsidering 
subjectivity from the psychoanalytical angle. As to the difference between the penis 
and the phallus, Lacan notes, 
The phallus can be better understood on the basis of its function here. In 
Freudian doctrine, the phallus is not a fantasy […]. Nor is it as such an 
object (part-, internal, good, bad, etc.) inasmuch as “object” tends to gauge 
the reality involved in a relationship. Still less is it the organ – penis or 
clitoris – that it symbolizes. And it is no incident that Freud adopted as a 
reference the simulacrum it represented to the Ancients.7 
                                                 
6 For the feminist re-readings of these notions, see, for instance: Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not 
One, trans. Catherine Porter and Carolyn Burke (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1985); 
Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1994); Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions. Three French Feminists 
(Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989); Judith Butler, Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of 
Identity (New York and London: Routledge, 2007). 
7 Jacques Lacan, “The Signification of the Phallus,” in: Jacques Lacan, Écrits. The First Complete 
Edition in English, trans. Bruce Fink in collaboration with Héloïse Fink and Russel Grigg (New York 
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In this excerpt, Lacan emphasises the non-bodily status of the phallus, described in 
reference to such notions as “simulacrum” or “symbol[ising].” In this case, male 
genitals provide nothing more than a conceptual space. Deprived of its corporeality, 
the phallus thus becomes the category reigning the Symbolic and Imaginary orders.8 
Nevertheless, in the Freudian thought the penis has a significant cognitive value and 
establishes a major point of reference during one’s development in contrast to female 
sexual organs, which are claimed to be inexistent for the (male) subject up to the age 
of puberty.9 Finally, while the penis is either possessed or not, depending on one’s sex, 
the relation between the phallus and the subject is more complex and is manifested on 
a non-biological level. 
 Neither a “fantasy” nor an “object” (not to mention an actual organ), the 
phallus is defined as a signifier in Lacan’s work.10 Precisely, as he writes further on in 
“The Signification of the Phallus,” the phallus is “the signifier of the Other’s desire.”11 
The subject cannot know what the desire of the Other is; it is forever untraceable for 
him or her, which is why it is impossible to be fulfilled. After all, the phallus – just 
like phallic jouissance12 – is doomed always to fail. In his Encore seminar, Lacan goes 
                                                 
and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), p. 579. It ought to be kept in mind that in Freud the 
distinction between the phallus and the penis is implied rather than clearly stated. 
8 Lacan makes a distinction between three phalluses – each of them related to one of the three orders. I 
choose not to analyse this division, because it is not that significant in the context of Ettingerian 
psychoanalysis. For the concise description of the three phalluses, see: Dylan Evans, An Introductory 
Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 143-146. 
9 Sigmund Freud, “The Infantile Genital Organization (An Interpolation into the Theory of Sexuality),” 
in: Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. 
Volume XIX (1923-1925), trans. James Strachey in collaboration with Anna Freud (London: Vintage 
Books, The Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 2001), p. 145. In Freudian 
psychoanalysis, it is the castration complex – the discovery that not everyone possesses a penis resulting 
in the fear of losing it – that is significant in one’s development. 
10 Lacan, “The Signification of the Phallus,” p. 579. In this gesture, Lacan links Freud to linguistics. 
See: Lacan, “The Signification of the Phallus,” pp. 577-578. 
11 Lacan, “The Signification of the Phallus,” p. 583. 
12 See: Néstor Braunstein, “Desire and Jouissance in the Teachings of Lacan,” in: The Cambridge 
Companion to Lacan, ed. Jean-Michel Rabaté (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 102-
115; Sean Homer, Jacques Lacan (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 88-91. 
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as far as to claim that the phallus is “the signifier that has no signified.”13 When it 
comes to male and female sexualities in reference to the phallus, Lacan introduces the 
division into “being” and “having” it, which is again a manifestation of the desire 
rather than an actual state of affairs. According to this dichotomy, the male represents 
having the phallus so as to fulfil the mother’s desire. The female, on the contrary, is 
supposed to partially sacrifice her femininity in an attempt at being the phallus; such 
an action is identified as the masquerade.14 All the mentioned elements link the phallus 
to such notions as lack, failure, impossible desire, castration, and inadequacy. 
As we can note, when referring to sexual difference, both Freud and Lacan are 
uncompromising, pronouncing the phallus the only formative element in the field of 
interest of psychoanalysis. The phallus has a status of a primary signifier: “the signifier 
of signification itself,”15 as Bruce Fink has it. At the same time, it is a universal point 
of reference for both sexes. As it has already been mentioned, there is no other sexual 
organ than the male one during the phallic phase of an infant’s psychosexual 
development described by Freud16; likewise, there is no female signifier analogous to 
the phallus in Lacanian psychoanalysis.17 This is why the phallus occupies a privileged 
position in both systems. When turning directly to the possibility of femininity in the 
phallic phase, Freud speaks frankly that there is none, since “[t]he antithesis here is 
                                                 
13 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and 
Knowledge. Book XX. Encore 1972-1973, trans. Bruce Fink, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (New York and 
London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), p. 81. Bruce Fink explicates it as follows: “[W]e might say 
that the phallus is the signifier of the barred relationship (or missing relationship) between the signifier 
and the signified (hence, the missing sexual relationship).” Bruce Fink, Lacan to the Letter. Reading 
Écrits Closely (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2004), p. 85. 
14 Lacan, “The Signification of the Phallus,” pp. 582-583. See also: Joan Riviere, “Womanliness as a 
Masquerade,” The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 10 (1929), pp. 303-313. 
15 Fink, Lacan to the Letter, p. 139. 
16 Freud goes as far as to claim that in this phase of development there is “not a primacy of the genitals, 
but a primacy of the phallus.” Freud, “The Infantile Genital Organization,” p. 142. Emphasis in the 
original. 
17 Lacan claims that the phallus is the only formative element when it comes to sexual difference, as it 
“is a symbol to which there is no correspondent, no equivalent.” Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques 
Lacan. Book III. The Psychoses 1955-1956, trans. Russell Grigg (New York and London: Routledge, 
1993), p. 176; quoted in: Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, p. 145.  
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between having a male genital and being castrated.”18 He goes on to claim that 
femininity appears only at the stage of puberty, when the vagina gains the function of 
“shelter,” or an envelope for the male sexual organ.19 Lacan takes these statements 
further, maintaining famously that not only “woman does not exist,” but also she “is 
not whole (pas toute)”20; he also sees maternity as the only functional position for a 
woman to occupy in a sexual relationship.21 Simultaneously, aware that they take into 
consideration the male perspective only, both theorists suggest that they may miss the 
feminine side; womanhood and female sexuality thus remain unsolved mysteries of 
the “dark continent.”22 
The lack of the feminine viewpoint on the issue of psychosexual development 
is also traced in Freud’s “On the Sexual Theories of Children,” although the 
psychoanalyst fairly notes at the beginning that it is the male perspective that these 
research results concern.23 Freud writes that when coming upon the question of the 
origin of babies, a child jumps to the conclusion that they have to be born through the 
anal aperture. Such a statement is based on the belief that women (including the 
mother) possess a penis, the male sexual organ being a universal human trait. This 
conviction does not provoke disgust, which is present in the further phases; yet, it is 
soon forgotten and replaced with different ideas the child comes up with later on.24 We 
                                                 
18 Freud, “The Infantile Genital Organization,” p. 145. Emphasis in the original. 
19 Freud, “The Infantile Genital Organization,” p. 145. 
20 Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality, p. 7. Emphasis in the original. 
21 Lacan, On Feminine Sexuality, p. 35. 
22 Sigmund Freud, “The Question of Lay Analysis: Conversations with an Impartial Person,” in: 
Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Volume 
XX (1925-1926), trans. James Strachey in collaboration with Anna Freud (London: Vintage Books, The 
Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 2001) p. 212. See: Freud, “The Infantile Genital 
Organization,” p. 143 (Freud referring to the phallic phase of development); Lacan, On Feminine 
Sexuality, pp. 63, 72. 
23 Sigmund Freud, “On the Sexual Theories of Children,” in: Sigmund Freud, The Standard Edition of 
the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud. Volume IX (1906-1908), trans. James Strachey 
in collaboration with Anna Freud (London: Vintage Books, The Hogarth Press and the Institute of 
Psychoanalysis, 2001), p. 211. 
24 Freud, “On the Sexual Theories of Children,” p. 219. 
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read: “[I]t was only logical that the child should refuse to grant women the painful 
prerogative of giving birth to the children. If babies are born through the anus, then a 
man can give birth just as well as a woman.”25 This claim is interpreted by Bracha L. 
Ettinger as an act of defending the male narcissism under cover of the universal one, 
arguably applicable to both men and women. She notes that it is not so much about 
Freud denying the existence of the womb along with all its potential consequences for 
the development, but rather about emphasising “the importance of such a denial”26 for 
the child. To be precise, the (male) infant is argued to be threatened by the possibility 
of not having all the needed organs, which is why the hypothesis on giving birth seems 
plausible and natural to it. This statement keeps the male narcissism intact, but does 
not take into account the female one. 
Another thought-provoking question in this respect is penis envy, described by 
Freud in greater detail in “Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical 
Distinction between the Sexes.”27 Therein, Freud claims that in case of a girl, the 
initiation of the phallic phase is linked to the observation that a male child possesses 
something she does not – a penis. The female is said to wish to have the male organ 
and thus to identify herself as missing it. We read that, as a result of this “wound to 
her narcissism,” the woman “develops, like a scar, a sense of inferiority,”28 not only 
of herself, but also of the female sex in general. Freud associates penis envy with 
jealousy, claiming that this feature is more developed in women. Furthermore, he 
argues that the girl usually puts the blame for her lack on her mother, which is the 
                                                 
25 Freud, “On the Sexual Theories of Children,” pp. 219-220. 
26 Ettinger, “The Matrixial Gaze,” p. 54. Emphasis in the original. 
27 This issue is already mentioned in “On the Sexual Theories of Children,” but “Some Psychical 
Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes” provides a more comprehensive study. 
See: Freud, “On the Sexual Theories of Children,” pp. 217-218. 
28 Sigmund Freud, “Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomical Distinction between the Sexes,” 
in: The Standard Edition… Volume XIX, p. 253. 
23 
 
reason why their relationship begins to deteriorate.29 Finally, maintaining that another 
result of penis envy is the rejection of masturbation, the psychoanalyst touches upon 
the issue of humiliation, which – in his view – is indispensable to the girl’s movement 
towards femininity.30 Penis envy thus becomes one of the formative aspects of 
feminine sexuality.  
Interestingly enough, in Freud’s writings there is no mention of any possibility 
of womb envy.31 This is criticised among others by Karen Horney, Melanie Klein, and 
Joan Riviere.32 Riviere reflects on the notion of womb envy as follows: “[I]t is often 
not realized how much boys envy girls, and especially envy women (their mothers) for 
their breasts and milk, and above all for the mysterious capacity women’s bodies have 
of forming and creating babies out of food and what men give them.”33 She also notes 
that even though the male type of envy is as frequent as that of females, it is more 
concealed. As Riviere argues, firstly, boys possess the penis from the beginning, while 
girls have to wait until their breasts develop, thus being deprived of the weapon against 
jealousy, and, secondly, the womb remains inside as a secret female quality 
unavailable for possession and comprehension.34 Yet, both penis envy and womb envy 
                                                 
29 Freud, “Some Psychical Consequences,” p. 254.  
30 Freud, “Some Psychical Consequences,” pp. 255-256. A comprehensive study of the concept – 
including the writings of Sigmund Freud, Karen Horney, Melanie Klein, Luce Irigaray, John A. 
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32 See: Karen Horney, “The Dread of Woman. Observations on a Specific Difference in the Dread Felt 
by Men and by Women Respectively for the Opposite Sex,” in: Karen Horney, Feminine Psychology, 
ed. Harold Kelman (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1973), pp. 133-146; Melanie Klein, “Love, 
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World and Joan Riviere. Collected Papers: 1920-1958, ed. Athol Hughes (London and New York: 
Karnac Books, 1991), pp. 168-205. 
33 Riviere, “Hate, Greed and Aggression,” p. 189. 
34 Riviere, “Hate, Greed and Aggression,” pp. 191-192.  
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supporters ceaselessly fall into the binarisation of the psychoanalytical discourse, not 
attempting to look beyond the notion of envy itself, and thus failing to propose a more 
affirmative, non-dichotomous frame. 
One of the numerous endeavours to theorise the feminine subjectivity 
formation based on the female corporeality instead of the negative difference of “man 
versus woman” and “penis versus womb,” in which “man” and “penis” are the 
privileged elements, is made by Julia Kristeva. She introduces the promising notion of 
the semiotic chora into the Lacanian phases of development. The chora is a concept 
taken from Plato, who defines it as a “nourishing and maternal”35 envelope; in 
Kristeva’s reading, it becomes a post-natal yet pre-Imaginary “rhythmic space,” which 
“precedes evidence, verisimilitude, spatiality, and temporality.”36 The chora is argued 
to be the source of signification; however, paradoxically, at the same time it moves 
within the boundaries of and eludes “all discourse,”37 which is a quality that renders it 
similar to the Real. In the space of the chora, the most significant role is assigned to 
the infant / mother relationship; Elizabeth Grosz delineates it as follows: “The chora 
is a function of the child’s unmediated (imaginary) relation to the mother’s body, even 
though the child does not, at this point, recognise itself as separate or distinct.”38 
Therefore, in this maternal-corporeal receptacle, the boundaries of the self are not yet 
cognised by the infant. Still, when the becoming subject is supposed to enter the 
Symbolic, signification and difference need to come to dominate, hence ending the 
abovementioned borderless existence reigned by drives. In the thetic phase, 
                                                 
35 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 26. 
36 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 26. 
37 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 26. 
38 Grosz, Sexual Subversions, p. 44. Emphasis in the original. 
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understood as “the threshold of language,”39 the separation occurs, and the bond with 
the mother is irreversibly broken. 
Since in the Kristevan universe the maternal connection can by no means be 
preserved, one of the processes responsible for putting it to an end is abjection. 
Belonging neither to the realm of a subject, nor to that of an object, an abject resides 
on the boundaries of the two, being “above all ambiguity.”40 The abject – along with 
the mirror stage and the recognition of castration – is claimed to finalise the 
detachment of the subject from the mother, although it is at the same time fluctuant 
and traumatic due to the unceasing threat of returning into the chora.41 To experience 
abjection is to face the return of the repressed – bodily fluids, certain foods, corpses, 
faeces, filth – which results in a bodily, repulsive reaction, such as vomit or convulsion. 
Yet, despite its uncanny hazard of dismantling the I, the seemingly clear-cut 
boundaries, and stability, abjection is identified as requisite for narcissism and, 
accordingly, for the entrance to the Symbolic;42 it is so because, as Grosz succinctly 
puts it, “‘proper’ subjectivity and sociality require the expulsion of the improper, the 
unclean and the disorderly.”43 Ultimately, what is also expelled is boundless intimacy 
and communicability between the mother and the infant, the latter starting to abide to 
the law of the father. 
What is, then, the position the feminine / maternal occupies in this system? 
Starting with pregnancy, for Kristeva it is subjectless – it is the phase in which identity 
is inexistent.44 In “Women’s Time,” we read:  
                                                 
39 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 45. 
40 Julia Kristeva, Powers of Horror. An Essay on Abjection, trans. Leon S. Roudiez (New York: 
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41 Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 13. 
42 See: Kristeva, Powers of Horror, p. 2, pp. 12-13. 
43 Grosz, Sexual Subversions, p. 71. 
44 See: Julia Kristeva, “Motherhood according to Giovanni Bellini,” in: Julia Kristeva, Desire in 
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Pregnancy seems to be experienced as the radical ordeal of the splitting of 
the subject: redoubling up of the body, separation and coexistence of the 
self and of an other, of nature and consciousness, of physiology and speech. 
This fundamental challenge to identity is then accompanied by a fantasy 
of totality – narcissistic completeness – a sort of instituted, socialized, 
natural psychosis.45 
Inextricably linked to series of separations and scissions, the maternal body becomes 
the mediator between the natural and the cultural.46 Finally, in Kristevan reading, the 
woman who has become a mother begins to perform a phallic role for an infant.47 All 
in all, although the woman / mother and her body are significant parts in the infant’s 
development, this system does not endeavour to evade being rooted in lack. As a result, 
we are provided with an utterly phallic interpretation of the female subjectivity and 
corporeality. 
While in Kristeva’s thought the feminine flesh remains dangerous, Bracha L. 
Ettinger’s matrixial theory endeavours to go beyond this impasse. The following 
excerpt marks the underpinnings of the relationship between the body and the matrixial 
theory:  
In building subjectivity-as-encounter upon the borderlinking between the 
subject-to-be and the becoming-mother, between the fetus and the female 
body-and-psyche, we should avoid the mistake of looking for the sense of 
the matrixial encounter in nature […]. Yet anatomy makes a difference that 
we should open to conceptualization.48 
Ettinger distances herself from any form of essentialism or biological determinism, but 
simultaneously she does not overlook the potential the feminine corporeality can 
provide. Such an approach enables her to read the female bodily specificity as an 
inspiration, model, and vehicle for a new sense of subjectivity – the subjectivity before 
and beyond the split into entirely separate, supposedly fixed entities. The period of 
                                                 
45 Julia Kristeva, “Women’s Time,” Signs, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1981) p. 31. 
46 See: Kristeva, “Motherhood according to Giovanni Bellini,” p. 238. 
47 See: Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language, p. 47. 
48 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist with-in the Matrixial Encounter-Event,” in: The 
Matrixial Borderspace, p. 181. 
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pregnancy becomes an opportunity to reconsider the relationship between the I and the 
non-I: to de-radicalise the Other, here understood as the co-participant in sharing and 
mutual change. Such an encounter is thus a humanising event, in a twofold sense of 
the word – it makes the becoming-subject both human and humane. 
As I have already mentioned, the fundamental element of Ettingerian 
psychoanalysis is the notion of the matrix. The theorist turns to the Latin origin of the 
word, linking it with the womb.49 The womb is perceived as a space of difference that 
emerges in togetherness – the archaic space of an originary meeting, whose 
participants have an impact on each other. The extreme closeness they experience is 
connected with the notion of boundaries, which are either challenged or not yet defined 
fully. Echoing the womb’s attributes, the matrix simultaneously transfers it “from 
nature to culture.”50 This notion is defined as a supplementary sphere of subjectivity 
formation and a signifier of difference, named feminine, but in fact non-gendered, non-
Oedipal, and non-phallic.51 The discussed difference is not based on opposition, but 
rather it comprises the potential to meet and share, inspired by the prenatal encounter.52 
Ettinger’s project shifts the emphasis from loss, split, and castration to proximity, 
interconnectivity, and exchange. What we witness here is the pronouncement of an-
other, supplementary dimension, which does not aim at expunging the phallic stratum. 
Instead, Ettinger puts forward a hypothesis that while in the prenatal phase the 
matrixial subjectivity formation is more significant, after birth it gives way to the reign 
                                                 
49 See: Ettinger, “The Matrixial Gaze,” p. 64. 
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51 For the matrix as a signifier, see, for instance: Pollock, “Introduction,” pp. 6-7, 21; Ettinger, “Weaving 
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of the phallus. Yet, as it is argued, it does not mean that the matrixial sphere disappears 
– it can resurface in the postnatal phase.53 
Introducing the concept of the matrix, Ettinger confronts both Freud and 
Kristeva in terms of the womb and pregnancy. The aforementioned claim on the 
challenged frontiers between the I and the non-I can by no means be perceived as a 
“fusion with the mother,”54 as Kristeva has it. The boundaries are fragile, fluid, and 
possible to be surpassed – or even suspended – but they are not absent, as their lack 
would block the chance for subjectivity. Griselda Pollock clarifies that the matrixial 
domain is grounded upon two (or more) subjects “sharing space but never fusing, 
encountering but never dissolving their boundaries, jointly eventing without ever 
knowing fully the other’s event.”55 Hence, there is no question of them merging into 
one, as their relation would then turn into symbiosis, a state in which subjectivity is 
impossible. Instead, we ought to focus on the issue of linkages between the mother and 
the becoming-infant, who – despite not knowing each other – are precariously 
connected in their co-existence. Moreover, in contrast to Kristeva, in the matrixial 
theory pregnancy and the prenatal phase are the inspirations for the inclusive and 
subjectivising sphere of the matrix, instead of being linked to “separation” and 
“splitting,” and thus psychosis and non-subjectivity. When it comes to the womb, 
Ettinger strongly opposes its omission in one’s development, as argued in Freud. 
Accordingly, she rethinks his rejection of the womb, claiming that Freud’s openly 
male-oriented proposition is not universal. In short, her aim is to expand the scope of 
psychoanalysis by including the subjectivising potentiality provided by the female 
corporeality. 
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Another question that ought to be touched upon is how the matrix / womb 
structure is posited with reference to the phallus / penis dichotomy. Similarly to the 
womb, the penis is an organ forming the ground for the reconsideration of subjectivity 
in psychoanalysis. The phallus – a symbolic and imaginary representation of the penis 
– is a signifier of the male sexual difference and lack. The matrix is based on a similar 
mechanism since anatomy is by no means essentialised here: it only serves as a model. 
We read: “The womb and the prenatal phase are the referents to the Real to which the 
imaginary Matrix corresponds. But as a concept, the Matrix is no more – but no less – 
related to the womb than the Phallus is related to the penis. That is, Matrix is a 
symbolic concept.”56 The womb – just as the penis – is treated as an opening to the 
reconsideration of difference. However, contrary to Freudian-Lacanian statements 
concerning the privileged status of the phallus, Ettinger does not aim at the counter-
proposal; instead of trying to reverse the hierarchy, she conceptualises and emphasises 
the coexistence of these two modes instead. 
As it has already been noted, Ettinger proposes a new understanding of 
difference. Let me clarify this notion. First of all, for Ettinger difference is always 
minimal – it does not vanish or lead to non-subjective symbiosis or fusion. Secondly, 
it reaches beyond and before the phallus along with its binary paradigms, but this does 
not mean that it is connected with psychosis or mysticism, as it is often presumed.57 
This is why this type of difference is claimed to be “primary and originary”58 – it comes 
before the phallic subjectivising domain, thus not succumbing to its rules. Pollock 
writes that the matrixial difference is  
a sexual difference originally “in the feminine,” in an encounter of several 
subjective/subjectivising elements in the corpo-Real of becoming-life 
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occurring in the shared borderspace of several becoming subjectivities, 
unknown and unknowable to the other, whose becoming the non-I other 
mutually co-affects in unpredictable and yet subjectivising ways.59 
This fragment points to several features of the abovementioned notion. The Ettingerian 
difference is a feminine one, but it is not posed as an opposition to the masculine 
difference; instead, it is grounded upon shareability and encounter between subjects-
to-become, who – despite being anonymous – transform each other in the sphere of 
the matrix. The matrixial feminine minimal difference serves as a supplementary one, 
being not anti-phallic, but non-phallic / beyond-phallic. For this reason, it is also called 
an-Other difference – it is not supposed to function as the absolute Otherness to the 
phallic stratification. 
It is also crucial to keep in mind that in Ettinger’s thought the pronouncement 
of a “feminine” difference does not found the gender distinction. In her writings, the 
theorist makes it clear that while it is the female corporeality which constitutes a point 
of reference for the notion of the matrix – just as the phallus is formulated via the male 
organ – the matrixial borderspace is not limited to women only; namely, both males 
and females can experience the matrixial domain, since their origins lie in the same 
space – the space of the feminine / motherly body.60 Simultaneously, Ettinger does not 
claim that masculine and feminine potentialities of (re-)connecting with the matrixial 
are exactly the same; on the contrary, while both females and males “experience the 
womb as an archaic out-site and past-side,” only females are exposed to it as an “in-
site/future-side,”61 which is unavailable to male subjects. Agreeing that females are 
privileged due to this differentiation as they have more possibilities to enter this sphere, 
Ettinger emphasises that males are by no means excluded from the access to the 
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matrix.62 Finally, in the matrixial understanding of the term, one’s gender is the result 
of a subjectivising cut and thus a product of phallic stratification, which is claimed to 
come when the matrixial sphere withdraws. Therefore, naming this difference 
“feminine” indicates its originary space instead of being an essentialising act that 
rejects the phallus-grounded paradigms and male subjectivity as formed in the 
postnatal phase. 
The matrixial theory, in fact, endeavours to fill the blank spots of the classical 
psychoanalysis noticed by Freud himself. One of the most significant hints Freud 
provides us with in this context can be found in “The ‘Uncanny’,” in which 
Muttersleibphantasien are identified among the sources of the feeling of uncanniness. 
As Freud notes, referring to the etymology of the uncanny, “Unheimlich is in some 
way or other a sub-species of heimlich.”63 When scrutinising the ambiguity of the term 
in both language and psychoanalysis, Freud claims that uncanniness is not about fear 
in itself; it concerns the return of something that should have been left in the state of 
being unremembered: a repressed experience that used to be familiar. He clarifies it 
on the example of some people’s fear of waking up in a coffin, realising they have 
been buried alive: “And yet psycho-analysis has taught us that this terrifying phantasy 
is only a transformation of another phantasy which had originally nothing terrifying 
about it at all, but was qualified by a certain lasciviousness – the phantasy, I mean, of 
intra-uterine existence.”64 Freud, therefore, makes a difference between experiences 
that cause anxiety twice – before repression and as a result of it – and those that 
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Psychoanalysis, 2001), p. 226. Emphasis in the original. 
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provoke anxiety only when repressed. The latter type is linked with the female body, 
identified as at the same time homely, originary, and universal (as it is the site where 
all human beings emerge), and uncanny.65 Regarding this fragment, Ettinger puts 
forward the thesis that we can trace the matrixial – or maternal womb / intrauterine – 
complex here.66 Nevertheless, as the theorist stresses, the moment the matrixial 
withdraws in the postnatal phase marks the beginning of the domination of the 
castration and Oedipus complexes. All in all, the return of the maternal repressed, as 
conceptualised by Ettinger, portrays the fundamental status of the corporeal 
connection between the mother and the infant in this theory. 
As it has been hinted at several times before, the womb-inspired structure of 
relationships present in the matrixial theory shatters the dominant dichotomies, such 
as active / passive and inside / outside. In psychoanalysis, the womb tends to be seen 
on the one hand as a passive envelope – which Freud makes explicitly clear, for 
instance when discussing the puberty phase67 – and on the other hand as a symbiotic, 
non-subjective space. In the matrixial model, the womb is shown as an archaic site of 
sharing with Other(s) and, as Ettinger calls it, of “active/passive co-emergence.”68 Due 
to this change, the active / passive dualism ceases to apply. There is no possibility to 
divide the two instances, as they constantly interlace in the matrixial encounter. 
Similarly, the inside / outside binary is also disturbed when it comes to the womb. As 
                                                 
65 Freud, “The ‘Uncanny’,” p. 245. 
66 Ettinger, “The Matrixial Gaze,” p. 47. Ettinger links this concept to the matrixial phantasy. She writes: 
“While castration phantasy is frightening at the point of the emergence of the original experience before 
its repression, the matrixial phantasy (from matrice, for womb) is not frightening at the point of its 
original emergence, but becomes frightening when the experience is repressed. […] Thus for both 
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Matrixial Gaze,” p. 47. Emphasis in the original. 
67 In “The Infantile Genital Organization” we read: “Maleness combines [the factors of] subject, activity 
and possession of the penis; femaleness takes over [those of] object and passivity. The vagina is now 
valued as a place of shelter for the penis; it enters into the heritage of the womb.” Freud, “The Infantile 
Genital Organization,” p. 145. Additions in square brackets in the original. 
68 Ettinger, “The Matrixial Gaze,” p. 64. 
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Ettinger emphasises, in the matrixial realm becoming-subjects “share and are shared 
by the same vibrating and resonating environment, where the inside is outside and the 
outside inside,” and, as we read further on, “inside and outside vibrate together.”69 The 
boundaries between the seemingly clear distinctions become uncertain and fluid as 
they perpetually cooperate, producing a space that above all welcomes and privileges 
meeting and the experience of being together. On the whole, both the spatial 
dichotomy of interiority / exteriority and that connected with the action of the subject 
lose their significance within the matrix. 
The other set of dichotomies Ettinger reconsiders is that related to subjectivity 
and gender. As to the I / non-I differentiation, it does not cease, but it becomes more 
prone to alterations; the boundaries between the subjects may be stretched, suspended, 
or moved in the intimate matrixial meeting, but this happens without the abandonment 
of the self. In this mode, the focus is on exchange and transformation, both of which 
have a substantial impact on its participants, and the boundaries are indeed shaky, yet 
it does not make them fully irrelevant. Still, such an approach to the seemingly stable 
borders of subjectivities is unthinkable from the point of view of classical 
psychoanalytical teachings. The female / male opposition also has a changed status. 
As far as the phallic subjectivity creation is concerned, Ettinger does not reject or 
question the relevance of this dichotomy. However, she notes that when speaking of 
the access to the matrixial, one ought not to assume mistakenly that it is limited to one 
gender only, since originally – and originarily – both males and females have already 
been in the matrixial. Moreover, in the sphere itself, the gender division is not (yet) 
recognised and plays no role in subjectivising processes. As we can see, the subject-
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related binaries are not relinquished entirely, but they gain a new meaning in the 
matrixial stratum which aims at widening the scope of the Freudian-Lacanian thought. 
In view of the above deconstructions of dichotomies proposed by Ettinger, the 
matrixial borderspace may seem paradoxical, or even controversial. Its underpinnings 
appear to be in ongoing dissonance with the phallic logic. Yet simultaneously we may 
note that such a play with binaries is first and foremost an attempt to reach their 
margins and operate on them in order to define difference anew. Herein, femininity is 
freed from the burden of passivity, but also from its other burdens – it is no longer a 
negative term to masculinity, a minus, a container, or a potentially psychotic entity. 
 
3. Trans-subjective Matrixial Ethics 
One of the basic attributes of such a re-read notion of femininity is severality, 
seen as the originary instance of co-existence and relation between oneself and the 
Other. Griselda Pollock maintains that “in this model, there never was a celibate, 
singular subject becoming all on its own.”70 There is always more than one subject in 
the process of becoming. Severality is seen as the first experience of being with and 
embracing the Other, staged before the Other’s rejection resulting in the entrance into 
binarised language.71 Based on the female bodily specificity and the late prenatal 
encounter, it becomes the originary condition of the ethical relation between subjects. 
Ettinger describes the ambiguous structure of the term as follows: “[I]t is the Several, 
the more-than-one or less-than-one, the ‘Un-en-moins’ (One-less), and the not-all that 
become a transgressive borderline, never all-encompassing, never limitless. Multiple 
and plural matrixial subjectivity is therefore also singular and partial.”72 Severality 
                                                 
70 Pollock, “Introduction,” p. 4. 
71 See: Ettinger, “The Matrixial Gaze,” p. 72. 
72 Ettinger, “The Matrixial Gaze,” p. 69. Emphasis in the original. 
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always includes at least one partner-in-difference, but it does not equal multitude. 
Moreover, the subject is never complete during such an encounter with the non-I – 
neither of them is a fixed or stable entity; hence, seeming “fullness” is not the aim of 
the matrixial. Yet, even though it implies partiality as a principle, the notion of 
severality puts an emphasis on intimate shareability that occurs between two (or more) 
subjects before and beyond the act of rejection. 
A number of properties of the concept can be found in the etymology of the 
word “several.” Its origins in Anglo-French, Middle French, and Latin mean “existing 
apart,” “separate,” and “different,” whereas since the 1530s “several” has meant “more 
than one.”73 These meanings comprise the lack of fusion or symbiosis – what we are 
dealing with in the matrixial is a certain division into separate entities that are 
nevertheless strongly connected with each other. In other words, as it has already been 
noted, if the notion of boundaries fully ceased to exist, there would be no possibility 
of subjectivity; the limits of the self – though challenged – are not abandoned.74 
Ettinger emphasises the minimal difference that needs to occur for the subjectivity to 
emerge. At the same time, the subjects are partial per se since they are still in the 
process of becoming, that is, a state of openness to change. Such an incompleteness is 
by no means comfortable: it seems that it is not accidental that there is some degree of 
“severity” in the word “severality.” Pollock summarises it as follows:  
This is not about cosy mothers and babies, symbiosis and fusion, nor 
fantasies of return to oceanic self-loss which are so common in phallic 
invocations of the maternal body as subjectless otherness and origin from 
which the subject must be separated to be a subject at all. It invokes a 
dimension of subjectivity, co-existing with, but shifting the phallic, in 
which the subject is fragile, susceptible, and compassionate to the 
                                                 
73 Online Etymology Dictionary, available at: 
http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?allowed_in_frame=0&search=several (access: 4 April 2016). 
74 This is why this structure of relations is non-symbiotic, but reciprocal and asymmetrical. The 
boundary between two subjects participating in a covenant is maintained, but there is a possibility of 
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unknown other who is, nonetheless, a partner in the situation, but a partner-
in-difference.75 
The matrixial experience is not “cosy,” safe, and easy, since it requires vulnerability 
and an ability to share and be shared, to transform and be transformed; it is based on 
proximity that challenges the notions of selfhood and individuality, but without 
confusing the I with the non-I. 
Severality is modelled on the physical proximity of two or more becoming 
subjects, witnessed in the late prenatal / pregnancy phase, in which there is no 
privileged subject position. The mother and the child are equally important in this 
covenant: there is no question of superiority of one over another, as they base their 
relation on reciprocity. Nevertheless, they are recognised as different, and their 
dissimilar experiences do not merge while being shared. Hence, just as the mother / 
child relationship is asymmetrical, so is the matrixial meeting. The subjects connecting 
in severality continuously transform each other while transforming themselves, 
engaging in humanising intimacy, but without making a pretence that their change can 
in any way be predicted, channelled, or equally distributed. There is no symmetry 
concerning the flow of information between the subjects, in a sense that what one gives 
is not what the other receives – what can be communicated is an affective partial trace 
coming from the non-I by no means mastered by him or her. All in all, the relationship 
between the mother and the child in the severality of the prenatal phase, if transferred 
to the field of psychoanalysis, provides it with such features as reciprocity and 
togetherness in not-yet-binarised difference. 
The notion of severality contributes to the paradigm shift the matrixial theory 
provides us with. The phallic logic is the logic of cut, in which the paradigm is based 
on exclusion – on the principle of either / or. In this system, the woman is always 
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posed as negative, or the radical Other for the man. As a result, the emergence of 
subjectivity is conditioned by split, rejection, or castration – one needs to separate itself 
from the Other in order to become a subject. The matrixial psychoanalysis gives us 
another possibility: before and beside this set of cuts indispensable in the phallic 
stratification, the logic of inclusion is at work. This is exactly where the matrixial 
meets Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of becoming, and transforms it. To put it briefly, 
in schizoanalysis becoming always aims at a certain “goal” – becoming-woman, 
becoming-animal, or finally becoming-imperceptible, where becoming-woman is only 
one of stages. The becoming “[extracts] particles between which one establishes the 
relations of movement and rest, speed and slowness that are closest to what one is 
becoming, and through which one becomes.”76 Therefore, becoming is an active, 
continuous, and rhizomatic struggle to become-somebody/something. For Ettinger, this 
process is potentially humanising since it is always performed in severality and leads 
to a mutual transformation of co-participants. Becoming – grounded upon the creation 
of links and connections with the Other – is hence always becoming-with-
somebody/something, or becoming-together, which means that the very procedure 
differs from Deleuze and Guattari’s proposition.77 To be more specific, from the 
matrixial perspective one is becoming precisely because one is engaged in the act of 
connecting oneself with the anonymous yet intimate Other. Due to such a re-
consideration, the woman – as well as the mother – ceases to be merely the first stage 
leading towards a greater aim, and instead she is seen as a meaningful and active 
partner-in-becoming. 
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The underlying feature the partners in the matrixial domain ought to possess is 
hospitality. This ambiguous term, inspired by the womb and including both being a 
host and being a guest, is essential in the ethical reading of the matrix.78 Without 
hospitality – along with fragility, openness, response-ability, and matrixial desire to 
link with the Other – the very entrance to this sphere is impossible, as one needs to go 
beyond the phallic structure of relations and relinquish one’s narcissistic tendencies in 
order to participate in the humanising encounter with the Other fully. Pollock writes 
that hospitality “is a matrixial transformational potentiality for the human subject,”79 
in the sense that it facilitates the further flow of knowledge, affects, traumas, and 
desires between the becoming subjects, which has ethical implications, such as the 
ongoing humanising change. In this respect hospitality can be linked to 
communicaring – an Ettingerian neologism described by Catherine de Zegher simply 
as “caring within sharing,”80 which, however, has a more convoluted range of 
meanings than that. To be precise, it embraces transferring and sharing knowledge, 
being protective, empathetic, and responsible, and involving community or 
commonness. Its Latin counterpart – communicare – adds to the Ettingerian notion 
such actions as imparting, uniting, and participating.81 Both hospitality and 
communicaring invoke proximity between – and with-in – subjects; precisely, it is the 
severality of the feminine corporeal specificity that becomes the borderspace of the 
humanising resonances of workings incited by these two notions. 
                                                 
78 The meaning structure of the word embraces “from Old French ospitalité ‘hospitality; hospital,’ from 
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What seems to embrace the core of the Ettingerian approach to relations 
between subjects and their bodily underpinnings is co-naissance. A multileveled 
structure of the notion provides us with numerous hints concerning its meaning and 
significance. “Conaissance” in French means “knowledge,” while “naissance” – 
“birth.” The prefix “co-” gives us a sense of sharing. Moreover, the word “co-
naissance” is connected with “reconnaissance,” which, as Pollock notes, means both 
“acknowledging an other” and “cognitive understanding at a second take.”82 This 
subtle linguistic wordplay in French immerses us in the broad scope of the notion. Co-
naissance is therefore a non-cognitive and non-linguistic comprehension of 
togetherness and shareability, which reveals a quality of belatedness. The shared birth 
of several subjects implies that the feminine body is something more than a mere 
container, since it is a space of emerging relations that are mutually affective and 
performed in closeness, but also a sphere facilitating the transmission of non-linguistic 
knowledge.  
The logical outcome and the underlying feature of all the discussed concepts is 
a new dimension of subjectivity: subjectivity-as-encounter. Inspired by the originary 
encounter in the womb, responsible for the creation and maintenance of life, it 
becomes the first instance of subjectivity, subverting the primary position of 
separation. As severality is a prerequisite for this form of subjectivity to occur, unity, 
autonomy, and self-sufficiency are put into question. The price that needs to be paid is 
partiality, yet this state of shakiness and vulnerability is the condition without which 
it is impossible to partake in new connections, as Deleuze would put it. Ettinger 
delineates this paradoxical subjectivising mode as follows: “In subjectivity-as-
encounter – where an-other is not an absolute separate Other – [relations-without-
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relating] turn both of us into partial-subjects, still uncognized, thoughtlessly known to 
each other, matrixially knowing each other, in painful fragility.”83 This excerpt, 
connoting the prenatal state, not only sheds light on what kind of knowledge is being 
transferred, but also depicts the relationship between partners in the covenant. In the 
matrixial sphere, any Other turns into a co-existing border-Other, which makes the 
encounter profoundly ethical. In such a space, there is no place for rejection, 
aggression, or total Otherness that has to be either incorporated as the Same or made 
an enemy. Moreover, the information that is being passed on in the process is non-
cognitive and seemingly empty from the phallic viewpoint; it originates in the non-I 
and can be processed only affectively, fuelling the transformations to come. 
This encounter with the experiences of the Other, often traumatic and 
threatening to one’s sense of integrity, is the greatest prospect of the matrixial model. 
Occurring before split, subjectivity-as-encounter is based on extreme proximity 
between subjects that do not necessarily know each other, and yet there is a certain 
intimate element that circulates between them, be it knowledge, memory, or pain. The 
relationship between them is unnameable in terms of binarised language: it happens 
on the affective, rather than language-based level. Yet if we are able to abandon 
comfort and security, this transfer becomes profoundly humane instead of being 
unconceivable and devastating; this intimate sharing can be described as “hurting 
while healing”84 – it is distressing, but it provokes almost boundless closeness with the 
Other. This, in turn, leads to new distribution of the processed affective information, 
which may often be traumatic and impossible to be handled by a singular subject.  
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In fact, it is, among others, the very act of shattering the boundaries between 
the I and the non-I that is responsible for the chance described above. A shift from 
“borderlines” into “thresholds”85 postulated by Ettinger makes the non-phallic 
encounter before and beyond rejection possible, since subjects with unalterable 
frontiers not only are unwilling to sacrifice their stability (thus depriving themselves 
of the possibility of engaging in the matrixial encounter), but also preserve the status 
quo of the radical Otherness, which is impossible to be changed within the phallic 
frame. The fluidity of borders is the attribute of subjectivity-as-encounter that carries 
an ethical promise of such a connection in which the division into what is mine and 
what belongs to not-me – or where I end and where the Other begins – is less 
significant than the very act of becoming-together.  
The question of frontiers examined above clarifies the new subjectivising 
dimension Ettinger proposes, which has to be carefully distinguished from pre-
subjectivity. Even though subjectivity-as-encounter is inspired by the intrauterine 
period, identifying it as a form of pre-subjectivity undeservedly locks it in this phase, 
prohibiting its return in the later stages of development. A more proper name for it 
seems to be inter-subjectivity – the prefix “inter-” conjures up togetherness, 
reciprocity, and mutuality, emphasising that subjectivisation happens between two (or 
more) subjects. However, the most adequate means to describe this notion is provided 
by yet another affix – “trans-,” which grasps the complexity of the Ettingerian re-
reading of the term in a more all-embracing manner. Always partial and never 
complete, matrixial subjectivity not only is formed together with the anonymous yet 
intimate non-I, but also transcends such a relation. Trans-subjectivity is inextricably 
linked to a change of its participants and to a transfer of knowledge beyond 
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comprehension, but not beyond sense; this type of subjectivity crosses the boundaries 
of subjects, inducing their fragile transformation. Ettinger notes that subjectivity in 
such an understanding “accompanies the phallic subjectivity all along its voyage in 
time and place, even if its sources are in the ‘pre-’.”86 Not reduced to the frames of the 
prenatal period, gestation, and female corporeality – although theorised through their 
prisms – the matrixial subjectivity formation continues to resurface occasionally in the 
moments of extreme openness to the Other, breaching the order of the phallus. 
What is worth noting, trans-subjectivity also stems from a change in the 
understanding of the relation between the orders of the Real, the Imaginary, and the 
Symbolic. As Ettinger notes, the “late” Lacan describes these registers as 
interconnected, as if in an inextricable braid, in which inside and outside can switch; 
in this braid-like structure, “the knowledge of the Real marks the Symbolic with its 
sense and its thinking no less than the Symbolic gives meaning to the Real via 
signification and concepts.”87 In the matrixial mode of connectedness, in turn, a braid 
crosses the boundaries of singular subjects, interweaving the fragments of knowledge 
originating in non-Is.88 Traces of traumas, phantasies, or affects gain the possibility of 
going beyond one’s psyche and of reaching the Other in an always already-mediated 
form. To be precise, in trans-subjectivity we can find “a signifiance between no-
meaning and sign,”89 unthinkable from the phallic point of view, and almost-
impossible from the matrixial one. The trans-subjective sphere, therefore, not only 
links the three registers more closely together, but also reveals fields of knowledge 
that Oedipus and the castration paradigm cannot conceive of. 
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The matrixial encounter is not an experience that is closed in the Real, which 
would render it unintelligible and psychotic. The Real – described by Sean Homer as 
an “indivisible brute materiality that exists prior to symbolization” and that eludes the 
two other orders90 – is strongly linked to the female bodily specificity for the matrix 
refers specifically to the feminine corpo-Reality. Yet, as it has already been noted, the 
matrix transcends the pre-subjective frame; moreover, it changes the perspective on 
the relation between the three registers as it occurs in all of them. We read: 
Matrixial events do not remain on the level of the corpo-Real in relation to 
affective space-time-body instants or in relation to interconnectivity. 
Retunigs of distance-in-proximity are beyond-the-phallus psychic events 
that testify to the matrix in the fields of the Real, the Imaginary, and the 
Symbolic – the three distinct-yet-linked interfaces of each event. With the 
matrix of the Imaginary and the Symbolic, we identify and locate 
inscriptions of traumas and phantasies veiling transformed traces of archaic 
relations-without-relating between I and unknown non-I […], and shared 
matrixial objets a.91 
The fact that matrixial events are not reigned by phallic paradigms does not sentence 
them to materiality and incomprehensibility of the Real. On the contrary, the matrix 
resurfaces in all the orders, participating in the transfer of disruptive information of the 
anonymous Other(s). Moreover, shared knowledge is never complete or unaltered – it 
is in the process of constant change, thus disturbing the question of origin; in other 
words, the trauma of the non-I also partially touches the I in the matrixial encounter. 
Emphatically, in the Ettingerian system, castration is recognised as not the only path 
towards the Symbolic order. Ettinger identifies yet another way – a process she calls 
metramorphosis, which is claimed to take place before and beyond such phallic 
paradigms as gender distinction, castration, and separation.92 Metramorphosis is a 
process of transmission occurring among partial-subjects, whose results are change 
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and “affective ‘communication’.”93 Fragments and traces of events, traumas, fantasies, 
encounters, and other phenomena are transferred through this change-inducing process 
which always happens in severality94 and asymmetry, but not supremacy.95 The 
entrance to this metramorphic route is grounded upon involvement and closeness up 
to the point of partial relinquishing of one’s borders. All these qualities contribute to 
the power of metramorphosis to lead the becoming-subject from the Real towards the 
Symbolic. 
Multileveled matrixial trans-connectedness described in this section constantly 
reveals its ethical potential. Due to such terms as severality, becoming-together, 
communicaring, co-naissance, or subjectivity-as-encounter, the position of the Other 
changes significantly. He or she ceases to be in radical dissonance with the I, turning 
into the border-Other instead. The implications of such a change are profoundly 
humanising, since the border-Other is the Other in proximity, but also full of empathy, 
open, and shareable, while the I – in this relationship – does not have the necessity or 
need to reject him or her. Furthermore, in the matrixial realm, each borderline may 
become a threshold for transfer and trans-formation – processes which carry 
knowledge otherwise inaccessible; it is, among others, this knowledge of the non-I 
shared in the encounter that is potentially ethical. Partial subjectivity that emerges out 
of such a transmission of intimate information between the participants is also based 
on matrixial closeness, paradoxical in its structure. Proximity experienced in the 
matrix is almost boundless, yet not symbiotic; still, it links seemingly contradictory 
time-spaces of several subjects provided that they are fragile and open for an 
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encounter. Matrixial closeness ought not to be comprehended in phallic terms, as it 
escapes their classification, resembling symbiosis, fusion, or psychosis but being none 
of them. The ethics of the domain theorised in Ettinger’s writings corresponds to its 
aesthetic realisation, where we – as viewers – may witness traces of corporeality, 
motherhood, and humanising covenant. 
 
4. Almost-boundless Canvas Space 
Brian Massumi writes that in Ettinger’s case “painting is a crowd dynamic.”96 
Indeed, she creates “crowds” of paintings that constitute different series, out of which 
the Eurydice series is most famous. In fact, there are not only crowds of paintings in 
it, but also these are the paintings of crowds, as the Eurydices97 are grounded upon the 
already mentioned photograph from the Mizocz ghetto depicting the moment just 
before the execution of a group of naked women with children. The series undergoes 
evolutionary changes; one of them is the gradual disappearance of the source picture. 
It seems that its final moment – or its stage of becoming-imperceptible – comes after 
2000; while in the paintings produced before this year the women can still be found to 
a greater or lesser degree, since 2000s we, as viewers, have been left with nothing but 
trust. It is the paintings from this period that will be of interest in this part. First, I 
intend to examine chosen paintings from the late Eurydice series – No. 44, No. 45, No. 
47, and No. 50 – and thereafter I will turn to two paintings from a different series – No 
Title Yet, No. 2 and No. 3 (both subtitled Saint Anne, who appears to be a patroness of 
not only the matrixial connection but also the Eurydices themselves). As it will be 
argued, in their disruptive hospitality, these matrixial, corpo-Real artworks move away 
                                                 
96 Massumi, “Afterword,” p. 206. 
97 By Eurydices in italics I mean the series, whereas by Eurydices in a regular font I refer to the women 
from the Mizocz ghetto. 
46 
 
from the purely aesthetic mode of perception, taking the direction towards the ethical 
one. Instead of proceeding with the images in a linear, one-by-one manner, in my 
analysis I intend to treat them as a mentioned crowd, believing that these paintings are 
different manifestations of the same issue, or one statement in severality; therefore, I 
will provide a comparative analysis of the chosen aspects present on these canvases 
that complement the theoretical study contained in the previous parts of this chapter. 
All the aforementioned paintings from the Eurydice series share the technique 
and colour scheme. Mechanical-like lines that appear on the canvas due to the 
movement of the paint brush resemble the effect the photocopy machine produces. 
They seem to strive for the full coverage of the painting space, fulfilling this aim 
gradually year by year. As to the colours, in Eurydice, No. 44 (2002–2006), purples 
dominate, with the occasional touch of red and pale, fading hues.98 The light elements 
gain in strength in Eurydice, No. 45 (2002–2006), similar in terms of purples, but 
visibly brighter, with more pale spots; when the red colour is concerned, it is almost 
inexistent in this piece.99 Eurydice, No. 47, already mentioned in the first part of this 
chapter, lacks the light described in the previous works.100 Herein, it is the red colour 
that begins to struggle for supremacy, making the artwork look as if more covered with 
paint; yet, the red still does not overpower the purples. Such a tendency is continued 
in Eurydice, No. 50 (2006–2007).101 Intense and overbearing, the red colour pulsates 
out of the picture boundaries, while purple withdraws. Simultaneously, in contrast to 
the previous works, the horizontal lines are bright here, connoting the photocopier with 
                                                 
98 Bracha L. Ettinger, Eurydice, No. 44, 2002–2006, oil on paper mounted on canvas, 23.1x27.8 cm, in: 
Art as Compassion, p. 167. See: Appendix, p. 222. 
99 Bracha L. Ettinger, Eurydice, No. 45, 2002–2006, oil on paper mounted on canvas, 24.2x29.7 cm, in: 
Art as Compassion, p. 168. See: Appendix, p. 223. 
100 See: Appendix, p. 221. 
101 Bracha L. Ettinger, Eurydice, No. 50, 2006–2007, oil on paper mounted on canvas, 25.3x31.1 cm, 
in: Art as Compassion, p. 175. See: Appendix, p. 224. 
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greater strength. The colour scheme, although evolving through these works of art, is 
unceasingly intense, be it purple, red, or the mixture of both. Despite their differences, 
these paintings seem to flow together, sharing sui generis vigour and agitation,102 to 
be grasped in the colour and the artistic method respectively. 
The features mentioned above contribute to the “feminine” character of the 
paintings: feminine in the matrixial sense of the term. If we take Eurydices, No. 47 and 
No. 50 into consideration, their blood coloured, rhythmical, and pulsating fluidity can 
be argued to reach the viewer with utmost power because of its connotations with the 
womb environment, resembling the Kristevan description of the chora. Yet, as we will 
see further on, the femininity explored here goes beyond it. Still, these attributes are 
strictly linked to the female corpo-Real, as Ettinger often names it, because they are 
the origins of such theoretical propositions as severality, blurred borders, togetherness, 
and exchange. As can be seen, the images are womb-like in both their resemblance to 
the feminine bodily specificity in its physiological sense and their symbolic layer. The 
latter element is considered to be the more relevant one, since – as Griselda Pollock 
accurately argues – it is not as much “content” as “gesture”103 that matters in Ettinger’s 
artistic activity. This emphasis on gesture is related to its affective potentiality. Once 
again, Eurydice, No. 50 can exemplify it well. Namely, the image relies above all on 
the viewer’s senses, sensibility, and sensations, as there is nothing else left to follow 
but colour, occupying a central position here. Therefore, when it comes to the workings 
                                                 
102 In an article concerning Ettinger’s recent painting (including Eurydice, No. 50 and the No Title Yet 
series to be commented upon later in this section), Erin Manning notes the artist’s movement “from 
suspension to agitation.” While, in my opinion, the question of suspension has not lost its relevance in 
the context of these artworks, the noun “agitation” perfectly describes Ettinger’s technique to be 
witnessed in them. Erin Manning, “Vertiginous before the Light: The Form of Force,” in: Art as 
Compassion, p. 174.  
103 Griselda Pollock, “Introduction: Trauma and Artworking,” in: Griselda Pollock, After-affects / After-
images. Trauma and Aesthetic Transformation in the Virtual Feminist Museum (Manchester and New 
York: Manchester University Press, 2013), p. 3. Emphasis in the original. 
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of the aforementioned features, it is the affect that Ettinger’s womb-like paintings are 
supposed to provide us with, sending us back to the matrixial borderspace. 
As it has been mentioned, the layers of paint in these Eurydice paintings cover 
the source photograph with more precision than the previous artworks from the series. 
However, we may wonder if the very existence of this image – or its visibility – is 
relevant at all from the matrixial viewpoint. In No. 44, the women from Mizocz are 
imperceptible. Simultaneously, in the light, central-left part of the painting, a half-
profile face resurfaces. The pale paint brushes resemble the skin on the face, probably 
of a woman, as suggested by the shape of cheeks. The darker stains are like a mouth – 
open as if in awe – and an eye, looking away. Yet, this impression is a subjective one: 
each spectator may see a face somewhere else in the image, which makes an encounter 
with it both volatile and uncertain. Eurydice, No. 45 appears to give us more in terms 
of the women’s bodies, as the light smears of paint connote female shapes along with 
faces in the upper part of the artwork.104 It may be, however, the case that such an 
association is possible only when the viewer is familiar with the historical document 
hidden underneath the layers. In No. 47, the situation is similar: there is a “crowd” of 
faces possible to be grasped. Eurydice, No. 50, in turn, does not give the spectator this 
opportunity, relying on the bodily tropes elaborated on in the previous paragraph 
instead of the actual distinguishable body-like shapes. What we witness in these 
paintings is a movement from a purely aesthetical encounter to an ethical one, 
occurring on two levels. One of them may be perceived as historical; it is connected 
with the knowledge of the background of Ettinger’s artworks from this series – the 
traumatic and tragic history behind them. However, there is also an-Other level – 
ahistorical, or maybe timeless – grounded upon openness to an unknown Other. One 
                                                 
104 The trope of a face in Ettinger’s art is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, section: Responding 
to the Mizocz Women. 
49 
 
of the underlying theses of the matrixial theory is that one does not need to know one’s 
non-Is to affectively experience the fragments of their events, pain, or traumas. Indeed, 
due to Ettinger’s gesture, the Eurydice figures are in a sense made accessible – ready 
for an encounter. Yet, what they require is receptivity – one has to be able to receive 
affective information and share it, already transformed.  
We may identify the actions these paintings perform as hospitable invitations 
to the matrixial sphere of reciprocity. The reason for such a claim is related to the 
complex notion of boundaries in these artworks, which gradually lose their stability. 
In other words, internal borders become increasingly dispersed and elusive, with no 
specific figures or hints for the viewer to follow. On the one hand, the result is a 
tightened interaction between the pieces themselves. Brian Massumi claims that 
Ettinger’s “paintings call to one another, call each other forth, across the distance 
between the first floor and basement, across today and yesterday, light and darkness, 
visibility and invisibility, in a collective rhythm building from the rhythm of each.”105 
The canvases forming the series are thus interconnected, producing together an 
affective storyline. On the other hand, shaky borders make the images more 
vulnerable; they do not possess the power – or privilege – to “speak” in a clear manner. 
For instance, Eurydice, No. 50’s boundaries seem not to be found within the frames, 
due to which the image is prone to any subjective alterations. Simultaneously, this 
quality may possess an ethical value in matrixial terms. Such fragility of the artworks 
contributes to their openness to the potential observer, who is not obliged to follow the 
linear story anymore. Thus, they affectively encourage the viewer to enter their realm. 
Interestingly enough, while the paintings may be claimed to be fragile, this feature is 
also mirrored in the viewer, who in his or her sensitivity surrenders himself or herself 
                                                 
105 Massumi, “Afterword,” p. 205. 
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to the artwork. Therefore, vulnerability, openness, and interaction become sine qua 
non conditions for the encounter with the paintings. Emphatically, just as the paintings 
invite one to the sphere of reciprocity, it is the viewer that proves his or her readiness 
to receive the imprints of the Other’s experiences, since he or she is claimed not only 
to be transformed, but also to pass the exchanged knowledge on.106 
In Freudian psychoanalysis, two profound male characters are summoned: 
Oedipus (with his mythological heritage) and Moses (a religion-based father figure). 
Accordingly, we may identify the corresponding females in Ettinger’s art and theory, 
one of them being Eurydice and the other – Saint Anne, who becomes the theme of the 
two paintings I am going to discuss in the next paragraphs. Eurydice is a figure that 
grasps the complexity of both the matrixial encounter and Ettinger’s painting; Judith 
Butler explains it as follows: “She is coming toward us, she is fading away from us, 
and both are true at once, and there is no resolution of the one movement into the 
other.”107 A paradoxical encounter with Eurydice is on the verge of impossibility as 
she is simultaneously present and absent, still alive and already dead, appearing and 
disappearing. Her act of shattering the dichotomies forms the ground for Ettinger’s 
theoretical assumptions. In turn, Anne – whose name in Hebrew means favour or grace 
– is a patroness of femininity and of the matrix itself. The mother of Mary and a patron 
saint of unmarried women, housewives, women in labour, mothers, and grandmothers, 
Anne serves a function of the foremother. As the above list implies, she also becomes 
a patroness of the women captured in the photograph from Mizocz – females of 
different ages, with children, pregnant, united by not only their gender but also their 
                                                 
106 The viewer, as a participant of the encounter, is claimed to transmit the story “to others, present and 
archaic, cognized and uncognized appealing from the future, from the past or from an unrealized 
virtuality.” Bracha L. Ettinger, “Copoiesis,” Ephemera, Vol. 5, No. X (2005), p. 710,  
http://www.ephemeraweb.org/journal/5-X/5-Xettinger.pdf (access: 16 April 2013). 
107 Judith Butler, “Foreword: Bracha’s Eurydice,” in: The Matrixial Borderspace, p. viii. 
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fate, which in this historical document at the same time belongs to the future and is 
already met; she is thus a guardian saint of those who have been returning from the 
dead by means of Ettinger’s artistic gesture. Summing up, in the proposed reading, 
Anne portrays aspects of the matrix different from those Eurydice stands for, while 
remaining strictly connected with the other female figure. 
Despite the suggestion that the subtitle and the time of creation give us, we may 
note a number of differences between No Title Yet, No. 2 (Saint Anne) (2003–2009) 
and No Title Yet, No. 3 (Saint Anne) (2003–2009) in terms of colour and overall 
impression.108 No. 2 is noticeably darker than the analysed Eurydices, with its purple-
claret surroundings and dispersed vertical light lines. In No. 3, we also observe a 
“crowd” of vertical stains, but, in contrast, there is an extraordinary amount of light 
covering most of the canvas, filled with the beige colour, and occasional reds and 
purples mixed in sharp brushstrokes. Colour-related bodily connotations are prominent 
in No. 2, which – when the artworks are collated – emphasises the unusual character 
of Saint Anne, No. 3; to be precise, in the context of the paintings explored here so far 
(and, in fact, the pre-2000 period of Ettinger’s artistic work), such brightness appears 
to be transgressive. While the Eurydices move in the direction of increasing overlay 
of the canvas, No. 3 is dazzlingly and disruptively fulgent. Simultaneously, in a 
broader cultural context, light tends to stand for positive emotions and affects. Such 
an ambivalence on the level of colour makes Saint Anne, No. 3 a piece of art immune 
to binarisation. When juxtaposed, No. 2 and No. 3 may leave two distinct impressions, 
and yet, as it will be claimed, they may speak together. 
                                                 
108 Bracha L. Ettinger, No Title Yet, No. 2 (Saint Anne), 2003–2009, oil on canvas, 30x54 cm, in: Art as 
Compassion, pp. 182-183; Bracha L. Ettinger, No Title Yet, No. 3 (Saint Anne), 2003–2009, oil on 
canvas, 30x54 cm, in: Art as Compassion, pp. 184-185. See: Appendix, pp. 225, 226. 
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In the Saint Anne series, the issue of knowledge is even more problematic. In 
No. 2, there is nothing to be seen – no imprint of an at least semi-present figure to 
grasp. Therefore, there is no question of an examination in terms of the “plot” or 
“story.” In No. 3, on the other hand, in the middle of the canvas one may find a 
resurfacing face – does it belong to one of the Eurydices? – as if in a spasm. 
Consequently, there is an element that possibly strives for the return to visibility, but 
we cannot identify it or provide a proof of its existence. This brings us to yet another 
issue – that of technique. In the discussed series, Ettinger’s artistic technique changes, 
which is explained in Erin Manning’s article. According to Manning, in the Saint 
Annes xeroxing is not used anymore and digital scanning is reduced in favour of the 
so-called “eye-hand-painting” or “mind-hand-feeling” technique, which, as we read, 
“brings the machinic tendencies (light, horizontal scanning) to the artwork through 
painting itself. Ettinger’s hand-eye becomes the scanner, screening the painting toward 
the light.”109 Since the chance for grasping at least a remnant of a historical event 
hidden under the layers of paint is thus eliminated, we are left with affective reading 
only. The artist’s “hand-eye” is able to guide us into the sphere of the painting provided 
that we are open, ready, and fragile enough for such an encounter with an unknown, 
unidentifiable non-I. 
Ettinger’s feminine-bodily paintings support the entanglement of aesthetics in 
ethics by challenging such notions as knowledge, boundaries, or subjectivity; being in 
line with Ettinger’s theoretical pronouncements, these images widen their scope. All 
the artworks presented connote the womb by means of colours, rhythmicity, and pulse-
like, fluid painting technique. Simultaneously, they transport the womb “from nature 
                                                 
109 Manning, “Vertiginous before the Light,” p. 174n.10. Emphasis in the original. In this essay, 
Manning identifies Eurydice, No. 50 and the Saint Annes discussed in my study as the constituents of 
the “light-series.” See: Manning, “Vertiginous before the Light,” p. 173. 
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to culture,” supporting the Ettingerian notion of the matrix. Not only do they resemble 
the prenatal encounter, but also they invite the viewer in, making him or her (re)turn 
to the maternal. The Other in this meeting is not going to be cognised; instead, the non-
I here is forever anonymous, even if he / she leaves traces. This, in turn, is connected 
with the issue of knowledge in this art. Not being mere representations of the historical 
events, these images produce affective charge – one to be experienced rather than 
comprehended. In this sense, not so much do they communicate their content as they 
hospitably communicare with / for the spectator, engaging in the humanising transfer, 
sharing, and change. The paintings also question the stability of boundaries, which is 
yet another reason why they are related to the maternal sphere understood in the 
matrixial terms. Their borders seem to be either bendable or inexistent, providing a 
threshold that the viewer can cross. Yet, what is necessary for such an action is certain 
willingness on the part of the viewer to give in to the encounter, without which it 
remains locked. Such an approach undoubtedly has its risks – the said encounter carries 
the possibility of experiencing pain, traumas, and phantasies that do not originate in 
the I. Still, it also hides a promise of inducing a change that is impossible for the 
singular, sole subject: a change that can take place only in togetherness. This issue 
leads us to the reconsideration of subjectivity in Ettinger’s covenant of aesthetics and 
theory. It is not enough to say that that the experiences arising from the artistic 
encounters are subjective; rather, they are trans-subjective. They involve the 
transgression of boundaries of an individual self and an exchange of otherwise 
impossible information among partial-subjects, while requiring extreme vulnerability 
that reaches beyond the phallic division into the I and the non-I. Yet, most 
significantly, the Eurydice and Saint Anne paintings testify to the ethical dimension in 
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art: to the humanising and reciprocal linkage with the Other that sends us back to the 
matrixial space. 
 
5. Towards the Aesth/ethics 
The main objective of this chapter has been to examine and prove the ethical 
potential and feminine-corporeal origins of the Ettingerian notion of the matrix along 
with concepts closely connected with it, and subsequently to trace these elements in 
Ettinger’s artistic activity. In order to fulfil this aim, first I have briefly summarised 
Freud’s, Lacan’s, and Kristeva’s takes on the issue of femininity in order to prepare 
the ground for introducing and scrutinising the matrix and its direct implications. As 
it has been demonstrated, the supplementary signifier Ettinger proposes is related to 
the womb, pregnancy, and femininity, yet it does not lead to essentialising any of them. 
Instead, it frees womanhood from the burdens of passivity, negativity, and psychosis 
while providing a new understanding of the subjectivising process, which ought not to 
be associated with castration, separation, and lack. Simultaneously, Ettinger does not 
reject the phallic paradigm of subjectivity, postulating the coexistence of phallic and 
matrixial realms. The deconstruction of dichotomies and a new concept of difference 
serve as attributes of Ettinger’s theory originating in the matrix. The subsequent part 
has further examined matrix-related notions in order to show their bodily sources and 
humanising aspects. I have endeavoured to embrace the complex meaning structure of 
such notions as severality, co-naissance, communicaring, becoming-together, and 
subjectivity-as-encounter, showing their entangled relation with Otherness, 
indebtedness to the meeting in the womb, and hospitable dimension – one of the 
foundations of the trans-subjective matrixial covenant. Other issues tackled in this 
section are knowledge in the matrix, possibility of transmission, and uncertainty of 
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borders. These three elements occupy a special position in the part concerning 
Ettinger’s works of art. What we witness in the analysed Eurydices and Saint Annes is 
a (re)turn to the trans-subjective ethics of the maternal / matrixial, which links them to 
Ettinger’s psychoanalytical thought. In these artworks, there is no specified knowledge 
or story included, and the point is that, in fact, there is no need for it there; what we 
encounter engrained in the canvases are the affective tropes and traces that can touch 
the viewer in his or her willingness to receive and transmit them. Shareability, 
openness, almost-boundlessness, and the overall womb-like atmosphere not only 
further portray the notion of trans-subjectivity, but also, more importantly, contribute 
to the turn towards the ethics of an aesthetic encounter, which is argued to supplement 
and inspire Bracha L. Ettinger theoretical assumptions. 
Since bodily origins and ethical connotations have already been traced in the 
most fundamental concepts of the matrixial theory, we need to proceed with the next 
question in line: can the body itself – as constructed in Ettinger’s oeuvre – be a 
potentially ethical site? In other words, can we read the corporeality as the origin of 
ethics in the matrixial psychoanalysis? The next chapter will constitute a response to 
these questions, expanding the issues discussed above, but also posing the matrixial 
theory in dialogues with, among others, Emmanuel Lévinas, Gilles Deleuze and Félix 
Guattari, and, again, Jacques Lacan. The correspondence between these two chapters 
will allow me to outline the proto-ethical dimension of the body in Ettinger’s thought 
and art. 
  
 Chapter 2 
HUMAN(E) ORIGINS 
THE FEMALE BODY AS AN ETHICAL SITE 
 
The pregnant woman is meouberet: she is 
a transport station, a station of passage for 
a period of passage, and she herself is a 
conductor, a conveyer, a transmissible and 
transitive vector, a transit place, a 
transition time, a scavenging channel for a 
transition period.1 
 
[T]here is always a collectivity, even 
when you are alone.2 
 
The feminine is that difference, the 
feminine is that incredible, unheard of 
thing in the human by which it is affirmed 
that without me the world has meaning.3 
 
1. Bodies and (proto-)Ethics 
Bracha L. Ettinger’s untitled sketch made between 1988 and 1989 invites us to 
face a crowd of bodies, comprised of two distinct groups – Ettinger’s parents on the 
left and women from the Mizocz ghetto on the right.4 It calls on us to explore the 
relation arising between them on the canvas. Finally, it points to Ettinger herself: to 
her human origin – represented by the image of Bluma Fried and Uziel Lichtenberg – 
and to her humanity – to her compassionate working-through the image of women who 
are humiliated and sentenced to death. It is the female body seen as both a human and 
                                                 
1 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist with-in the Matrixial Encounter-Event,” in: Bracha L. 
Ettinger, The Matrixial Borderspace, ed. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis and London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2006), p. 185. Emphasis in the original. 
2 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian 
Massumi (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), p. 177. 
3 Emmanuel Lévinas in conversation with Bracha L. Ettinger, “What Would Eurydice Say?,” trans. 
Joseph Simas and Carolyne Ducker, Athena, No. 1 (2006), pp. 142-143. Emphasis in the original. 
4 Bracha L. Ettinger, No Title-Sketch, 1988–1989, xerography with photocopic dust, pigment, and ashes 
on paper, 22.3x24.9 cm, in: Art as Compassion: Bracha L. Ettinger, eds. Catherine de Zegher and 
Griselda Pollock (Brussels: ASA Publishers, 2012), p. 207. See: Appendix, p. 227. 
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a humane source that is going to be of interest in this chapter. While in the previous 
one the matrix and matrix-related notions were shown as both rooted in the corporeal 
materiality and open to the ethical interpretation, here I will attempt to go further with 
these assumptions, treating the space in the female body as the ground for the re-
conceptualisation of humanism. I will endeavour to prove that in Ettingerian 
psychoanalysis the body gains a status of a potentially proto-ethical dimension: 
precisely, that it is a source and a site of ethics. 
Firstly, the feminine body will be portrayed as home for the womb and the 
originary site of an encounter in severality. It will be theorised in reference to 
Emmanuel Lévinas’s ethics and Deleuzian / Guattarian schizoanalysis. Since 
knowledge will be the resurfacing trope there, it will be explicated in the next section, 
depicting the body as a site of emergence of meaning and sense before and beyond 
linguistic structures. The connected issue that will follow is that of the trauma of the 
Other – tackled in the context of the Holocaust – along with the ethical prospect of 
experiencing it for and instead of the affected non-I. Finally, the relation between an 
artistic encounter and a late intrauterine one, and the position of the artist will be 
commented upon in order to prepare the ground for the examination of body, 
connectedness, and encounter in Ettinger’s Eurydice, No. 17, Eurydice, No. 37, and 
two untitled sketches. 
 
2. A Prototype for Connectedness 
From the anatomical or biological viewpoint, the body is a sui generis container 
for the womb placed within it. This organ is an essential part of the motherly body, but 
it by no means implies that women are defined by its very presence – or possession; 
still, as it has already been mentioned, “anatomy makes a difference that we should 
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open to conceptualization.”5 The existence of the womb within the female corporeality 
– which is the womb’s “Heimlich” space – provides us with a possibility of theorising 
the body itself. Regarding the questions of “nature,” female specificity, and difference, 
we read: 
The incestuous in/out-side relation (rapport) between subject-to-be and 
archaic-m/Other-to-be, by its connection to female corporeal invisible 
specificity (which is the place where this incest takes place), is the source 
in the Real for a matrixial stratum. This source should not mislead us into 
seeking the matrixial encounter in biological nature, any more than the 
phallic structure stands for the corpo-Real male sexual organ (although it 
is related to it). […] In the matrix, her sex difference in terms of female 
bodily specificity, and experiencing an affected linking to that specificity 
(the Real), inscribes a paradoxical sphere on the Symbolic’s margins.6 
At this point, the notion of incest ought to be clarified. In the matrixial context, this 
term gains a new meaning. Ettinger notes that in the prenatal phase, the desire to 
establish a linkage with the Other – felt by both partners in the encounter – is an 
ordinary phenomenon, essential to the emergence of life and to the orienting to the 
matrixial sphere.7 Therefore, instead of being forbidden, the incestuous relation 
becomes humanising and creative. In this excerpt, Ettinger makes it clear that even 
though the said meeting between two becoming-subjects is held within the feminine 
specificity (and thus becomes the origin of the matrixial domain), the matrix itself is 
no more natural than the phallus, grounded upon the male organ. Moreover, female 
connectedness to her corpo-Reality contributes to the movement towards the 
peripheries of the Symbolic: the order Ettinger expands in her thought. 
As it is the body that becomes a space abundant in linkages, in this respect the 
matrixial theory connotes Emmanuel Lévinas’s view on ethics, in which corporeal 
                                                 
5 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 181. See: Chapter 1, section: Not Only the Phallus. 
6 Bracha L. Ettinger, “The With-In-Visible Screen,” in: The Matrixial Borderspace, p. 105. Emphasis 
in the original. 
7 See: Bracha L. Ettinger, “Fascinance and the Girl-to-m/Other Matrixial Feminine Difference,” in: 
Psychoanalysis and the Image: Transdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Griselda Pollock (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006), p. 88; Ettinger, “The With-In-Visible Screen,” p. 94. 
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connotations seem to resurface time and again. As soon as in On Escape – his re-
examination of Heidegger, (embodied) self, and ego published in French in 1935 – 
Lévinas ponders upon the connection between physical conditions, including malaise 
and nausea, and the eponymous evasion, which is described as the urge to “break that 
most radical and unalterably binding of chains, the fact that the I [moi] is oneself [soi-
même].”8 Bodily tropes continue in Lévinas’s oeuvre, returning also in Totality and 
Infinity. They can be found, among others, in the notion of sensibility: “the mode of 
enjoyment”9 – not to be mistaken for representation and not related to understanding 
– which is available to the body.10 We read: “One does not know, one lives sensible 
qualities: the green of these leaves, the red of this sunset. […] Sensibility, essentially 
naïve, suffices to itself in a world insufficient for thought.”11 Neither rational nor 
intuitive, the way proposed by Lévinas affirms an affective and sensual encounter 
without objectification, without the firm division into the I and the non-I, and yet 
entirely egoistic.12 The question of the body in the concept of sensibility gains in 
importance and visibility in Otherwise than Being; this book also offers a more 
straightforward affirmation of the Other in sensibility. Being for the Other is absorbed 
into a greater pre-subjective fundamental stratum, which – although not derived from 
cognition – turns out to be strikingly corporeal.13 Because of its non-cognitive – or 
rather pre-cognitive – status, this stratum is not necessarily preoccupied with the issue 
of selfhood; as Lévinas writes, “I am bound to others before being tied to my body.”14 
                                                 
8 Emmanuel Lévinas, On Escape. De l’évasion, trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2003), p. 55. Emphasis in the original. 
9 Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 135. Emphasis in the original. 
10 See: Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, pp. 136-137. 
11 Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 135. The issue of corporeality also appears in the theorisation of the 
face, but I will explore this notion in detail in Chapter 5, section: Facing the Bare Life. 
12 See: Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, pp. 134, 187-188. 
13 Emmanuel Lévinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), pp. 76-77. 
14 Lévinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 76. 
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He goes on to claim that “subjectivity is sensibility – an exposure to others, a 
vulnerability and a responsibility in the proximity of the others, the-one-for-the-other 
[…].”15 These excerpts reveal Ettinger’s indebtedness to Lévinas’s ethical reflections, 
considering that in Ettingerian psychoanalysis the body provides a site of an originary 
encounter with the Other. 
What is, then, the position the female / motherly body occupies in Lévinasian 
thought? Kathryn Bevis undertakes this issue by means of analysing two metaphors 
used by the philosopher: maternity and dwelling. In her interpretation of the excerpts 
from Totality and Infinity, she notes that “Woman is the precondition for human 
reflection because she represents […] a primary human contact and sociality which is 
not yet the transcendent, shattering presence of the face-to-face relationship with the 
Other.”16 Simultaneously, she argues, the female here is neither dialogic nor 
personalised; not being a part of the discourse, a subject, or an Other, instead she 
functions as a hospitable envelope for someone else’s selfhood.17 In turn, in Otherwise 
than Being, the status of the maternal body undergoes transformation, as the previously 
described notion of sensibility becomes strongly connected to the metaphor of 
maternality. We read: 
[S]ensibility is being affected by a non-phenomenon, a being put in 
question by the alterity of the other, before the intervention of a cause, 
before the appearing of the other. […] It is being torn up from oneself, 
being less than nothing, a rejection into the negative, behind nothingness; 
it is maternity, gestation of the other in the same. […] In maternity what 
signifies is a responsibility for others, to the point of substitution for others 
and suffering both from the effect of persecution and from the persecuting 
itself in which the persecutor sinks. Maternity, which is bearing par 
excellence, bears even responsibility for the persecuting by the 
persecutor.18 
                                                 
15 Lévinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 77. 
16 Kathryn Bevis, “‘Better than Metaphors’? Dwelling and the Maternal Body in Emmanuel Levinas,” 
Literature & Theology, Vol. 21, No. 3 (2007), p. 321. See: Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, pp. 154-155. 
17 Bevis, “‘Better than Metaphors’?,” p. 321. 
18 Lévinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 75. Emphasis mine. 
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The maternal metaphors are utilised to grasp the complexity of the ethical relationship, 
which is based on extreme responsibility that assumes the option of being affected, or 
even hurt by the Other. Maternity – the site of bearing and the first habitation, by means 
of which one is originarily “bound to others” – becomes the primary, sensible structure 
of relations.  
The questions of the woman and her corporeality are also addressed by Lisa 
Guenther in her analysis of the feminisation / maternalisation of Moses in Lévinas. To 
begin with, she proposes to translate the phrase “Psychisme, comme un corps 
maternal” into “The psyche, like a maternal body” instead of Lingis’s version: “Here 
the psyche is the maternal body,”19 in order to stress that one does not have to be a 
mother in a biological sense to act like one. She proceeds to the scrutiny of Lévinas’s 
use of the Book of Numbers and the figure of Moses present there.20 The author 
identifies the dangers of using Moses as a maternal figure from the feminist 
perspective, but also notes that such a choice leads to a number of ethical implications, 
coded in the story of Moses’s childhood, in the biblical passage Lévinas quotes, and 
in his philosophical reflections concerning responsibility, substitution, politics, and 
justice. Guenther concludes that an encounter with the Other makes one become “a 
unique, embodied, and responsible self”21 despite one’s gender, identity, social status, 
or biological qualities. Motherhood understood in such a way is freed from these 
bounds, becoming instead the mode of responding to the Other’s ethical demand.22 A 
                                                 
19 Lévinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 67. Lisa Guenther, “‘Like a Maternal Body’: Emmanuel Levinas 
and the Motherhood of Moses,” Hypatia, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2006), p. 133n.3. 
20 The excerpt Guenther analyses in detail goes: “In proximity the absolutely other, the stranger whom 
I have ‘neither conceived nor given birth to,’ I already have on my arms, already bear, according to the 
Biblical formula, ‘in my breast as the nurse bears the nurseling.’ He has no other place, is not 
autochthonous, is uprooted, without a country, not an inhabitant, exposed to the cold and the heat of the 
seasons. To be reduced to having recourse to me is the homelessness or strangeness of the neighbor. It 
is incumbent on me.” Lévinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 91. The quotations used are derived from 
Numbers, XI, 12. 
21 Guenther, “‘Like a Maternal Body’,” p. 131. 
22 Guenther, “‘Like a Maternal Body’,” pp. 132-133. 
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figure of displacement and feminisation, Moses provides Lévinas with the possibility 
of transferring maternity and maternal corporeality from “nature” to the field of 
humanism. 
Ettinger’s affinity to Lévinas in terms of such issues as connectedness, 
encounter, and the maternal body is indisputable, yet when it comes to femininity itself 
– leaving for a moment its motherly aspect – Ettinger clarifies that for the philosopher 
it becomes an impassable limit. In Existence and Existents, Lévinas proclaims that “the 
other par excellence is the feminine,”23 because of which Ettinger locates the thinker 
within a wider tendency noticed also in Freud and Lacan: the tendency of identifying 
the feminine as the Other. She also notices the paradoxical image arising from the 
writings discussed above – the woman lacks the dialogic quality and is Otherness per 
se, and yet the originary difference is undoubtedly feminine, as feminine / motherly 
attributes are ascribed to it. Moreover, femininity is absent in Lévinas’s late work. 
Referring to it, Ettinger puts forward a hypothesis that this notion has been abandoned 
not so much because it has ceased to be essential from the ethical viewpoint as, in fact, 
because the philosopher has started to comprehend the fact that the woman is not an 
absolute Other: that, instead, the feminine informs the very notion of subjectivity.24 
Ettinger clarifies that the attributes of subjectivity are precisely the traits that used to 
be identified as feminine.25 These assumptions are confronted in a conversation 
between the two theorists, in which Lévinas makes a diagnosis that  
Woman is the category of future, the ecstasy of future. It is that human 
possibility which consists in saying that the life of another human being is 
more important than my own, that the death of the other is more important 
to me than my own death, that the Other comes before me, that the Other 
counts before I do, that the value of the Other is imposed before mine is. 
                                                 
23 Emmanuel Lévinas, Existence and Existents, trans. Alphonso Lingis (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1978), p. 85. The issue of feminine otherness reappears in Lévinas’s work. For instance, in Time and 
the Other, the woman becomes “essentially other.” Emmanuel Lévinas, Time and the Other (And 
Additional Essays), trans. Richard A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1987), p. 86. 
24 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 190. 
25 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 190. 
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[…] The feminine is that difference, the feminine is that incredible, 
unheard of thing in the human by which it is affirmed that without me the 
world has meaning.26 
In this passage, we can see to what extent Lévinas’s vision of the feminine coincides 
with his ethical postulates. Although he claims that femininity is yet to come, the 
qualities that resurface in this quotation – being for the Other, responsibility, and 
encounter – prove that the woman is in Lévinas’s thought persistently present despite 
her apparent absence. 
Ettinger’s take on femininity posed in the context of Lévinas confirms his 
position as one of the precursors of the ethical aspect of the matrixial theory. As 
Ettinger claims, femininity is responsible for a change in the understanding of the 
subject, channelled towards a humanising encounter.27 The encounter – directly linked 
to the feminine corporeal specificity – is preceded by and contains an act of self-
fragilisation, necessary to face the Other openly despite the threat of suffering; such a 
vulnerable position contributes to the turn towards alterity that Lévinas delineates in 
the above passage. Most significantly, Ettinger strongly objects to treating the woman 
as a total Other. She argues that in the matrixial reading of Lévinasian femininity, 
responsibility changes into response-ability,28 which, while still including the 
activities of taking care of the Other and answering the Other’s calls, also opens the 
possibility of the actual responding: human(e) dialogue and asymmetrical reciprocity, 
missing in this philosopher’s proposition.29 Yet, even though the aforementioned 
postulates and arguments are critical to a degree, they are nevertheless deeply and 
expressly grounded upon the Lévinasian ethics of the Other. 
                                                 
26 Lévinas in conversation with Ettinger, “What Would Eurydice Say?,” pp. 142-143. Emphasis in the 
original. 
27 See: Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 190. 
28 This notion is further commented upon in Chapter 5. 
29 See: Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 190. 
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What helps Ettinger establish her position beyond the limitations faced by 
Emmanuel Lévinas is the shift to the border-Other, linked to the notion of severality. 
Using weaving metaphors,30 Ettinger describes the female as a border-Other, with 
whom relations can be established provided that “we follow upon her threads in the 
texture and the textile of the web.”31 She continues: “She is weaving and being woven. 
She bears witness in the woven textile and texture of psychic transsubjectivity.”32 
These excerpts illustrate the matrixial structure of connections, which is active-passive 
(the subject is simultaneously an addresser and an addressee of processed information), 
reciprocal, and asymmetrical. Responsive and willing to share, the matrixial woman is 
also a witness. However, the condition of her potential response and generosity of 
sharing is eagerness to pursue the traces which belong not to her only, and yet can be 
found within her psychic space. Emphatically, the imagery employed here 
distinguishes femininity from the conceptualisations based on fusion or symbiosis; that 
is, instead of borderless fluidity, it is seen as a web comprised of threads and strings. 
Nevertheless, we ought not to ascribe the notion of multitude to this structure, since 
“matrixial subjectivity does not entail an endless multiplicity of singular individuals, 
but rather a limited multiplicity – a severality – that traverses subjectivity.”33 A term 
modelled upon the motherly specificity and prenatal / pregnancy phase,34 severality 
makes any subject a co-subject, or a transject,35 whereas an Other – in spite of his or 
her gender – ceases to be total because of his or her intimate proximity to the I. 
                                                 
30 I return to the metaphor of weaving in the contexts of knowledge and Lacan, and schizoanalysis later 
on in this chapter. 
31 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 194. Emphasis in the original. 
32 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 196. 
33 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 196. 
34 See: Chapter 1, section: Not Only the Phallus. 
35 In her writings, Ettinger introduces the notion of the transject in order to question the boundary 
between a subject and an object in the matrixial sphere. See: Bracha L. Ettinger, “Uncanny Awe, 
Uncanny Compassion and Matrixial Transjectivity beyond Uncanny Anxiety,” French Literature 
Series, Vol. 38 (2011), pp. 1-30; Bracha L. Ettinger, “Fragilization and Resistance,” Studies in the 
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In her theory, Ettinger transcends Lévinasian intersubjectivity, which despite 
being oriented towards the Other remains immersed in singularity and individual 
experience. Simultaneously, by no means does she reject the prominence of his 
proposition, which after all places the female body at the centre of his ethical project. 
Interestingly enough, while for Lévinas “the other par excellence is the feminine,” for 
Ettinger it is subjectivity that par excellence is the feminine. Moreover, the originary 
subjectivity resurfacing in Lévinas’s writings, described by means of female attributes, 
corresponds to the matrixial proposition of trans- or co-subjectivity that transcends the 
pre-mode of subjectivisation. What serves the purpose of deconstructing a “lone 
subject”36 in Ettingerian sphere is motherhood: the notion that is the common ground 
for both theories, being a primary structure and source of relations, and a mode of 
responding in vulnerability. Importantly, all the notions described here reveal their 
eminent entanglement with corporeality and embodiment. Ettinger’s recognition of 
femininity as the ethical subject itself transports us to the future Lévinas has spoken 
of. 
The weaving metaphors mentioned above direct Bracha L. Ettinger’s work 
towards Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. In the matrixial theory, weaving signifies 
interrelatedness and the possibility of passing fragments of information by virtue of 
the proximity of threads. “[T]he texture and the textile” that Ettinger writes about 
imply tangibility and – in general – the relation to senses; yet, this sensual structure 
has no fixed beginning or end, and no centre or peripheries, its boundaries being 
constantly negotiated. The matrixial web is not, however, coincidental. Certain borders 
and limitations are maintained despite being challenged, and there is no question of 
                                                 
Maternal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2009), pp. 1-31, 
http://www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk/back_issues/issue_two/documents/Bracha1.pdf (access: 16 April 2013). 
36 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Transcyptum: Memory Tracing In/For/With the Other,” in: The Matrixial 
Borderspace, p. 164. 
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appropriation or fusion. Deleuze and Guattari employ a corresponding – yet different 
– imagery. In fact, their interests lie in such issues as forming linkages, incompleteness 
and (non-linear) continuity, progression, experimentation, and change; affects, 
assemblages, and intensities are also the recurring tropes in schizoanalysis. Inspired 
by Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattari argue: “We know nothing about a body until we 
know what it can do,”37 which stresses the role of exercising the body and transforming 
it. Returning to Ettinger’s proposition, experimentation can be linked to boundaries-
shattering openness to the encounter with the anonymous non-I, since its result is 
threatening and uncertain. It becomes a potential path towards change, yet it is implied 
rather than directly pronounced, and – significantly – it is not an aim or a value per se. 
Despite this difference, Deleuzian / Guattarian intervention into psychoanalysis 
provides an important context and manifests Ettinger’s bodily entanglement, which – 
being straightforward in schizoanalysis – often remains implied in the matrixial theory. 
Seemingly moving in opposite directions yet allied by means of common goals, two 
figures of experimentation are going to be examined: one is the rhizome, connected to 
linkages, the other is the Body without Organs, characterised by the practice of 
dismantling. 
The tendency displayed by the first notion is that of expansion. Opposed to “a 
structure, tree, or root,”38 the rhizome has no centre or underlying hierarchy. It is 
comprised of lines instead of points, and yet by no means do these lines form a 
linearity. The example of a rhizome given by Deleuze and Guattari is a multiplicity, 
which “has neither subject nor object, only determinations, magnitudes, and 
dimensions that cannot increase in number without the multiplicity changing in 
                                                 
37 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 300. On Spinoza, see: Deleuze and Guattari, A 
Thousand Plateaus, p. 299. 
38 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 7. 
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nature.”39 Grounded upon flows, the rhizome has neither a beginning nor an end; it is 
decentralised, but still its realm is “the middle,”40 just as is the case of plateaus it 
consists of. Interestingly, even if the rhizome is ruptured in some way, it can start 
anew; when it does, it can follow either the same or completely different paths.41 This 
quality can be related to the assumption that the rhizome is “a map and not a tracing”42 
since a map “[…] is detachable, reversible, susceptible to constant modification. It can 
be torn, reversed, adapted to any kind of mounting, reworked by an individual, group, 
or social formation.”43 The rhizome is open for experiments and metamorphoses, and 
– just as a map – it can have various functions, interpretations, and possible routes, 
whereas tracing necessarily sticks to its designated path.44 Finally, rhizomatic linkages 
are delineated as rather coincidental, as there is no pattern that organises their 
creation.45 
While the rhizome deals with the practice of expansion, the Body without 
Organs (BwO) – a term borrowed from Antonin Artaud – is preoccupied with 
dispersal. While its name implies that the Body without Organs fights the very organs, 
the real opposition is the organism, which is claimed to organise them.46 Moreover, 
the BwO does not in any way precede the organism; rather, their relation can be 
described through adjacency – a mode of co-existence at the borders.47 What does then 
such a body consist of? Being “the matrix of intensity,” the Body without Organs is 
occupied by circulating “waves and vibrations, migrations, thresholds and gradients 
                                                 
39 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 7. 
40 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 22. 
41 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 8. 
42 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 12. Emphasis in the original. 
43 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 12. 
44 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 12. 
45 We read that “the rhizome connects any point to any other point.” Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus, p. 21. Emphasis mine. 
46 See: Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 184. 
47 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, pp. 190-191. 
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[…],”48 but also flows and desires.49 Because of such an abundance within the BwO, 
one of the assumptions is that “there is always a collectivity, even when you are 
alone.”50 In order to achieve such excessiveness, Deleuze and Guattari propose to 
experiment with one’s corporeal possibilities, but with moderation and care, as this 
practice poses a danger of, among others, emptying the body.51 An unceasing change 
is here an aim in itself, since the Body without Organs by no means strives for 
completeness: it is the process that matters and the attempt to “[open] the body to 
connections […].”52 Therefore, what Deleuze and Guattari encourage is a perpetual 
stream of experiments that aims at surpassing the limits of the organism and the 
boundaries of the body because it paves the way for new assemblages, intensities, and 
encounters.  
Although there is a number of significant correspondences between the two 
systems, Ettinger rethinks the very need for “opening the body to connections,” 
introducing an irreducible ethical aspect of an alliance between several entities. As to 
the similarities, the relation between the Body without Organs and the organism may 
be compared to that between the matrixial and phallic subjectivising strata, since in 
both juxtapositions we can speak of a degree of adjacency.53 Both theories employ an 
analogous vocabulary, pertaining to alliances, exchange, vibration, flows, boundaries 
and thresholds, asymmetry, and decentralisation. Also, within the matrixial theory and 
schizoanalysis, what is at stake is not completeness, but the very endeavour to 
                                                 
48 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 178. 
49 See: Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 187. 
50 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 177. 
51 See: Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 175. Caution is an underlying principle of this 
process, for “a body without organs that shatters all the strata, turns immediately into a body of 
nothingness, pure self-destruction whose only outcome is death.” Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus, p. 189.  
52 Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus, p. 186. 
53 We should, however, keep in mind that in Deleuze and Guattari’s pair there is an aggressive element 
– as the organism is called an “enemy” – non-existent in Ettinger. Deleuze and Guattari, A Thousand 
Plateaus, p. 184. 
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transgress the imposed limitations: of the body and of the dominant discourse. 
However, one of the vital discrepancies revolves around multiplicity, instead of which 
Ettinger proposes severality; severality emphasises the lack of coincidence in an 
encounter, for its participants ought to fulfil certain conditions such as extreme 
openness, commitment, or self-fragilisation. This fact is directly connected to the issue 
of caution raised by Deleuze and Guattari. Ettinger notes that while entering the 
matrixial sphere requires specific qualities, leaving it – and thus putting the encounter 
to an end – is beyond one’s control54; hence, the questions of choice and moderation 
become less relevant. Also, who and what do we encounter in both propositions? 
Ettinger notes that we can speak of subjectivity in the matrixial encounter, but such 
subjectivity it is partial, as are the shared data. To specify, in the matrixial space what 
circulates are not only intensities; we can also find traces of partial, affective 
knowledge originating in the Other. Yet another incongruity can be revealed in the 
descriptions of the rhizome and the matrixial domain: even though both have no 
beginnings or ends, the matrix is always a border-space – a space moving towards 
margins rather than focusing on “the middle.” The final vital incompatibility between 
two theories regards the position of the feminine. It seems that the feminine-motherly 
aspect underlies some of the concepts elaborated by Deleuze and Guattari, which is 
visible for instance in the quoted excerpt on collectivity; yet, except for the notion of 
becoming-woman, it is far from being pronounced.55 As for Ettinger experimentation 
                                                 
54 We read: “[I]n the trauma and the phantasy of the other, you can sometimes register your own 
involvement. And then, from then on, you cannot choose when to terminate the covenant, or how, or to 
what extent, if at all. Because the phallus cannot master the Matrix.” Bracha L. Ettinger, “The With-In-
Visible Screen,” in: The Matrixial Borderspace, p. 118. 
55 For an analysis of the notion of becoming in both systems, see: Chapter 1, section: Trans-subjective 
Matrixial Ethics. For an in-depth study of schizoanalysis as a male-oriented system, along with its 
potentialities and threats for feminist critique, see Elizabeth Grosz’s chapter devoted to Deleuze and 
Guattari in Volatile Bodies: Elizabeth Grosz, “Intensities and Flows,” in: Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile 
Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
1994), pp. 160-183. 
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and change are not enough – a proof of which is the complex notion of 
metramorphosis, incorporating transmission, transformation, and communication56 – 
she instead focuses on the body as a prototype for a different mode of connectedness; 
the encounter in severality theorised in reference to maternity and prenatality both 
inspires and is inspired by ethics. 
 
3. Knowledge in / of the Humanising Specificity 
Meaning, knowledge, and language reappear throughout this argument as 
problematic and puzzling issues that require further attention. This section is going to 
show the relation between the female body and the listed questions, and thereafter to 
turn to ethical reconsiderations and promises of the feminine bodily specificity. To 
begin with, Lacan’s famous statement – “the unconscious is structured like a 
language”57 – is going to be elaborated on in the context of the matrixial theory. 
Keeping in mind that the richness of the concept of the unconscious makes an attempt 
to outline it doomed to fail, I am going to touch upon the qualities and implications 
that are of use in clarifying Ettinger’s stance. In his indebtedness to Ferdinand de 
Saussure, Jacques Lacan redefines psychoanalysis by means of linguistics. Regarding 
the unconscious, he observes that it neither belongs to the realm of biology and 
instincts nor is originary58; instead, it is perceived via its language-like quality. He 
elucidates that even though the unconscious on the whole is unreachable, it can be 
fragmentarily captured “when it is explicated, in that part of it which is articulated by 
                                                 
56 See: Chapter 1, section: Trans-subjective Matrixial Ethics. 
57 Jacques Lacan, “The Freudian Unconscious and Ours,” in: Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques 
Lacan. Book XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. 
Alan Sheridan (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1981), p. 20. Emphasis in the 
original. 
58 Jacques Lacan, “The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious, or Reason since Freud,” in: Jacques 
Lacan, Écrits. The First Complete Edition in English, trans. Bruce Fink in collaboration with Héloïse 
Fink and Russel Grigg (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2006), p. 434. 
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passing into words.”59 Although this may imply that the unconscious is an internal 
phenomenon, Lacan notes that it is exterior and trans-subjective, that is, it belongs to 
the Other.60 Defined by deficiency, suspension, and split,61 it nevertheless is qualified 
as language62 – the workings of signifiers within one’s Symbolic. Because of that, even 
if it is “Eurydice twice lost,”63 the unconscious is seen as a certain kind of structured 
yet unreachable knowledge. 
Ettinger opposes the primacy of “the unconscious is structured like a 
language,” pointing to its paternalised undertone and its theoretical insufficiency. She 
identifies the father as one who  
“carries” language and the symbolic dimension that establishes this [the 
paternal] function and that enables the infant to create a distance from the 
mother, who is at the source of the originary experience. The Ideal of the I 
has a calming influence; it is like a sympathetic paternal representation that 
helps us to distance ourselves from the phallic, archaic, symbiotic, and 
incestuous mother, who, in her complicity with the fragmentary body, 
threatens us with her infinite, engulfing power.64 
It is the Name of the Father that provokes the separation between the infant and the 
mother by introducing binarised language. Within this linguistic envelope, the mother 
is depicted in phallic terms – as a disruptive entity seeking symbiosis and incest, who 
is willing to absorb her infant. In contrast to such a monstrous representation,65 the 
paternal order carries a promise of peace and unity of the becoming-subject. As, 
                                                 
59 Jacques Lacan, “Pleasure and Reality,” in: Jacques Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis. The Seminar 
of Jacques Lacan. Book VII, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Dennis Porte (New York and London: W. 
W. Norton & Company, 1997), p. 32. 
60 See: Jacques Lacan, “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” in: Écrits, 
pp. 214-215, 219-220. 
61 See: Lacan, “The Freudian Unconscious and Ours,” pp. 17-28. 
62 Jacques Lacan, “Science and Truth,” in: Écrits, p. 736. 
63 Lacan, “The Freudian Unconscious and Ours,” p. 25. In this excerpt, Lacan compares the relation 
between the analyst and the unconscious to that between Orpheus and Eurydice. 
64 Bracha L. Ettinger, “The Matrixial Gaze,” in: The Matrixial Borderspace, p. 52. Emphasis in the 
original. 
65 The question of a “monstrous” mother appears in Ettinger’s article concerning the clinical situation 
between the analyst and the patient. She notes that often the analyst uses the ready-made mother-
monster figure, misidentifying the mother as a cause of the patient’s problems, which has damaging 
consequences. See: Bracha L. Ettinger, “Demeter–Persephone Complex, Entangled Aerials of the 
Psyche, and Sylvia Plath,” English Studies in Canada, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2014), pp. 123-154. 
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according to Ettinger, Freud’s and Lacan’s readings of the unconscious are sufficient 
when it comes to the wide range of the subject’s not-conscious experiences, she 
proposes a supplementary mode. What interests Ettinger is a nonconscious kind of 
“knowledge,” which can be categorised as neither conscious nor unconscious in 
Lacan’s reading. What she adds is the matrixial unconscious she names the sub-non-
conscious: “the connectionist sphere of severality and encounter,”66 abundant in 
metramorphic traces of Others and linkages. Such an intervention does not mean that 
Ettinger rejects the Lacanian unconscious; rather, she fills the empty space Lacan has 
left with his definition that excludes the potential non-linguistic data. 
Since Ettinger identifies “phallic” language and the unconscious based on it as 
insufficient, in her theory – which is supposed to re-cover the feminine territory 
abandoned by Freud and Lacan – she hypothesises the expanded notion of the 
Symbolic register, which includes the feminine and sense. As to the Symbolic – or 
“the Other’s discourse”67 – Ettinger claims that it does not encompass the feminine 
difference she has recognised, which is non-phallic and non-Oedipal.68 It is argued that 
the Symbolic ought to be extended beyond the scope of the phallic signifier and the 
discourse ruled by it.69 Griselda Pollock adds that the matrixial model assumes “a 
subjacent, subsymbolic stratum of subjectivization,”70 which challenges the 
overbearing position of the phallic logic but does not reject it, as it is required both for 
subjectivising processes that prevail in the postnatal phase and for the acquisition of 
language. Pollock goes on that in this thought “the Symbolic is shifted or retuned, 
rather than overturned, by a supplementary co-shaping-not-quite-logic that she 
                                                 
66 Ettinger, “The With-In-Visible Screen,” p. 222n.38. 
67 Jacques Lacan, “Seminar on ‘The Purloined Letter’,” in: Écrits, p. 10. Emphasis in the original. 
68 For Ettinger’s take on the feminine difference, see: Chapter 1, section: Not Only the Phallus. 
69 See: Ettinger, “The Matrixial Gaze,” p. 59. 
70 Griselda Pollock, “Introduction. Femininity: Aporia or Sexual Difference?,” in: The Matrixial 
Borderspace, p. 6. 
73 
 
invokes using the term matrixial.”71 This “not-quite-logic” is, however, by no means 
senseless. In the Ettingerian system, the feminine corporeal encounter between several 
becoming-subjects leaves traces in their psyches: traces which might – or might not – 
be comprehended. Therefore, the knowledge of and from the feminine as hypothesised 
in the matrixial mode is not impenetrable and meaningless even if it is not easily 
disclosed.72 Rather, it relies on affectivity and sensibility as its pathways, instead of 
the phallic +/- paradigm rejecting the sphere located between its two poles. Ettinger 
notes that the knowledge escaping both this paradigm and the discourse of signifiers 
“not only exists, but also can trace itself and make sense.”73 Although partialised and 
residing in the sub-symbolic, the meaning is thus carried with-in the web of the 
matrixial feminine. 
Not only is it carried, but also the meaning is constantly woven. The weaving 
metaphors, previously commented upon in the context of connectivity, also cast light 
on the nature of the passed knowledge. Ettinger delineates the relationship between 
the feminine (body), meaning, and weaving as follows: “A feminine difference based 
on bodily specificity not only occurs as the always-too-early for knowledge and 
always-too-late for access, but it also makes sense, and not by retroactive significance, 
but rather inside a weaving.”74 Such a difference is located in the domain of pre-
knowledge in the phallic sense, since the knowledge we speak about in the matrixial 
is not yet reigned by signifiers and binarised linguistic structures; it is, in turn, “too-
late for access” because it is grounded upon the intrauterine encounter-event within 
the female body, which is a “past-side”75 for the subject. Still, Ettinger claims that it 
                                                 
71 Pollock, “Introduction,” p. 6. Emphasis in the original. 
72 See: Ettinger, “The Matrixial Gaze,” p. 86. 
73 See: Ettinger, “The Matrixial Gaze,” p. 61. Emphasis in the original. 
74 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 191. Emphasis in the original. 
75 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma and the Matrixial Gaze,” in: The Matrixial Borderspace, 
p. 143. See: Chapter 1, section: Not Only the Phallus. 
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acquires meaning within a web of woven trans-subjective strings. Weaving provides 
us with the imagery of textiles, textures, and rhizome-like linkages, but it excludes 
fusion, psychosis, or any other loss of subjectivity. The origins of the woven 
knowledge are situated in “blanks and holes in the Real,”76 whereas what makes it 
resurface is the process of metramorphosis. As we can see, knowledge in a weave – 
non-cognitive, non-linguistic, and yet fragmentarily retrievable – again takes us to the 
notion of corporeality. 
The feminine corporeality in Ettinger is a site and a “transport-station” of 
knowledge; it calls to mind Lévinasian ethics, which renders the maternal body the 
origin of signification. As Ettinger maintains, the female ought to be open and ready 
to re-connect with her matrixial realm of severality in order to find meaning in the 
traces of experiences originating there. To be precise, “[s]he must uncognizantly know 
her non-I(s).”77 This excerpt emphasises that the knowledge about the border-Other(s) 
is not cognitive, and yet it is relevant for the matrixial sphere, being simultaneously its 
aim and its condition – the subject both strives for it, and needs to be receptive and 
fragilised during its acquisition. What is more, it is the female that makes a further 
transfer of such knowledge – or rather “subknowledge”78 – possible as she passes it on 
to the subjective space, on whose margins it is supposed to reside, challenging the 
phallic organisation but still remaining side by side with it.79 In his ethical reading, 
Lévinas links the body to signification, posited before language but comprehensible 
nonetheless. Using the metaphor of motherhood, he describes the workings of 
                                                 
76 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 194. 
77 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 142. Emphasis in the original. 
78 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 142. 
79 The notions of “side-by-sideness” and “besideness” return in Ettinger’s descriptions of the matrixial 
domain, usually describing the relation between the matrixial subjectivising sphere and phallic 
subjectivisation. They are also used in reference to the artistic encounter; see: Ettinger, “Uncanny Awe, 
Uncanny Compassion,” p. 27. 
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signification by means of caretaking activities.80 Moreover, he points to the 
interrelatedness of subjectivity, sensibility, and signification as follows: 
“[S]ubjectivity is sensibility – an exposure to others, a vulnerability and a 
responsibility in the proximity of the others, the-one-for-the-other, that is, 
signification.”81 This fragment again reveals Ettinger’s entanglement in Lévinas’s 
thought, as the main qualities of the matrixial realm of subjectivisation are fragility 
and fragilisation, response-ability, and closeness aiming at opening oneself for the 
Other and his or her non-cognitive knowledge. Finally, Lévinas notes: “Subjectivity 
of flesh and blood in matter – the signifyingness of sensibility, the-one-for-the-other 
itself – is the preoriginal signifyingness that gives sense, because it gives.”82 Hence he 
establishes the role of maternity and its connection not only to sensibility but also to 
sense and signification. The maternal-like body becomes the source of meaning 
precisely because it has the capacity for providing and sharing. Therefore, the 
intersection of these two approaches depicts the body – be it feminine, maternal, or 
any body – as an entity that has a number of functions, being an originary locus and a 
pathway of knowledge beyond the linguistic systems. 
Who does this knowledge belong to and what does it cover? Ettinger argues 
that it is possible to carry and transmit the imprints of memories that do not originate 
in the I. Ettinger identifies them as “traces of memory of/in/for/with the other,”83 
portraying the intermingled structure of relations that the I and the non-I enter within 
the matrix. Keeping in mind that processing the Other’s imprints of experiences is out 
of the question in Freudian and Lacanian propositions, Ettinger emphasises that the 
                                                 
80 Lévinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 77. 
81 Lévinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 77. 
82 Lévinas, Otherwise than Being, p. 78. Emphasis mine. 
83 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Transcryptum: Memory Tracing in/for/with the Other,” in: The Matrixial 
Borderspace, p. 165. 
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process of metramorphosis can produce “non-symbolic and designified sense,”84 and 
thus make one remember what could not have been forgotten because it has not been 
born within one’s psychic apparatus. Furthermore, remembrance is not enough, as in 
the matrix we are confronted with the impossibility of not-sharing, which Ettinger 
finds profoundly ethical – we are called upon to work-through the Other’s memories.85 
As we can note, in the matrixial theory we encounter the feminine body that is given 
sense and the humanising capacity to gain, produce, carry, and communicate non-
cognitive and non-psychotic knowledge that does not stem from the I. However, can 
we include trauma in this kind of knowledge, or – can we communicate the trauma of 
the non-I? 
The notion of trauma was mentioned several times in the previous chapter, but 
it requires a detailed interrogation since Ettinger reconsiders it from the matrixial 
angle. Ettingerian psychoanalysis assumes that the subject may deal with the imprints 
of memories and experiences of the Other(s). Metramorphic processes – based on 
sharing, togetherness, reciprocity, and mutual transformation – lead to the partialised 
and affective tracing and (re)cognition of the Other’s memories, within which the 
theorist identifies trauma, suffering, and pain. Interestingly enough, in Ettinger’s work 
we can distinguish two types of trauma, or rather – a twofold trauma, as these types 
are often interwoven. The first of them – trauma of proximity – characterises the 
matrixial sphere itself. It is especially visible in Ettinger’s description of self-
fragilisation, which “is risky and also painful because you are reaching compassion-
beyond-empathy and a com-passion that is often hard to tolerate on the level of an 
individual that seeks mental security and needs to withdraw inside its habits.”86 In 
                                                 
84 Ettinger, “Transcryptum,” p. 165. 
85 See: Ettinger, “The Matrixial Gaze,” p. 90; Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 182. 
86 Ettinger, “Fragilization and Resistance,” p. 9. 
77 
 
general, matrixial processes and encounters are seen as traumatising per se, as they 
challenge the subject’s boundaries, are transgressive, and are perilously close to 
symbiosis or fusion. The other type, implied in the above reflections on knowledge, 
may be identified as the proximity to trauma, in the sense that within the matrixial 
connection one may find the traces of the Other’s traumatic memories. We read: 
“Engravings of affected events, of others, and of the world are unknowingly inscribed 
in me, as mine are inscribed in others, known or anonymous, in an asymmetrical 
exchange that creates and transforms a transsubjective matrixial alliance.”87 The 
notion of shared – yet not fully cognised or known – memory carrying the traces of 
trauma shows that Ettinger makes a step beyond Freud’s and Lacan’s propositions.88 
As a result of reconceptualising the feminine body as the sphere of jointness and 
mutual transformation, trauma can be witnessed, signified in a non-linguistic manner, 
and shared, transforming the I and the non-I during the matrixial encounter. 
The question of trauma leads us to the Holocaust: an important part of 
Ettinger’s biography and family history, a constantly recurring theme in her art, and a 
rarely pronounced – but often implied – event in the matrixial theory.89 As Ettinger 
suggests, there is a possibility of working-through the Shoah by those who have not 
gone through it. One of the notions introduced to support such a thesis is based on Dori 
                                                 
87 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 145. 
88 The double notion of trauma of proximity / proximity to trauma is proposed in my article, “Uraz – 
bliskość – nie-pamięć” (in Polish). This text explores the changes in and redefines the potential of the 
psychoanalytically grounded trauma discourse in the context of Ettinger’s theory. Namely, it analyses 
the main assumptions regarding trauma in Sigmund Freud, Jacques Lacan, Jean Laplanche, Dominick 
LaCapra, Marianne Hirsch, Shoshana Felman, and Dori Laub in order to introduce Ettinger’s 
proposition and prove that her matrixial theory provides the tools to rethink the possibilities of the 
trauma discourse. See: Anna Kisiel, “Uraz – bliskość – nie-pamięć. Psychoanalityczny dyskurs traumy 
od Freuda do Ettinger,” Narracje o Zagładzie, No. 2 (2016), pp. 115-132. Another take on trauma and 
proximity is provided by Ettinger, who writes about “a triple trauma of maternity and prematernity: the 
traumatic proximity to the Other during pregnancy, the traumatic regression to a similar archaic sharing 
[…] and the traumatic separation from the non-I during birth-giving.” Bracha L. Ettinger, “From Proto-
ethical Compassion to Responsibility: Besideness and the Three Primal Mother-phantasies of Not-
enoughness, Devouring and Abandonment,” Athena, No. 1 (2006), p. 105. Emphasis in the original. 
89 The Holocaust is analysed in detail in Chapter 5. For now, the most important assumptions connected 
to this chapter are going to be highlighted. 
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Laub’s assumption that the Holocaust is an event without a witness, because of not 
only the scale of this genocide, but also “the inherently incomprehensible and 
deceptive psychological structure of the event,”90 which made it impossible to provide 
any reference or perspective.91 Basing on her artistic practice and theoretical 
reflections, Ettinger modifies Dori Laub’s concept, proposing the term of a wit(h)ness 
with-out an event. To be precise, art in its matrixial understanding reveals the potential 
to transfer the imprints of traumatic events to those who could not experience them 
directly. Adding “h” to “witnessing,” Ettinger emphasises togetherness and 
shareability with-in the matrix. Wit(h)nessing then becomes a sudden sense of almost 
unrestricted proximity evoked via the artwork, whose result is an entrance to the 
matrixial sphere of encounter, in which the artist and the viewer share their affective 
knowledges and are transformed by each other.92 To be a wit(h)ness means to process 
the traces of the Other’s trauma, which is deemed particularly significant when 
speaking of the Other who is not able to work them through within his or her own 
psyche. Ettinger elucidates:  
[E]vents that deeply concern me, but which I cannot fully handle, are 
subject to fading-in-transformation […] while my non-I becomes 
wit(h)ness to them and elaborates a memory for them. If, because of the 
highly traumatic value of events, I cannot psychically contain “my” 
wounds at all, then in the matrixial psychic sphere “my” imprints will be 
transscribed for potential remembering by the Other. Thus my others will 
process traumatic events for me, just as my archaic m/Other had 
metabolized archaic events for my premature and fragile partial-
subjectivity.93 
                                                 
90 Dori Laub, “An Event without a Witness: Truth, Testimony and Survival,” in: Shoshana Felman and 
Dori Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History (New York and 
London: Routledge, 1992), p. 80. 
91 We read: “[I]t was also the very circumstance of being inside the event that made unthinkable the 
very notion that a witness could exist, that is, someone who could step outside of the coercively 
totalitarian and dehumanizing frame of reference in which the event was taking place, and provide an 
independent frame of reference through which the event could be observed.” Laub, “An Event without 
a Witness,” p. 81. Emphasis in the original. 
92 See: Bracha L. Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 150. 
93 Ettinger, “Transcryptum,” pp. 167-168. Emphasis in the original. 
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The above excerpt simultaneously emphasises the ethical dimension of wit(h)nessing 
and points to its bodily origin. Namely, the function of a witness is reconsidered and 
enriched with the chance of carrying the burden for the sake of someone who could 
not bear it, which is an expression of utmost care.94 Such ethical commitment is 
directly inspired by the intrauterine encounter of an infant with a becoming-mother, in 
which the mother in her protective embrace tends to the infant, trying to ease or take 
over various stimuli it still cannot handle. 
The above theoretical stance has a concrete practical application: working-
through the Other’s trauma is for Bracha L. Ettinger a significant aspect of artworking 
(which is implied even in the neologism itself95). Griselda Pollock goes further in her 
– seemingly abstract – remark regarding the impossibility of the Holocaust in the 
matrix. She begins with defining the Shoah as an extreme outcome of the phallic logic, 
which “establishes clear, even phobically defended frontiers between Self and Other”96 
and identifies difference as a threat that ought to be either incorporated or eliminated; 
the Other is understood here as dangerous to one’s unity. She goes on to claim that 
because of the redefinition of the notions of boundaries and exchange between 
subjects, in the matrix “such a catastrophe is unimaginable.”97 This statement may 
sound counter-intuitive and unrealistic, or even quixotic; however, it has an ethical – 
and a political – side. In a different text, Pollock casts light on this issue. She notes 
that since – within the matrixial frame – a non-oppositional type of relation between 
                                                 
94 The connection between caring and carrying is grasped in Ettinger’s notion of carriance, which 
embraces caring, being cared-for, carrying, and being-carried. See: Bracha L. Ettinger, “Carriance, 
Copoiesis and the Subreal,” in: Bracha L. Ettinger, And My Heart Wound-space (Leeds: The Wild Pansy 
Press, 2015), pp. 343-351; Bracha L. Ettinger, “And My Heart, Wound-space with-in Me. The Space 
of Carriance,” in: And My Heart Wound-space, pp. 353-366. See also: Chapter 3, section: Ettingerian 
Mythos. 
95 “Artworking” refers to such psychoanalytical notions as working-through, dream work, or work of 
mourning. See: Griselda Pollock, “Aesthetic Wit(h)nessing in the Era of Trauma,” EurAmerica, Vol. 
40, No. 4 (2010), p. 865. 
96 Pollock, “Introduction,” p. 11. 
97 Pollock, “Introduction,” p. 11. 
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subjects has been experienced by all the human beings, it can and ought to be used as 
an alternative model of approaching difference.98 In other words, instead of using the 
phallic view on Otherness, we should keep in mind how the prenatal / prematernal 
encounter – an encounter characterised by asymmetry, severality, proximity, 
shareability, co-emergence, hospitality, and compassion – shapes our becoming-
human and becoming-humane. Pollock emphasises: “If we are to create peace, it is 
not through mere tolerance of others. It is in a radical rethinking of how integral a 
relation of otherness might be to what any ‘I’ is.”99 This statement goes beyond the 
ethical aspect, as it reaches the political issues in a straightforward manner. In the 
Ettingerian universe, it is crucial to comprehend – firstly – how fundamental the Other 
is in our own process of becoming, and – secondly – that while the Other is hurt, we 
do not remain unaltered. Therefore, if we manage to think beyond and before the 
rejection of the non-I, basing on our shared corporeal origins, tragedies such as the 
Shoah indeed cannot take place. 
 
4. Aesth/ethical Encounter 
In Bracha L. Ettinger’s thought, an aesthetic encounter and a late intrauterine 
one are closely linked to each other, since the traces of the latter inhabit the artwork. 
In one of her descriptions of a prenatal encounter, Ettinger observes that so-called 
“[m]atrixial awareness”100 is formed thanks to certain qualities that the partners of this 
covenant possess. Namely, the becoming-infant has a synesthetic faculty that makes it 
sensitive to various affective stimuli, resonances, and flows, whereas the becoming-
                                                 
98 Griselda Pollock, “From Horrorism to Compassion. Re-facing Medusan Otherness in Dialogue with 
Adriana Caverero and Bracha Ettinger,” in: Visual Politics of Psychoanalysis. Art and the Image in 
Post-traumatic Cultures, ed. Griselda Pollock (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2013), p. 178. 
99 Pollock, “From Horrorism to Compassion,” p. 178. Emphasis in the original. 
100 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 187. 
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mother is capable of “transsubjective inscription”101 or, in other words, of registering 
and re-working the partialised imprints of – and between – herself and the Other that 
emerge in this relation.102 Ettinger’s comment on the etymological roots of the word 
“pregnant” in Hebrew can provide an interesting context. We read: 
The pregnant woman is meouberet: she is a transport station, a station of 
passage for a period of passage, and she herself is a conductor, a conveyer, 
a transmissible and transitive vector, a transit place, a transition time, a 
scavenging channel for a transition period. To be pregnant, meouberet, is 
to expand the boundaries, to be a ferryboat (maaboret).103 
On the one hand, this excerpt demonstrates the connection between the maternal bodily 
specificity and the acts of, among others, sharing, carrying and imparting information, 
or challenging the borders; it also shows the female’s active-passive diversity, being a 
place, time, and a sui generis guide for the infant. On the other hand, we cannot deny 
the artistic connotations here, especially if we keep in mind Ettinger’s discovery that 
art is the transport-station of trauma.104 Returning to the late prenatal encounter, 
Ettinger claims that one ought not to consider it repressed or foreclosed, but “faded-
by-transformation.”105 From the matrixial viewpoint, the dispersed fragments of the 
intrauterine event are taken to the thresholds of the sub-non-conscious by means of the 
matrixial encounter, which is made possible by art itself, “impregnate[d]”106 by the 
matrix. Art, in turn, is claimed to transfer the shreds of the matrixial encounter-events 
“into culture”107 within the process of metramorphosis. 
Not only do the traces of the prenatal encounter inhabit the work of art, but also 
they can be accessed in and through it. When delineating the potential ways of entering 
                                                 
101 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 187. 
102 See: Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 187. 
103 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 185. Emphasis in the original. 
104 See: Bracha L. Ettinger, “Art as the Transport-station of Trauma,” in: Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger: 
Artworking 1985-1999 (Ghent and Amsterdam: Ludion, 2000), pp. 91-115. 
105 Ettinger, “The With-In-Visible Screen,” p. 108. 
106 Ettinger, “The With-In-Visible Screen,” p. 109. See: Ettinger, “The With-In-Visible Screen,” pp. 
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107 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 144. 
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the matrixial borderspace for both genders,108 Ettinger points specifically to the 
aesthetics-related experiences. She notes that both male and female subjects can find 
themselves in this intimate trans-subjective mode via not only “compassionate joining-
in-difference with others in transference relations,” but also “art-objects, art-actions, 
art-gestures, such as music, painting, and dance.”109 Artistic activities thus become 
passageways to the matrix. Referring to Lévinas, Ettinger notes that such an access – 
which is par excellence an access to the Other – has ethical implications, for it requires 
the vulnerable position; vulnerability here involves becoming and remaining open to 
the Other despite the traumatising threat such extreme fragility inevitably brings.110 
Moreover, we ought not to mistake it for sacrificial disappearance, as vulnerability 
covers “a partial disappearing to allow jointness.”111 As we can see, art in the 
Ettingerian frame is inextricably linked to the intrauterine existence since it potentially 
offers a humanising pathway to the fragmented memory of this state. 
The crucial question that ought to be tackled at this moment concerns the duty 
and the position of the artist in such a universe. The artist is the one who brings the 
non-consciously inscribed traces to memory and culture by creating the artwork. 
Ettinger writes that he or she “captures/produces/conducts ideas, traumas, and 
phantasies only inasmuch as s/he is affected by the trauma of the m/Other, of others, 
and of the world.”112 Such an artist – who discloses the matrixial-feminine qualities, 
who works through and passes on the traces of the traumas of the Other(s), and who is 
capable of “conceiving of a world without me”113 – is pronounced the “artist-
                                                 
108 The issue of access to the matrix for both genders is further explored in Chapter 3, sections: 
Femininity and Universality and Fe-male Privilege. 
109 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 143. Emphasis mine. 
110 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 145. 
111 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 145. 
112 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 153. 
113 Lévinas in conversation with Ettinger, “What Would Eurydice Say?,” p. 142. Emphasis in the 
original. See: Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 155. 
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woman.”114 It is crucial to emphasise that the artist becomes here a part of a bigger 
structure, which embraces the viewer, the piece of art, and – in general – all the 
potential Others that can join the covenant. He or she does not occupy the only active 
position in the encounter – as it would wrongly imply the viewer’s passivity – but 
simultaneously the relationship between the artist and the viewer is by no means 
symmetrical.115 Responsive to the Other’s call, it is the artist that makes any 
participation possible as a result of his or her artistic gesture, which in itself is an 
ethical move.116 However, it does not mean that the artist is aware of the potential 
ethical charge; when writing about the weaving of aesthetics and ethics in the creative 
activity, Ettinger maintains that it may happen without his or her “intentions or 
conscious control.”117 All in all, the woman-artist is a crucial partner in the matrixial 
sphere accessible via aesthetics, whereas aesthetics gains an ethical aspect as a result 
of the woman-artist’s activity.  
In the following paragraphs, I will turn to the tropes of the body, encounter, 
and connectedness, which reappear in the theoretical parts of my argument, in an 
endeavour to identify and examine them in Ettinger’s chosen artistic works. At this 
point, it is necessary to stress that Ettinger’s art strives to challenge the borders of 
representation, since, in Brian Massumi’s words, “[t]he parts and paintings couple not 
because they look alike, but because they feel alike. If there is resemblance, it is in the 
feeling: it is of relived feeling to itself.”118 While my slightly affective reading by no 
means renounces representation, it endeavours to move towards its limits; I wish to 
                                                 
114 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 197. Of course, Ettinger by no means claims that men cannot 
be artists of this kind. It takes us back to the very pronouncement of a difference based on female bodily 
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in Chapter 3. 
115 See: Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 154. 
116 See: Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 151. 
117 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 148. See also: Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 151. 
118 Brian Massumi, “Afterword. Painting: The Voice of the Grain,” in: The Matrixial Borderspace, p. 
207. 
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show how these artworks interweave with and contribute to the theory, adding new 
shades of meaning. 
Historically speaking, the women from the Mizocz ghetto are abandoned; yet, 
are they completely alone? The image they are captured in is a result of the anonymous 
photographer’s gesture of dubious ethical value; after all, we do not know whether he 
or she took it “as witness, as protest, [or] as trophy.”119 The depicted women were 
murdered in the name of terrible collective responsibility – on 13th October 1942 there 
was a revolt of prisoners in the Mizocz ghetto, Ukraine, the day after which all the 
men, women, and children were executed. In the picture, the women’s bodies are 
naked: they are humiliated and exposed to the voyeuristic gaze, left with no chance to 
defend themselves. Bracha L. Ettinger’s art can be claimed to change their hopeless 
position. Eurydice, No. 17 (1994–1996)120 is one of Ettinger’s early works in the 
series, in which the women are still discernible.121 The surface of the piece is blurry 
and grainy; the bright background merges with black and purple shades. The 
photographic frame the artist works on includes the most characteristic and recurring 
face of the series, located in the middle of the canvas. We can observe the women with 
no difficulty, but they are not exposed, being partly clothed by means of Ettinger’s 
artistic actions, as the grain and the colour hide their bodies from the voyeur’s look. 
These females are not alone in a threefold sense. At the moment they are captured in 
the image, they are in “collectivity,” supporting and warming each other, waiting for 
their shared fate. Years later, they encounter the artist, who compassionately 
wit(h)nesses and works-through their pain. Finally, as they are named “Eurydices,” 
                                                 
119 Griselda Pollock, “Trauma, Time and Painting: Bracha Ettinger and the Matrixial Aesthetic,” in: 
Carnal Aesthetics. Transgressive Imagery and Feminist Politics, eds. Bettina Papenburg and Marta 
Zarzycka (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2013), pp. 25-26. 
120 Bracha L. Ettinger, Eurydice, No. 17, 1994–1996, oil, xerography with photocopic dust, pigment and 
ashes on paper mounted on canvas, 26x52 cm, in: Art as Compassion, p. 82. See: Appendix, p. 228. 
121 For the late, “indiscernible” paintings, see: Chapter 1, section: Almost-boundless Canvas Space. 
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they also encounter the viewer, who, like Orpheus, simultaneously sees them dead and 
keeps them alive. 
Not only are the Eurydices not alone, but also they are as if hospitable, 
occasionally sharing the canvas with Ettinger’s mother and father from the pre-war 
photo taken in the street of Łódź in 1936. In Eurydice, No. 37 (2001),122 the 
background determines the border between two temporalities, two fates, two stories, 
and disparate mental and physical states. The left side reveals the trace of the posed 
photograph of young, possibly careless, joyful people – Bluma Fried and Uziel 
Lichtenberg, Ettinger’s parents-to-be. We cannot see them clearly because of the 
technique that employs pigment, ashes, and dust, yet their shapes are easy to recognise. 
Their faces, in turn, merge with the canvas. The right side is inhabited by the face 
already encountered in the previous painting. Even though it is blurry, composed of 
smears of black paint, we seemingly can read more from it than from Ettinger’s 
parents’ in-visible expression. Here, we may discover fear and anguish of this 
anonymous woman. The right side, therefore, is occupied by the victim – one of 
anonymous females, who is about to die. On the left we watch the future survivors, 
who during the war fled Poland, escaped from several ghettoes, camps, and countries, 
to finally reach Palestine.123 What we, viewers, witness is an encounter beyond these 
differences: an encounter embodied on one canvas. 
Embodiment takes its literal form in No Title-Sketch (1988–1989),124 which we 
can say is “crowded” with bodies. This time, it is not the background that performs the 
separation; the contrast between the two realities is instead achieved by the 
                                                 
122 Bracha L. Ettinger, Eurydice, No. 37, 2001, oil, xerography with photocopic dust, pigment and ashes 
on paper mounted on canvas, 28.3x21.4 cm, in: Art as Compassion, p. 154. See: Appendix, p. 229. 
123 See: “Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger: Chronology,” in: Art as Compassion, p. 249. 
124 Bracha L. Ettinger, No Title-Sketch, 1988–1989, xerography with photocopic dust, pigment and ashes 
on paper, 22.3x24.9 cm, in: Art as Compassion, p. 207. See: Appendix, p. 227. 
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juxtaposition of naked bodies of the women standing in a row – using a different 
photographic frame than in the previous works – with elegantly dressed people. The 
faces of Bluma Fried and Uziel Lichtenberg are sharper than in Eurydice, No. 37, and 
there is an illusion that they are looking towards the females on the right. Here, the 
two groups – if we may call them that – are facing each other, unable to turn back. 
Sentenced by the artist to this co-existence, they are challenged to survive the 
aesthetically eternalised moment of fragility. The sketch becomes a space of 
interweaving, proximity, and blurred borders; because of the unbearably embodied 
presences it hosts, it opens a lane towards an ethical relation in which Otherness is 
always already partial. 
No Title-Sketch produced in 1985125 provides us with yet another manifestation 
of the analysed motif. The technique is the same, but the effect appears to be entirely 
different because of the domination of the purple colour in the painting’s space. The 
artwork has three main sets. The upper left part reveals a visible frame from the Mizocz 
photograph, showing the returning female face. Here, we can observe who surrounds 
her: behind her there is a woman with a baby in her arms and another woman, in front 
of her – a little girl, who, as we can see in the original, non-manipulated photograph, 
is holding yet another female – maybe her own mother – tight. This girl appears again 
in a close-up on the right, just next to Ettinger’s parents. They, for one, are standing in 
the middle of the sketch, as if in the foreground, overlaying the crowd. The mother’s 
smile is hidden from our gaze. Despite dark colours, the image discloses more than the 
previously described ones. Maybe one of the reasons is that this sketch is made in 
1985, thus being one of Ettinger’s early works, created seven years before starting the 
first Eurydice painting (1992–1994). Later in her art we can note the nonlinear, yet 
                                                 
125 Bracha L. Ettinger, No Title-Sketch, 1985, xerography with photocopic dust, pigment and ashes on 
paper, 27.3x23.1 cm, in: Art as Compassion, p. 203. See: Appendix, p. 230. 
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proceeding disappearance of the origin photo. Still, what we as viewers observe here 
is more than the Barthesian “return of the dead”126 taking place in the medium of 
photography. It also endeavours to go beyond Susan Sontag’s claim that the great 
number of images of atrocity we encounter makes us as if “anesthetize[d],”127 more 
immune to the horror they depict. Ettinger’s aim is not to immunise the spectator; on 
the contrary, by means of hosting the naked bodies – already dead but still alive, 
depending on the chosen temporality – the image calls us to gaze and to respond, 
posing an ethical demand in a Lévinasian sense.128 
The artworks have been presented in a non-chronological manner not without 
purpose; the reason behind such an arrangement was to show that the origin 
photographs’ in-visibility is in perpetual motion whether we look at Ettinger’s works 
individually or examine them as a series of interconnected images engaged in a 
dialogue. When we focus on the bodies of women from Mizocz, we note that they are 
in no way explicit or straightforward; nor are they easily accessible for the spectator. 
Ettinger’s artistic technique includes the processes of covering the photograph, 
cropping it, veiling and unveiling certain fragments of bodies or faces, to name a few. 
All these actions lean towards de-othering and de-objectifying129 these women, that is, 
resisting voyeurism, scopophilia, or erotisation they may be or might have been subject 
to. Importantly, it cannot be said that they are disappearing as a sacrifice for the Other. 
Rather, in an Ettingerian manner, they are “partial[ly] disappearing to allow jointness,” 
becoming vulnerable so as to let the Other approach them. As a result, when their Other 
                                                 
126 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida. Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 2010), p. 9. 
127 Susan Sontag, “In Plato’s Cave,” in: Susan Sontag, On Photography (London: Penguin Books, 
1979), p. 20. See: Sontag, “In Plato’s Cave,” pp. 19-21. 
128 The notions of gazing and responding return in Chapter 5. 
129 De-objectification as a humanising strategy is discussed in Chapter 5, section: Feminine Experiences 
of the Shoah. 
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– the viewer – in his or her fragility reaches the space they occupy, he or she is called 
not to leave, but to remain and co-exist. The spectator is demanded to become a Moses 
figure, who “like a maternal body” faces that which is unintelligible and potentially 
unbearable, but nevertheless carries the burden that was assigned to him or her. 
Through their partial invisibility, the female bodies – of women, daughters, mothers, 
grandmothers, girls, pregnant women – invite us to become one of them, outside of 
appropriation or objectification, but in terms of being interwoven, joining their 
affective web in a struggle towards humanity. 
When it comes to the alliance between the Mizocz Eurydices, and Bluma Fried 
and Uziel Lichtenberg, we might choose to follow the interpretation that what we 
witness in these works is the meeting of personal and historical trajectories; after all, 
there is a picture from Ettinger’s family album and a drastic photographic document 
of the genocide. Yet, the artist’s position is more complex than that. Born to a Jewish 
family, Ettinger was never able to meet the majority of her relatives, which is far from 
being a marginal issue for her. In one of her notebooks, we read about the photograph 
from Mizocz: 
I want her to look at me! That woman, her back turned to me. The image 
haunts me. It’s my aunt, I say, not, my aunt’s the other one, with the baby. 
The baby! It could be mine. What are they looking at? What do they see? 
I want them to turn toward me. Once, just once. I want to see their faces.130 
Another excerpt goes as follows: 
Please look at me once. You are my dead aunt, or you are my living aunt 
or you are someone I [have] known. […] Mother-I, my aunt could have 
been my daughter.131 
I do not – and do not have the right to – know whether Ettinger’s relatives were in the 
Mizocz ghetto, and whether one of the women might have been Ettinger’s aunt. These 
                                                 
130 Bracha L. Ettinger, Matrix. Halal(a)–Lapsus. Notes on Painting, 1985–1992, trans. Joseph Simas 
(Oxford: Museum of Modern Art, 1993), p. 67. Quoted in: Pollock, “Trauma, Time and Painting,” p. 
27. 
131 Ettinger, Matrix. Halal(a)-Lapsus, p. 67. Quoted in: Pollock, “Trauma, Time and Painting,” p. 27. 
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quotations shatter the binary opposition between the private and public spheres which 
outwardly merge here; in other words, they disturb the simplicity of the meeting that 
seemed to take place between two groups of people anonymous to each other, having 
different fates, but linked by the fact of being victims of the Holocaust. However, as I 
would like to argue, these excerpts are not aimed at revealing the historical connection 
between Bracha L. Ettinger and the Mizocz women, which would somehow explain 
her so-called “interest” in the case. Instead, from the Ettingerian viewpoint, historical 
knowledge does not play a role once one enters the matrixial domain. When evoking 
these lines, Griselda Pollock comments that there occurs a paradoxical structure of 
identification there, having its source in maternity itself. Namely, “[a]s the woman 
becomes a mother, she is at once her own mother and her own child precisely because 
any mother was also once child and daughter and now lends her own unconscious 
history to this event […] that is at once a repetition for her and a novelty for the child 
she now holds.”132 I would add that such a feminine connection is made possible 
thanks to the maternal-female bodily specificity. Hence, in Ettinger’s painting – which 
relentlessly interlaces with her theory – corporeality is significant not per se, but 
because it takes one to the level of the matrixial sphere of an almost-boundless 
proximity. An encounter with the bodies of Eurydices becomes trans-historically 
ethical, notwithstanding the anonymity of the I(s) and the non-I(s). 
 
5. Human(e) Origins 
The strength of the matrixial psychoanalysis lies in the possibility to conceive 
of the body outside the essentialist or biological frame, and yet to provide it with 
                                                 
132 Pollock, “Trauma, Time and Painting,” p. 28. Pollock also suggests that Ettinger identifies with these 
females as a result of her own experience of becoming a mother, but in my opinion by means of that we 
remain in the historical reading, which – keeping Ettinger’s theoretical remarks in mind – is not 
necessarily the most relevant one. 
90 
 
certain proto-ethical qualities. The result of such an intervention is the proposition of 
a relation between corporeality and ethics that does not essentialise femininity and 
motherhood, but nevertheless relies on certain prenatal / prematernal encounter-events 
that all the human beings have gone through and by which they have been non-
consciously affected. The aim of this chapter has been to trace this relation in Bracha 
L. Ettinger’s oeuvre. As it has been shown, the matrixial notion of the female bodily 
specificity is a site of the emergence and a dwelling-space of proto-ethics. I have begun 
with establishing the linkage between the feminine body and the womb, claiming that 
the placement of the latter in the former allows us to make certain assumptions about 
the whole body. In an endeavour to portray the body as a prototype for connectedness 
and a primary site of the trans-subjective encounter, I have turned to Emmanuel 
Lévinas’s discussion of the body – with a special emphasis put on sensibility, the 
Moses figure, maternal corporeality, and the Other – and Ettinger’s response to it. 
Another significant point of reference is schizoanalysis, which – just as the matrixial 
theory – cherishes experimentation, interconnectedness, exchange, decentralisation, 
and flows. The analyses of the Body without Organs and the rhizome have proven that 
despite several correspondences between the two theories, there is also a number of 
discrepancies, regarding among others multiplicity and severality, caution and choice, 
partners in encounters, and femininity itself. The next section has been devoted to the 
issues of knowledge, sense, and language in order to clarify their status in Ettingerian 
universe and, then, to show the potentiality of passing the knowledge of the Other on 
in the context of the Shoah. The matrix has been depicted as a sphere related to the 
sub-non-conscious and grounded upon the mother-infant prenatal relation; the matrix 
is given the possibility to carry and transmit the imprints of the non-cognitive – but by 
no means meaningless – knowledge originating in the Other, which may embrace the 
91 
 
traumatic memory the Other could not bear. Aesth/ethical Encounter has been, in turn, 
preoccupied with Ettinger’s artistic theory and practice. Having introduced her 
theoretical stance on the closeness between the aesthetic experience and the 
intrauterine meeting, and the significance of the artist in the matrixial paradigm, I have 
proceeded to art itself in search of corporeality, encounter, non-history, and 
connections. All these reflections contribute to the theorisation of the feminine / 
motherly body as a profoundly ethical site, underlying our human(e) origins. 
The question that may be posed in reference to the above remarks is whether 
the pronouncement of humane – and hence universal – origins is not far-fetched. In 
other words, does the Ettingerian notion of corporeality truly evade gender 
distinctions? The next chapter is going to exercise the validity of such a claim, trying 
to respond to questions and doubts regarding, for instance, the gender of the 
Ettingerian body, the privileged status of the woman, or the possibility of applying the 
matrixial theory in the “masculine” context. 
 Chapter 3 
THE PERPLEXING FEMININE 
GENDER(LESSNESS) OF THE ETTINGERIAN BODY 
 
[A]natomy makes a difference that we 
should open to conceptualization.1 
 
This theory is not just about women for 
women, but for all of us, for we are all 
born of woman.2 
 
It doesn’t matter if the image contains 
representation of “woman” or “womb” or 
not. For me it usually does, though.3 
 
1. About / for / of Women 
As implied in Bracha L. Ettinger’s above remark on “representation of 
‘woman’ or ‘womb’” in art, her paintings indeed teem with feminine motifs, starting 
from the choice of colours and ending with the presence of females on numerous 
canvases. Similarly, her theoretical reflections refer mainly to women-related issues 
and to the female corporeality itself. Such strong feminisation evokes a plethora of 
questions concerning applicability and the universal character of the matrixial theory, 
but also a possible privileging of women. In a nutshell, the main objective of this 
chapter is to unravel the perplexing male / female relations and gender-based problems 
that resurface in Ettinger’s theoretical and artistic oeuvre. 
                                                 
1 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist with-in the Matrixial Encounter-Event,” in: Bracha L. 
Ettinger, The Matrixial Borderspace, ed. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis and London: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2006), p. 181. 
2 Griselda Pollock, “Introduction. Femininity: Aporia or Sexual Difference?,” in: The Matrixial 
Borderspace, p. 29. 
3 Bracha L. Ettinger, “And My Heart, Wound-space with-in Me. The Space of Carriance,” in: Bracha 
L. Ettinger, And My Heart Wound-space (Leeds: The Wild Pansy Press, 2015), pp. 357-258. 
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The following section is devoted to universality and neutrality, and to the 
position of the feminine body regarding these two terms with a special emphasis put 
on the notion of the female body experience. It ponders upon the gender of the 
matrixial feminine difference and the origin of its “femininity”; finally, it addresses the 
issue of essentialism in the matrixial theory. The next subchapter is a continuation of 
the above questions. Firstly, it examines women’s privileged entrance to the matrixial 
borderspace and men’s limitations in this respect. Further on, Ettinger’s standpoint on 
women’s rights is presented and analysed in terms of its applicability, and the 
possibility of essentialist, biologically determinist, or right wing readings of the 
matrixial theory is considered. What I propose to call the “Ettingerian mythos” is 
delineated in the section that follows. Ettinger’s works – both theoretical and aesthetic 
ones – seem to be inhabited by dozens of male and female figures of diverse kinds, but 
biblical and mythological characters occupy a special position in Ettinger’s thought, 
contributing to – or even defining – various concepts. The section will portray bodily, 
ethical, and gender entanglements of the following figures: Eve, Abraham, Isaac, 
Sarah, Hagar, and Ishmael (the Bible), and Laius, Antigone and Jocaste,4 and Demeter 
and Persephone (Greek mythology). The last but one part moves from the theoretical 
mythos to the private one as it deals with Ettinger’s artistic works based on her family 
photographs. While my readings will not employ newly introduced concepts from 
previous subchapters, I will remain in the field of (family) relations, trying to look at 
them from a different angle in order to provide a fuller picture of gender and femininity 
in Ettinger’s multidirectional activity. In this section, differences in the way Ettinger’s 
mother and her male relatives are posited in this oeuvre will be scrutinised. Although 
I do not aim at a quantitative analysis (which is virtually impossible when considering 
                                                 
4 For the sake of consistency, I will use the name Jocaste – instead of Jocasta – after Ettinger, who 
introduces the Jocaste complex and tends to use this spelling. 
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Ettinger’s massive load of works), I intend to invoke a considerably large number of 
images sharing the same photographic motifs in order to compare them and draw 
assumptions about possible gender-related patterns. 
 
2. Femininity and Universality 
As it was implied in the previous chapters, what the discourse of Freudian-
Lacanian psychoanalysis tends to label as universal is, in fact, a set of male-centric 
paradigms.5 To begin, the penis / phallus pair points to the system based on the male 
corporeality. Penis becomes a biological instance that provides a ground for 
psychoanalytical restructuring of subjectivity. The phallus, in turn, is treated as a 
primary, privileged signifier that refers to both males and females, and thus is 
presented as neutral. As Ettinger stresses, “the phallic subjective structure (disguised 
as neutral), and with it (also disguised as neutral) the sexual phallic difference that has 
become the measure of any sexual difference, refer both directly and indirectly to the 
male body, to its pleasures and pains and to the phantasies attached to it.”6 Supposedly 
an originary and neutral signifier, the phallus reduces women to lack or even – as in 
Jacques Lacan – to inexistence. However, not only does “woman […] not exist,”7 but 
also such a diagnosis applies to her womb; the absence of the womb in Sigmund 
Freud’s analysis of children’s psychosexual development is portrayed not as a 
negligence, but as a necessity. Furthermore, while penis envy is shown as a formative 
stage for females, Freud does not consider a possibility of womb envy in males. Even 
Julia Kristeva does not free her theory from the bounds of the phallus-based 
                                                 
5 For a more precise study, see: Chapter 1, section: Not Only the Phallus and Chapter 2, section: 
Knowledge in / of the Humanising Specificity. 
6 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” pp. 178-179. Emphasis mine. 
7 Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and 
Knowledge. Book XX. Encore 1972-1973, trans. Bruce Fink, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller (New York and 
London: W. W. Norton & Company, 1999), p. 7. Emphasis in the original. 
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psychoanalysis. In her theorisations of the chora and the abject, Kristeva emphasises 
the role of separation from the fusion-like relation with the mother and thus of the 
creation of boundaries between the self and the Other. Kristeva appears to reject the 
potential of intimate communication between the mother and the child for the sake of 
the entrance to the Symbolic, an order reigned by the father. The above arguments 
unmask the masculine “nature” of Freudian-Lacanian thought: the nature Ettinger 
aspires to challenge because of its insufficiency. 
Ettinger’s theory of the matrix endeavours to de-masculinise the discourse of 
psychoanalysis without forming a binary opposition to it, but also without claiming 
that the body she refers to is neutral. The matrix and matrix-related concepts (including 
co-naissance, severality, communicaring, and subjectivity-as-encounter) are modelled 
specifically on the female body.8 Such a decision, however, is not made in order to 
provide an antithesis to Freud’s and Lacan’s ideas; on the contrary, Ettinger tries to 
complete the psychoanalytical system, supplementing it with the abandoned feminine 
element. When reflecting on the use of the female body, Ettinger clarifies: 
I believe that to avoid dealing with any aspect that touches on the female 
body and bodily experience, to avoid the conceptual potentiality that can 
be abstracted from the female body or has consequences with regard to it 
and its history – the agglomeration of its traumatic or pleasurable 
experiences, its potentiality, the phantasies that link to its inscriptions – I 
believe that this amounts to an unconditional surrender to the dominant, 
seemingly neutral, symbolic filter that censures both women and men and 
molds them in its phallic frame.9 
By saying that, Ettinger emphasises that the conceptual application of the female 
corporeality cannot be considered a threat or rejected straightaway as a form of 
essentialism, since that would mean falling back into the phallic logic one might want 
to escape. This statement may find an ally in Elizabeth Grosz’s analysis of the 
                                                 
8 See: Chapter 1, sections: Not Only the Phallus and Trans-subjective Matrixial Ethics. 
9 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” pp. 179-180. 
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“universal” body in, among others, Lacan, Freud, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Friedrich 
Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, and Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. As she observes, 
“a corporeal ‘universal’” that these theorists endeavour to grasp in their writings is 
grounded upon the “implicitly white, male, youthful, heterosexual, middle-class”10 
body. When, in turn, the female flesh is used, it is subject to another mechanism, 
described on the example of Deleuze and Guattari’s becoming-woman and the figure 
of the girl. As Grosz notes, these philosophers “deterritorialize women’s bodies and 
subjectivities only to reterritorialize them as part of a more universalist movement of 
becoming.”11 Ettinger’s theory appears not to be targeted by the above accusations. As 
it will be shown, it smuggles neither the male nor the female body under the guise of 
the neutral / universal one. Instead, the female corporeality is shown here as a sphere 
everyone can relate to – as an archaic site of the first encounter. 
Instead of theorising the neutrality of the female body, Ettinger puts forward a 
thesis that it is a site everyone has experienced. Since the matrixial psychoanalysis 
takes its inspiration directly from the prenatal period and pregnancy, Ettinger’s 
statement that “we have all, men and women, been prenatal once upon a time”12 carries 
a number of implications. Let us begin with the temporal one. While “once upon a 
time” is rather a rhetorical than a precise phrase, elsewhere Ettinger clarifies what the 
idea of “before” means within the matrixial paradigm. As it has already been noted, 
the matrixial sphere goes beyond and before the phallus or the division into the I and 
the non-I; yet, “before” is by no means a diachronic point of reference.13 Instead, 
                                                 
10 Elizabeth Grosz, Volatile Bodies: Toward a Corporeal Feminism (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1994), p. 188. 
11 Grosz, Volatile Bodies, p. 182. See: Grosz, Volatile Bodies, pp. 173-180. 
12 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Diotima and the Matrixial Transference: Psychoanalytical Encounter-event as 
Pregnancy in Beauty,” in: Beyond the Threshold: Explorations of Liminality in Literature, eds. Hein 
Viljoen and Chris N. van der Merwe (New York: Peter Lang, 2007), p. 107. 
13 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Carriance, Copoiesis and the Subreal,” in: And My Heart Wound-space, p. 344. 
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Ettinger defines it as a “pole in the structure of the human subject,” or “time before 
time, literally signifying even from before my face.”14 Thus, “before” belongs to an 
archaic time in which the becoming-subject has not yet recognised its borders and does 
not identify as a man or a woman, or – perhaps – even as the I, since the recognition 
of one’s face is often perceived as the beginning of selfhood. Yet, it is in this time that 
the “first corporeal-psychic connection”15 takes place – the encounter with-in the 
motherly-feminine body which contributes to one’s becoming as a subject.16 Finally, 
Ettinger elucidates the status of such becoming-subjects in the prenatal state, naming 
them “first matrixial partial-subjects,”17 who – characterised by not the phallic but the 
matrixial difference – participate in sharing and transforming with-in the non-I. 
Reading the feminine matrixial difference through the prism of a man / woman 
dichotomy is not fully adequate since this notion does not relate to women exclusively. 
As Ettinger notes, such difference is not concerned with biology, which would enact 
the male versus female division based on the principle of having or not having the 
particular organs. Nor is it grounded upon the notion of identity, which utilises the 
masculine / feminine binary.18 Ettinger endeavours to escape such dichotomous 
structuring as the main focus in this theory is not the “feminine” posited in opposition 
to the “masculine” but the woman-mother herself along with the meaning of her 
contact with the becoming-infant. Griselda Pollock puts it bluntly: “This theory is not 
just about women for women, but for all of us, for we are all born of woman.”19 
                                                 
14 Ettinger, “Carriance, Copoiesis and the Subreal,” p. 344. 
15 See: Bracha L. Ettinger, “Fascinance and the Girl-to-m/Other Matrixial Feminine Difference,” in: 
Psychoanalysis and the Image: Transdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Griselda Pollock (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006), p. 70. 
16 Griselda Pollock considers it “the unique form of human becoming” and describes it as follows: “all 
human life shares an encounter with a woman-subject, who is herself being changed by what is 
becoming with/in-side/with-in her.” Griselda Pollock, “Between Painting and the Digital: Matrixial 
Aesthetics Creates Matrixial Thought-forms,” in: And My Heart Wound-space, pp. 263-264. 
17 Bracha L. Ettinger, “The Matrixial Gaze,” in: The Matrixial Borderspace, p. 71. 
18 Ettinger, “The Matrixial Gaze,” p. 56. 
19 Griselda Pollock, “Introduction,” p. 29. 
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The double origin of the word “feminine” in the name of the matrixial 
difference can be identified. The primary one has already been pointed at. Namely, 
instead of being understood as a part of the “masculine / feminine” binary pair, the 
“feminine” stands for the first, originary contact that the subject experiences – the 
contact with and in the mother’s female body. Ettinger explains it in detail as follows:  
The matrixial designates a difference located, in its originary formation, in 
the linkage to female corporeal invisible specificity, to the archaic 
enveloping outside that is also an inside: the womb. However, by matrix I 
do not mean the organ but a complex apparatus modeled on this site of 
feminine/prenatal encounter – not fusion – that places any human 
becoming-subject-to-be, male or female, in relation with female bodily 
specificity and her encounters, trauma, jouissance, passion, phantasy, and 
desire. […] Female bodily specificity is thus the site, physically, 
imaginatively, and symbolically, where a feminine difference emerges, and 
through which a “woman” is interlaced as a figure that is not confined to 
one-body, but is rather a hybrid “webbing” of links between several 
subjectivities, who by virtue of that webbing become partial.20 
The difference is feminine in the sense that it refers to and is modelled upon the womb, 
the experience of pregnancy, and – most importantly – the prenatal encounter, which 
encompasses both male and female becomings. Moreover, the “woman” here is not a 
separate, “one-body” entity, but a partial-subject, similar in this respect to the prenatal 
subject as discussed above; this is why the feminine specificity makes it possible to 
theorise trans-connectedness and shareability of affective knowledge.21 The other 
origin of the “feminine” difference is related to its quality of going beyond the phallus, 
and its subjectivity and difference formation.22 On the one hand, we may conclude that 
Ettinger utilises the binary nature of language here to distinguish between these two 
supplementary types of difference; this might be a problematic strategy as binarisation 
is what the theorist usually endeavours to avoid, or even to challenge. On the other 
                                                 
20 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma and the Matrixial Gaze,” in: The Matrixial Borderspace, 
p. 141. Emphasis in the original. 
21 See: Chapter 2, section: Knowledge in / of the Humanising Specificity. 
22 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Art as the Transport-station of Trauma,” in: Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger: 
Artworking 1985-1999 (Ghent and Amsterdam: Ludion, 2000), p. 114. 
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hand, it is the matrixial “woman” that transcends the phallic frames of symbiosis and 
cut – often associated with motherhood23 – rendering the “feminine” an adequate 
name. 
Despite calling the matrixial sexual difference “feminine,” Ettinger declares it 
non-gendered. The psychoanalyst clarifies that the matrixial difference ought not to be 
placed within the dichotomy of “gendered individuals (male versus female)” but it 
should instead be perceived in terms of “[…] borderspacing with-in a female affective-
mental corporeality (for example; the difference between a male differentiating from 
female-m/Other and a female differentiating from female-m/Other).”24 How does then 
genderlessness of the difference apply to the female body referred to in this theory? 
First of all, the feminine body is not a social construct here; it is not anchored in the 
Symbolic or performed. Nor is it embedded in language as a set of binary terms; rather, 
the matrix – and thus the matrixially understood body – ceaselessly moves to the 
affective margins of language and cognition. When biology is considered, the position 
of the female corporeality becomes more complex. One cannot easily reject Ettinger’s 
indebtedness to the biological notion of the body. Namely, as it relates to intrauterine 
and pregnancy experiences, not to mention the inter-generational transmission 
occurring in the womb, the matrixial feminine specificity is to an extent biological; 
however, instead of remaining within the realm of anatomy, Ettinger treats these issues 
as inspirations, utilising the female flesh as a model of relations and difference, and 
not placing it at any side of the sex / gender dichotomy. In this respect, Pollock 
proposes that the female-maternal bodily specificity is a “thinking apparatus for 
human subjectivity.”25 As one can observe, while in part the Ettingerian body eludes 
                                                 
23 It is discussed in Chapter 1, section: Not Only the Phallus. 
24 Ettinger, “Diotima and the Matrixial Transference,” p. 116. 
25 Griselda Pollock, “Mother Trouble: The Maternal-feminine in Phallic and Feminist Theory in 
Relation to Bracha Ettinger’s Elaboration of Matrixial Ethics/Aesthetics,” Studies in the Maternal, Vol. 
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the above categorisations, it becomes hardly possible to conceive of the notion of the 
body entirely outside of these frames. 
Despite its apparent femininity, the Ettingerian notion of the body becomes the 
source of universal experience. It ought not to be mistaken for a form of essentialism 
– Ettinger strongly opposes such an approach, emphasising that she does not make any 
claims about women having to experience motherhood in order to grasp the matrixial 
sphere.26 She does not define the womb as a “natural” basis of man / woman difference; 
nor is it an “origin, […] a passive receptivity or passive internal container.”27 Instead 
of seeking the “substance,” Ettinger compares the matrixial difference to the phallic 
one, noting that both are available to men and women, and not to one of the genders 
exclusively.28 The main discrepancy lies in the structuring of these differences. The 
phallic one is grounded upon, among others, a binary opposition between having or 
not having a particular organ; the phallus, in this sense, is experienced as either a 
possessed attribute or a lacking / lost one. The matrixial difference, in turn, deals with 
being with-in the female-maternal body. For such an encounter-event there is no 
dichotomy-based alternative: it is a phase that each emerging human being necessarily 
goes through. The female body, as a result, becomes a universal site which all the 
subjects have experienced and may experience again, but by no means is it a 
universalised body. 
In part, Ettinger’s reading of the female body as a site of humanising experience 
of encounter (cor)responds to Elizabeth Grosz’s postulate concerning the need for 
rethinking the feminine corporeality. Having uncovered the hidden male agenda of the 
                                                 
1, No. 1 (2009), p. 13, http://www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk/back_issues/issue_one/GriseldaPollock.pdf 
(access: 29 November 2013). Emphasis mine. 
26 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 180. 
27 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 180. 
28 See: Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 140. 
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so-called universal body in the philosophers listed above, Grosz enumerates possible 
directions that may contribute to affirmative, non-patriarchal “women’s self-
representations.”29 Among others, she recognises the necessity of the female flesh to 
be liberated from the biologically determined frame (which considerably narrows and 
simplifies its potentialities). She also hints at the advantages of utilising “the psychical 
or interior dimensions of subjectivity and the surface corporeal exposures of the 
subject to social inscription and training”30; in other words, Grosz indicates that both 
the internal and the external aspects play a significant role in thinking the feminine 
body and subjectivity. Next to biological determinism, dualism as well as monism are 
other perspectives that Grosz suggests ought to be eluded; simultaneously, she 
advocates a theorisation of the woman which relies on “(at least) two surfaces”31 that 
do not necessarily fuse. Independently, Bracha L. Ettinger is guided by similar 
motivations. When her matrixial psychoanalysis is concerned, biological determinism 
is an issue that, as I believe, does not require a re-introduction. Turning to the interior 
/ exterior relation in reference to matrixial subjectivity, one can observe that both 
elements reappear in the theory,32 but what gains significance is the internal aspect; 
also, the matrixial subjecitivising sphere is not focused on the social, and the theorist 
herself seldom tackles this question. An evident correspondence, in turn, can be found 
in the study of dualism and related issues. To specify, one of the basic Ettingerian 
terms is severality, which always refers to two or more becoming subjects within the 
matrix: subjects that do not merge into one another, enter a symbiotic relation, or turn 
                                                 
29 Grosz, Volatile Bodies, p. 188. I aim at discussing just several propositions – the most relevant ones 
with regard to Ettinger’s theory. For all postulates, see: Grosz, Volatile Bodies, pp. 188-189. 
30 Grosz, Volatile Bodies, p. 188. 
31 Grosz, Volatile Bodies, p. 189. What she seems to propose is a multilayered theorisation of femininity 
and female corporeality, but she does not recognise or strictly define the abovementioned “surfaces.” 
32 See the analysis of the inside / outside binary regarding the womb in Chapter 1, section: Not Only the 
Phallus. 
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into a multitude.33 To summarise, although Grosz’s postulates are rather guidelines 
than conditions of a “successful” reading of the female flesh, the alliance of the two 
feminists is meaningful since both of them identify the need to escape phallic and 
patriarchal paradigms by means of a supplementary mode, and not a binary opposition. 
What seems to be implied in their postulates is the usefulness of a new perspective on 
the female corporeality for women. The question that may be posed in this respect is: 
do men need a new reading of the feminine? Also, to what extent can such a reading 
be relatable to both women and men?  
 
3. Fe-male Privilege  
Let us begin with addressing the latter question, related to the issue of accessing 
the matrix by females and males. Although Ettinger makes it clear that the matrixial 
domain is open for both sexes, she simultaneously notes that men and women occupy 
different positions in terms of potentialities of entering it. As it has been noted, the 
womb becomes “an archaic out-site and past-side” for both males and females; females 
exclusively are subject to the womb’s another spectrum – an “in-site/future-side.”34 
Ettinger does not deny this difference; she goes as far as to describe females’ access 
to the matrixial sphere as “double” and thus their position regarding it – “privileged.”35 
Yet, the theorist adds right away that the privilege ought not to be understood in the 
basic sense of the word, but as “access to surplus-of-fragility,”36 which by no means 
is safe, satisfactory, or comfortable. Ettinger also states that the differentiation 
                                                 
33 The notion of severality is discussed in Chapter 1, section: Trans-subjective Matrixial Ethics. 
34 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 143. Emphasis mine. It is discussed in Chapter 1, section: Not 
Only the Phallus. 
35 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 182. 
36 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 182. Emphasis mine. 
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occurring between a girl-infant and a woman-mother during the prenatal period reveals 
the insufficiency of lack as a marker of difference. We read: 
If each female differs from a woman first, a subject doesn’t desire only 
lacking objects (objet a), as Lacan would have it. There is a languishing 
beating by com-passionate connecting and by fascinance […]. This kind 
of yearning for binding-in-difference is healed by new vibrations of a com-
passionate non-sexual love in future cross- and trans-connectedness (also 
interwoven inside sexual love).37 
What the girl-infant brings to the notion of difference is a desire for com-passion and 
linkages while the minimal separation between her and the mother is maintained. Such 
yearning, or languishing, is considered to be crucial for the girl’s further – postnatal – 
development, but it also carries more universal implications for all the matrixially 
understood subjects. Still, pronouncing the becoming prenatal subject as a female is 
not a coincidence – earlier in the article Ettinger mentions the status of “the female 
and male daughter”38 in the matrix. Even though in this excerpt we read that the subject 
can be both male and female, the implication about the predominant gender is obvious 
here – s/he is a “daughter.” We cannot thus ignore the intensity with which the woman 
occupies this realm and the seeming inexistence – or irrelevance – of the masculine 
reference.  
Even though the matrixial difference is claimed not to be grounded upon gender 
distinctions or the “essentialistic raw data”39 of human anatomy, it nevertheless has 
varying resonances depending on the type of body that gets entangled with the female-
motherly corporeality in the subjectivising process. That is to say, while women are 
“privileged” when accessing the matrix, the male corporeality itself poses a certain 
                                                 
37 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Antigone with(out) Jocaste,” in: Interrogating Antigone in Postmodern 
Philosophy and Criticism, eds. S. E. Wilmer and Audronė Žukauskaitė (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), p. 221. Emphasis in the original. 
38 Ettinger, “Antigone with(out) Jocaste,” p. 215. Emphasis in the original. Later in the article, Ettinger 
states that, matrixially, “each son is also a daughter.” Ettinger, “Antigone with(out) Jocaste,” p. 227. 
Emphasis in the original. 
39 Ettinger, “Art as the Transport-station of Trauma,” p. 112. 
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limit. Males are, after the prenatal period, permanently separated from the womb, it 
being an outside space for them, accessed in the past with no future potentiality.40 
Ettinger puts it bluntly: “The adult male will not experience pregnancy and therefore 
will not coemerge again matrixially in that primary and radical real sense.”41 This 
shows how expressly men are deprived of the access to the Real of the “in-site/future-
side.” What is more, it is claimed that the male body has a special resonance with the 
phallic type of difference as the opposition between having and not having a sexual 
organ becomes an instant reference point, or “a corporeal self-evidence.”42 
Nevertheless, Ettinger finds the possibilities for men of re-turning postnatally to the 
matrixial sphere in participation in various aesthetic activities – for instance “music, 
painting, and dance”43 – and in transference, which in the matrixial theory is seen 
through the prism of com-passion and creation of linkages between the I and the non-
I44; these two aspects are applicable to both of the sexes. In a sense, therefore, the 
matrixial experience becomes an im-possibility for males – it is accessible, but to a 
lesser extent as a result of their corporeality. Even though it is difficult not to assess it 
as a huge limitation and not to recognise the matrixial psychoanalysis as a highly 
“feminised” one, we can observe certain symmetry here: after all, within the male body 
centred systems we can identify similar – although reverse – mechanisms.45 Also, 
Ettinger does not try to hide the discrepancies between male and female access to the 
matrix; despite these disparities, she considers the matrix to be an originary 
                                                 
40 See: Ettinger, “Diotima and the Matrixial Transference,” p. 126; Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” 
p. 143. 
41 Ettinger, “Diotima and the Matrixial Transference,” p. 126. 
42 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 195. 
43 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 143. 
44 See: Ettinger, “Diotima and the Matrixial Transference,” pp. 105-132. 
45 These mechanisms are discussed in Chapter 1, section: Not Only the Phallus. 
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subjectivising space for all sexes, necessary for one’s further development as a 
human(e) being. 
Even though the matrixial theory has its source in the female body, pregnancy, 
motherhood, and becoming-together, Ettinger draws a line between these encounter-
events and any restrictions concerning women’s reproductive rights. The theorist 
identifies herself with feminism and emphasises that she is a supporter of women’s 
rights.46 She also notes that there are two radical poles of treating the female 
corporeality. One of them is the essentialist claim that a woman’s main role is that of 
a mother; the other immediately rejects any theoretical uses of the feminine body, 
identifying them as perilous. Not positing herself on any of the sides, Ettinger claims 
they can be equally dangerous.47 She stresses that the matrixial frame can by no means 
be interpreted as restricting women’s rights since the matrix is founded on response-
ability, a notion different from – and broader than – responsibility48 and including 
“women’s full response-ability for any event occurring with-in their own not-One 
corpo-Reality.”49 Less an argument than a confirmation of Ettinger’s position, this 
quotation may not be sufficient in a debate regarding women’s rights.50 One ought to 
bear in mind, however, that even though this theory encourages certain social or 
political readings, it is still a psychoanalytical system, and its theses concerned with 
                                                 
46 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 179. 
47 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 179. 
48 The notion of response-ability is introduced in Chapter 2, section: A Prototype for Connectedness, 
and is explored further in Chapter 5. 
49 Bracha L. Ettinger, “The With-In-Visible Screen,” in: The Matrixial Borderspace, p. 221n.9. 
50 In this context, Griselda Pollock writes: “[T]he exploration of the prenatal does not in any way 
prejudice the woman’s right to choose. In fact, the ethics of this asymmetry enhance the adult subject’s 
rights over her shared body and support the choice positions of the maternal partner who is the only 
adult who can choose for this profound partnership in difference.” Pollock, “Mother Trouble,” p. 25. 
Although it utilises a number of matrixial concepts, this excerpt generates more questions than answers, 
for instance, What is the ethics of asymmetry?, In what sense is the statement that the adult is the only 
one to make a decision in the encounter matrixially grounded?, or Does it not diminish the role of the 
becoming-infant in the encounter? As I believe, however, this statement does not aim at being part of 
the discussion on women’s rights; rather, it intends to assure the potential reader that this theory will 
not try to appropriate and essentialise women’s bodies. In this sense, it fully agrees with Ettinger’s 
intention. 
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pregnancy and relations with-in the female body are not congruent with any social, 
political, or medical discourse concerning reproduction and reproductive rights. As a 
result, while it is a challenge to use the matrixial theory as an argument for women’s 
reproductive rights, simultaneously this system poses no threat to them. 
Keeping in mind the above argument, is there any possibility of an essentialist, 
biologically determined, or right wing interpretation of the matrixial theory? Before 
we focus on the matrixial realm and its take on motherhood, we shall investigate the 
figure of the father, since it provides a mirror-like context. In his article on right wing 
readings of Lacan, Jan Potkański refers to Bruce Fink’s reflections on the 
contemporary position of the father, found in A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian 
Psychoanalysis. As Fink claims, the father who, among others, “does not believe 
fathers should wield authority over their children, believes children are rational 
creatures and can understand adult explanations, […] wants to be loved not feared”51 
poses a threat recognised by Lacan – a threat to the symbolic paternal function, whose 
rejection can eventuate, for instance, in perversion or psychosis.52 However, as 
Potkański argues, in his writings Lacan does not ascribe “practical-pedagogical or 
socio-political interpretation”53 to the Name of the Father and its rejection. Potkański 
goes on to claim that the paternal function, which itself is an abstract term, and the 
father’s role in society ought not to be coupled as there is no adequate link between 
them.54 Returning to the matrixial theory, Ettinger’s depictions of the encounter-event 
in pregnancy, of the mother-child relations, or of trans-connectedness and affective 
                                                 
51 Bruce Fink, A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis. Theory and Technique (Cambridge, 
MA and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 180. Potkański uses the Polish 
translation of the book: Bruce Fink, Kliniczne wprowadzenie do psychoanalizy lacanowskiej. Teoria i 
technika, trans. Łukasz Mokrosiński (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Andrzej Żórawski, 2002). 
52 Fink, A Clinical Introduction to Lacanian Psychoanalysis, p. 111. 
53 Jan Potkański, “Przeciw lacanowskiej prawicy,” Śląskie Studia Polonistyczne, no. 1 (2013), p. 54. 
Translation mine. 
54 Potkański, “Przeciw lacanowskiej prawicy,” p. 54.  
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communication in the womb, to name a few issues, may appeal to theorists and 
philosophers who attempt to derive the social function and reproductive rights of the 
woman from essentialism and biological determinism. Yet, if one immerses deeper 
into Ettinger’s thought, one has to note a number of discrepancies that limit both such 
readings and those which seek to translate the psychoanalytical model directly into 
social relations without recognising the gap between the two spheres, as in the above 
argument by Potkański. One of the discrepancies is the difference between hospitality 
(towards a becoming subject co-inhabiting one’s body) and duty (to privilege the 
infant’s well-being). Matrixial hospitality embraces vulnerability, rejection of 
narcissism, willingness to co-transform, and openness to the Other despite the risk he 
or she poses, but simultaneously, as a concept, it is based on decision and readiness; 
an ideological orientation of the reproductive rights at the a priori moral obligation of 
the woman-mother can be hardly combined with such a stance as it challenges the 
question of choice. Also – and this mirrors Potkański’s position – the matrixial abstract 
of motherhood cannot simply be placed in the social or political contexts and legitimise 
a cultural role for every woman. What one, however, cannot deny is the metaphorical 
or rhetorical strength of Ettinger’s portrayals of the pregnancy-, intrauterine-, and 
motherhood-related questions. To summarise, just as the father in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis does not necessarily reflect the father’s social role, the Ettingerian 
woman-mother cannot be taken for a particular woman, but instead is a 
psychoanalytical figure of relations between subjects; nevertheless, elements of this 
theory may be of use for fundamentally different discourses, but mainly as metaphors 
or rhetorical tools. 
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4. Ettingerian Mythos 
Having discussed the male / female tension in the matrixial apparatus with a 
focus on particular concepts, we may now turn to the male and female figures used by 
Ettinger in order to examine the implications they carry for the theory and the 
abovementioned dyad. We might say that Ettinger’s thought is “crowded” with 
characters – mostly women – from various fields. Ettinger refers to literary examples, 
such as Lol Stein from Marguerite Duras’s novel or literary personas from Sylvia 
Plath’s poems,55 and to cinematography (Hiroshima mon amour written also by 
Marguerite Duras56). With regard to ancient philosophy, Ettinger considers Diotima, 
but she also comments upon psychoanalytical cases, among others Freud’s Dora and 
Donald Winnicott’s Margaret Little.57 Nevertheless, Ettinger’s two main sources of 
inspiration are the Bible and Greek mythology. Eurydice and Saint Anne have already 
been analysed, the former reflecting the paradoxical nature of the matrixial encounter 
as an encounter that breaks seemingly fixed dichotomies, the latter being a patroness 
of both the matrix and the Mizocz women from the photograph.58 Regarding Moses, 
Ettinger identifies him as “Father precisely because he carries like the mother caries 
infants,”59 thus remaining in proximity to the discussed stance of Emmanuel Lévinas.60 
                                                 
55 For the analysis of Lol Stein, see: Ettinger, “Fascinance and the Girl-to-m/Other Matrixial Feminine 
Difference,” pp. 60-93. For the reflections on Sylvia Plath’s poems, see, among others: Bracha L. 
Ettinger, “Demeter–Persephone Complex, Entangled Aerials of the Psyche, and Sylvia Plath,” English 
Studies in Canada, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2014), pp. 123-154. 
56 See: Bracha L. Ettinger and Kyoko Gardiner, “Affectuous Encounters: Feminine-matrixial 
Encounters in Duras/Resnais’ Hiroshima Mon Amour,” in: PostGender: Gender, Sexuality and 
Performativity in Japanese Culture, ed. Ayelet Zohar (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 
2009), pp. 251-275. 
57 See: Ettinger, “Diotima and the Matrixial Transference,” pp. 105-132; Dora is discussed in a number 
of texts, including “Fascinance and the Girl-to-m/Other Matrixial Feminine Difference” and “Demeter–
Persephone Complex,” while Winnicott, among others, is mentioned in “Demeter–Persephone 
Complex.” 
58 See: Chapter 1, section: Almost-boundless Canvas Space. 
59 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Laius Complex and Shocks of Maternality: With Franz Kafka and Sylvia Plath,” 
in: Interdisciplinary Handbook of Trauma and Culture, eds. Yochai Ataria, David Gurevitz, Haviva 
Pedaya, and Yuval Neria (Springer International Publishing Switzerland, 2016), p. 282. Emphasis in 
the original. 
60 See: Chapter 2, section: A Prototype for Connectedness.  
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Yet, there are more biblical and mythological figures that are worthy of further 
exploration. The main reason for focusing on these two groups of characters is that 
mythological and biblical figures frequently become valuable contributions to the 
matrixial theory, whereas other examples only portray theoretical considerations. 
Another reason is quantitative – mythological and biblical references prevail in this 
system. The aim of this section is to provide an insight into this “Ettingerian mythos” 
with a special emphasis put on gender issues on the one hand, and on its relevance for 
the matrixial borderspace in terms of corporeality and ethics on the other hand. 
Maternity as a site of pain and trust is identified in the figure of the primary 
biblical woman-mother, Eve. Having gone through the tragedy of one of her sons 
killing another, Eve decides – in Ettinger’s reading – to trust; we read: “she trusted life 
to carry again.”61 She gives birth to her third son, Seth,62 who, in turn, is a father of 
Enosh – whose name signifies “human being” and “humankind” – and a direct ancestor 
of Noah, the forefather of the whole post-flood humanity. Eve’s motherly body thus 
becomes the originary site of all human beings; she hospitably allows her body to be 
inhabited despite the pain she has experienced and the fear that presumably 
accompanies her choice.63 This position contributes to Ettinger’s concept of carriance, 
in which carrying, being and having been carried (within the mother’s body), caring, 
and being cared for are intertwined, as the very name suggests, but which goes even 
                                                 
61 Ettinger, “Carriance, Copoiesis and the Subreal,” p. 344. Emphasis in the original. The question of 
trust also returns in Ettinger’s art, most explicitly in one of her notebooks – two pages are covered 
mostly with the repetition of this word. See: Bracha L. Ettinger, Notebook, 2005, Indian ink, fountain 
pen, double-page spread from 19x19 cm notebook, in: Art as Compassion: Bracha L. Ettinger, eds. 
Catherine de Zegher and Griselda Pollock (Brussels: ASA Publishers, 2012), pp. 144-145. See: 
Appendix, p. 231. 
62 Ettinger argues that this name in Hebrew has the root “N.Sh.A,” and that it “means carry.” See: Brigit 
M. Kaiser and Kathrin Thiele, “If You Do Well, Carry! The Difference of the Humane. An Interview 
with Bracha L. Ettinger,” philoSOPHIA: A Journal of Continental Feminism, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2018), p. 
107. Emphasis in the original. 
63 In terms of suffering connected to the death of son, Eve bears similarities to yet another significant 
mother figure of the Bible, Virgin Mary; this figure, however, resurfaces not in Ettinger’s theoretical 
reflections but in her aesthetic ouevre – in the motif of Pietà. 
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further in its ethical implications. Ettinger specifies: “Carriance = care+response-
ability+wit(h)nessing in self-fragilization is a direct path to ethics: witnessing and 
responsibility to the vulnerable other.”64 Carriance grasps the matrixial relation which 
involves the ability to respond compassionately, to be attentive, and to tend to the 
intimate yet unknown Other, ignoring the potential danger that comes with such a 
fragilising enocunter. “[T]rust[ing]” and “carr[ying] again,” Eve embodies carriance 
as she opens herself for a new human life with all its threats and promises. 
Eve’s trust can be linked to Ettinger’s study of Isaac and his relation with 
Abraham. Referring to Caravaggio’s painting Sacrifice of Isaac (1603), Griselda 
Pollock describes the situation as an “act of paternal violence against his [Abraham’s] 
vulnerable, trusting son,” whom she portrays further as “the helpless child […] crying 
out in protest and terror.”65 Despite the fact that Isaac’s trust is betrayed – after all, his 
father seems to be ready to sacrifice him and is interrupted just before committing this 
act – Ettinger asks the reader to try to “imagine Isaac’s compassion for his father.”66 
Since at first glance it is an abstract request, Ettinger makes her stance clearer. Here, 
compassion is not supposed to mean one’s ability to understand or forgive the Other, 
as it is prior to mere empathy in terms of both chronology and significance.67 The 
source of such primary compassion is argued to be found, again, in the maternal-
matrixial mode: 
Isaac was compassionate toward his father, because, as Infant, he had 
already been compassionate toward his mother, apprehending her 
                                                 
64 Ettinger, “Carriance, Copoiesis and the Subreal,” p. 344. 
65 Griselda Pollock, “From Horrorism to Compassion. Re-facing Medusan Otherness in Dialogue with 
Adriana Caverero and Bracha Ettinger,” in: Visual Politics of Psychoanalysis. Art and the Image in 
Post-traumatic Cultures, ed. Griselda Pollock (London and New York: I. B. Tauris, 2013), p. 180. 
Emphasis mine. 
66 Bracha L. Ettinger, “From Proto-ethical Compassion to Responsibility: Besideness and the Three 
Primal Mother-phantasies of Not-enoughness, Devouring and Abandonment,” Athena, No. 1 (2006), p. 
100. 
67 Ettinger, “From Proto-ethical Compassion to Responsibility,” p. 124. 
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compassionate hospitality uncognizingly, and emotionally feel-knowing 
the trauma he had been to her in her bringing him to life.68 
The choice of Isaac as a point of reference ought not to be read as a pretext to explore 
the specificity of the matrixial space. On the contrary, this child’s extreme and 
incomprehensible situation is necessary here to understand that compassion theorised 
by Ettinger goes beyond and before the phallic logic, for it is a direct result of the 
matrixial encounter. Compassion, hospitality, and trauma accompany the prenatal 
becoming-subject and influence its development, including the postnatal one. Ettinger 
goes even further, stating that “[a] perpetrator can kill the subject, but it has no hold 
on its archaic compassionate potentiality.”69 Isaac’s trust, therefore, may have been 
violated, but this does not take away his originary capability for compassion. 
In one of her articles, Ettinger shares a number of reflections on Abraham, 
biblical figures directly related to him (Sarah, Hagar, Isaac, Ishmael), and a standard 
response to his action; these reflections do not constitute a complete theoretical stance, 
but the family relations discussed reveal the structuring of the matrix and bear an 
ethical charge. The theorist begins with a critique of “the denial of our human 
potentiality to become an Abraham who might abandon and kill.”70 Even though such 
deeds cannot be excluded from the catalogue of human actions, they are treated as 
unimaginable and appalling; coping mechanisms used in this respect are grounded 
upon identifying Abraham as the Other, and separating him from both his family 
members (especially Isaac) and ourselves as humans.71 Establishing the definite, 
impassable distance, these mechanisms solidify the denial of the idea that we may be 
capable of committing similar wrongs. Further on, Ettinger poetically portrays 
                                                 
68 Ettinger, “From Proto-ethical Compassion to Responsibility,” p. 124. Emphasis in the original. 
69 Ettinger, “From Proto-ethical Compassion to Responsibility,” p. 125. 
70 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Uncanny Awe, Uncanny Compassion and Matrixial Transjectivity beyond 
Uncanny Anxiety,” French Literature Series, Vol. 38 (2011), p. 16. 
71 Ettinger, “Uncanny Awe, Uncanny Compassion,” p. 16. 
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matrixial connectedness, making references and allusions to Abraham’s relatives; this 
dense excerpt goes as follows: 
A child is being abandoned. […] If you are opened to the matrixial horizon 
you know that an individual might be unconsciously metramorphosing 
traces of the trauma of someone else, who belongs to the same matrixial 
web. You might suddenly realise that the child that had been abandoned is 
another child, perhaps even one that is unknown to you, another child of 
your own father […], an unknown half-brother, someone else who had 
been abandoned by a parent, sent to some kind of desert, like the Biblical 
son of Hagar. Perhaps even, a mother is being abandoned – this mother is 
not your own one, but still, she is someone who belongs to the fabric of 
your matrixial webs […], and she reveals for you the capacity of the other 
to abandon, and your own capacity to abandon too. […] We carry traces of 
the trauma and of the joy of others who belong to our past and present 
webs. When you realise this possibility – another dimension for dream 
interpretations opens. If you are Abraham’s child, sometimes you are the 
son of Sara[h], sometimes you are the son of Hagar.72 
Within the matrix, one may encounter and affectively work through the fragments of 
memory, pain, and trauma which do not originate in the subject, but belong to one’s 
intimate Other. The Other is intimate in the sense that he or she and the said subject 
share the matrixial rhizome-like web even though they do not have to know each other. 
Still, in such a web, information is transferred, via which the subject learns also about 
abandonment. Finally, the last sentence from this excerpt is emblematic as matrixial 
connectedness goes further than the bloodline – it is not transmitted merely between 
one generation and the next. In the matrix, one may have access to the traces belonging 
not only to one’s “immediate” Others, such as parents, but also to those one does not 
recognise, which does not diminish the significance of such a relation. 
The issue of abandonment, hinted at above, takes us to the mythical figures of 
Antigone and Jocaste. In Ettinger’s reading, several actions of Jocaste are encrypted 
in Antigone, some of which have taken place before Antigone’s birth. The surface 
level is that of incestuous marriage with Oedipus, her son who becomes Antigone’s 
father and brother simultaneously. Yet, when one goes further, a “much earlier 
                                                 
72 Ettinger, “Uncanny Awe, Uncanny Compassion,” pp. 22-23. Emphasis in the original. 
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offence”73 of Jocaste can be found. This offence it threefold. Firstly, she abandoned 
Oedipus (which actually saved him from death) and then her other children by 
committing a suicide. Secondly, she collaborated with Laius, passively accepting his 
“paternal paranoid jealousy and an envy of the infant’s fate.”74 Finally, she is identified 
as a survivor – she survived her own act of abandonment. Antigone, thus, is raised in 
the shadow of her mother, who is capable of abandonment, and of her abandoned 
father-brother. As a result, two complexes function within her, the Oedipus complex 
and the Jocaste complex, the latter one corresponding to one of three primal phantasies 
proposed by Ettinger – the primal mother-phantasy of abandonment.75 Why is the 
Jocaste complex significant? Ettinger argues that the situation here is similar to that of 
the Oedipus complex. Namely, the Oedipus complex frees actual fathers from 
responsibility for that which “surpasses individual fathering and touches a human 
suffering,” and actual mothers are in need of a corresponding complex, which can 
“humanize” their “place/position.”76 Antigone and Jocaste’s difficult relation becomes 
a sui generis archetype of a universal psychological experience. 
Ettinger’s reading of Laius, the father of Oedipus, in part responds to the 
question about the necessity of a new take on the feminine from the male perspective. 
In one of her articles, Ettinger briefly hints at the existence of the “feminine man-to-
man difference.”77 This issue is further developed in the context of the mythical figure 
                                                 
73 Ettinger, “Antigone with(out) Jocaste,” p. 216. 
74 Ettinger, “Antigone with(out) Jocaste,” p. 217. 
75 Ettinger argues that in the clinical analyst-patient situation the analyst frequently employs the ready-
made mother-monster figure, according to which the mother becomes a reason for the majority of the 
patient’s problems. Ettinger notes that the frequency of using this figure points to a blank spot in 
psychoanalysis necessary to be filled, and what she proposes instead of shifting the guilt upon the 
mother are three primal mother-phantasies, expanding the basic list. These are the phantasies of not-
enoughness, devouring, and abandonment. Ettinger, “From Proto-ethical Compassion to 
Responsibility,” pp. 100-135. 
76 Ettinger, “Antigone with(out) Jocaste,” p. 216. For Griselda Pollock’s reading of Antigone (and 
Oedipus), see: Griselda Pollock, “Beyond Oedipus: Feminist Thought, Psychoanalysis, and Mythical 
Figurations of the Feminine,” in: Laughing with Medusa: Classical Myth and Feminist Thought, eds. 
Vanda Zajko and Miriam Leonard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 67-117. 
77 Ettinger, “Antigone with(out) Jocaste,” p. 220. 
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of Laius, who is governed by, above all, two impulses. The former one is related to his 
rape of Chrysippus, which leads to the boy’s suicide; Ettinger identifies it as the 
“envious erotic-aggressive” impulse. The latter one concerns his son: Laius wishes to 
sacrifice – that is, kill – him. Ettinger finds an equivalent of the myth in the clinical 
situation in which the analyst conceals a Laius complex78; this poses a danger of 
pathologising “the son’s creativity,”79 which may entail further – possibly tragic – 
occurences. Also, this results in rejecting and de-subjectifying the mother in the name 
of the dyadic relation. Ettinger postulates that these “pervert father-son relations”80 
may and should be resisted and even mended by means of the matrixial difference. 
Compassionate carriance and self-fragilisation are believed to hamper Laius’s impulse 
and to lead to “an ethical position of paternality where to have more power will mean 
to have more responsibility, not tyranny.”81 Characterised by the act of “carrying” his 
people, Moses is presented as a paternal figure informed by the matrix82 and thus a 
potential alternative to destructive Laius. 
So far, all the examined figures were burdened with loss, pain, and trauma (or 
themselves imposed such burdens on others); Demeter and Persephone’s case is no 
different in this respect, but this time Ettinger proposes an affirmative reading of the 
notion of a complex. Ettinger bases her considerations on the version of the myth in 
which Persephone makes it possible for Orpheus to enter the Underworld in his search 
for Eurydice because his endeavour reminds her of Demeter’s search for her. 
                                                 
78 Ettinger summarises the difference between the Oedipus complex and the Laius complex as follows: 
“The Oedipus complex is a child-version of what does the father want. In the Oedipus Complex the 
Father is viewed from the infant’s eyes. Yet other paternal possibilities are born with the arrival of 
parentality. Laius is one of the figures that mark a father-version of what a father wants.” Ettinger, 
“Laius Complex and Shocks of Maternality,” p. 282. Emphasis in the original. 
79 Ettinger, “Laius Complex and Shocks of Maternality,” p. 281. 
80 This is an excerpt from private e-mail correspondence with Bracha L. Ettinger, who has granted me 
permission to quote her directly. 
81 Ettinger, “Laius Complex and Shocks of Maternality,” p. 283. 
82 See: Ettinger, “Laius Complex and Shocks of Maternality,” pp. 282-283. 
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“Identification,” as Ettinger notes, “takes place here with the primordial mother as 
Love, an Eros beyond sexuality,” later called “the maternal-matrixial Eros of 
borderlinking.”83 Non-sexual and non-narcissistic but originary and compassionate, 
such love is not governed by the Oedipal logic of separation; it contributes to one’s 
process of becoming, which within the matrix always entails becoming-together.84 
That is why Ettinger asks rhetorically: “With Demeter so abased, her scars bleeding in 
the sky and on earth, does not Persephone, too, secretly bleed from her wounds?”85 In 
this context, Ettinger postulates the recognition of the Demeter–Persephone complex. 
What such recognition ought to result in is subjectivisation of both the mother and the 
daughter, and respect for the mother and her desire.86 Transsubjective linkages 
affirmed via this complex embrace sharing, compassion, and self-fragilisation, and 
thus they lead to a deeper understanding of the mother-subject’s own traumas instead 
of alienating or blaming her, which frequently is – according to Ettinger – the 
unwanted outcome of the clinical treatment. 
The Ettingerian mythos is dominated by women, particularly mothers and 
daughters; yet, even though male figures are outnumbered, they serve important 
functions in the system. Not only phallic counterparts, males can also be matrixial 
partners-in-difference. The example of such “matrixial masculinity” is Isaac; however, 
one cannot deny that his argued compassion originates in the female body-space. The 
features that connect the women portrayed above are maternity and mother–child 
relations, which usually imply pain and trauma, but also require an amount of trust to 
take a risk. What their female bodies offer is the prospect of humanising connectivity, 
even if such connectedness burdens the daughter. Alongside linkages, trust, 
                                                 
83 Ettinger, “Demeter–Persephone Complex,” p. 124. Emphasis in the original. 
84 It was discussed in Chapter 1, section: Trans-subjective Matrixial Ethics. 
85 Ettinger, “Demeter–Persephone Complex,” p. 128. 
86 See: Ettinger, “Demeter–Persephone Complex,” pp. 124, 125-126, 129-130. 
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compassion, and distress, there is also humanity, along with the persistently denied 
human capability to take away someone’s life or abandon someone, including one’s 
own son (or daughter). On the other side, Ettinger affirms non-sexual love that informs 
subjectivisation, mutual respect, and understanding. The above reflections – although 
based on non-theoretical figures – remain in the field of theory. The following part 
will be, in turn, concerned with Ettinger’s artistic practice; it will try to face the same 
questions – about gender, corporeality, and ethics – but with the use of different means. 
 
5. A Gendered Family Album 
Is Ettinger’s artistic oeuvre as feminised as her theoretical work? Ettinger 
points out that the theme of the artistic piece is not decisive in terms of the entrance to 
the matrixial borderspace; in other words, feminine motifs are by no means essential 
for art to be “matrixial.” However, she bluntly adds that while in general “it doesn’t 
matter,” in her case “it usually does.”87 It is hard not to agree with this statement. As 
it has already been explored, Ettinger deploys womb-like imagery in the late period of 
the Eurydice series.88 She intensifies this imagery in some of her works on paper, in 
which various elements are associated with the womb.89 Although such connotations 
are often related to the red colour – which recalls blood and thus carries the womb–
wound pair within itself – the shape is an equally significant trope. The shapes are 
frequently circular, but with gaps and breaches; the strokes of colour are watery and 
inconsistent. In part like intimate envelopes, these images may also connote dangerous 
and incomprehensible spaces. Moreover, some of her works exercise the inside–
                                                 
87 Bracha L. Ettinger, “And My Heart, Wound-space with-in Me. The Space of Carriance,” in: And My 
Heart Wound-space, pp. 357-358. 
88 See: Chapter 1, section: Almost-boundless Canvas Space. 
89 See my selection of works on paper, which were featured at the exhibition Bracha Lichtenberg 
Ettinger: Eurydice – Pieta in Muzeum Śląskie, Katowice, 7 July – 2 September 2017. See: Appendix, 
p. 232. 
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outside dichotomy, as it is difficult to decide whether the image may be read as the 
female body interior or the entrance to it. As a result, the womb experience is elevated 
in this series. 
While the womb indisputably is a feminine theme, we will now face family 
relations, turning from the mythical and biblical figures to Ettinger’s mother, father, 
and brother. Bluma and Uziel Lichtenberg have already been introduced; Mordechai, 
Ettinger’s brother, was born in Palestine in 1945.90 The three relatives inhabit 
Ettinger’s art, but one can spot differences between the representations of the mother 
and the male family members, regarding, among others, the quantity of their 
appearances; in this category, Bluma Lichtenberg outruns Uziel and Mordechai. The 
Mizocz women also have to be evoked here – they may be claimed to belong to the 
category of historical figures, but there is something relentlessly private and intimate 
in them for Ettinger, as noted before; they will not cease to emerge in this chapter, as 
they remain one of Ettinger’s greater motifs.91 Nevertheless, the abundance of female 
representations is not the only feature that may suggest the highly feminine character 
of this oeuvre; gender issues may also be revealed in artistic techniques and 
strategies.92 The discussion will feature artworks based on (at least) one of the three 
                                                 
90 See: “Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger: Chronology,” in: Art as Compassion, p. 249. 
91 See: Chapter 2, section: Aesth/ehical Encounter. 
92 Paintings and works on paper are not the only types of artistic practice Ettinger has been interested 
in. In 2009, Ettinger created an installation in the Freud Museum, London, entitled Resonance. Overlay. 
Interweave. Bracha L. Ettinger in the Freudian Space of Memory and Migration. In short, it was based 
on various additions and interventions, such as private photographs and other items, notebooks, and 
artworks, arranged in three museum rooms. I discuss the part of the installation placed in Freud’s 
consulting room in my article: Anna Kisiel, “Dis-obedience to the Father. Bracha L. Ettinger’s Theory 
and Installation Confronted with Freud and Lacan,” Romanica Silesiana, No. 12 (2017), pp. 53-63. In 
the article, I show how, in her theory and installation, Ettinger finds the place for the mother in the space 
of the Law of the Father. I conclude that “[i]nstead of trying to veil Freud’s room, Ettinger actively 
interacts with it, engaging in the dialogue and sharing experiences. She questions the Father and his 
rules, but in a creative way, as she notes the blind spots and ambiguities of his seemingly unquestionable 
laws. Yet, most importantly – she introduces the mother. […] [T]he woman-mother is given well-
deserved and longed-for sphere, yet instead of replacing the figure of the Law, she productively co-
exists with it” (Kisiel, “Dis-obedience to the Father,” pp. 61-62). This installation has various gender 
connotations and male / female relations to explore, but – as I believe – the results of such explorations 
would coincide with those I propose basing on the works of art chosen for this chapter. 
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following photographs: the already mentioned picture of Ettinger’s parents-to-be taken 
in 1936 in Łódź, the picture of Ettinger’s mother taken in Slovakia in 1941, and the 
family shot of Bluma with her both children from 1950, taken in Tel Aviv.93 
When exploring the images with the pre-war photo of Ettinger’s parents as a 
background, one may note the unceasingly present pattern of blur and coverage, and 
pose a question whether and how it is related to the figures of mother and father.94 In 
the image from the The Eye of the Compass–Lapsus series (ensemble I, drawing 4, 
1990), we can see both parents in purple surroundings moved towards the right side of 
the piece.95 They are juxtaposed with another reappearing motif – Gustaf Dalman’s 
book Hundert Deutsche Fliegerbilder aus Palaestina published in 1925, filled with 
aerial photographs of Palestine.96 In the artwork, the parents are not cropped, but the 
intensity of the purple colour makes them less visible. Uziel’s face seems to be less 
clear than Bluma’s, but simultaneously it is he who occupies a more central position 
in the image. However, this does not form a consistent theme – the blur works 
conversely, for instance, in the No Title–Sketch (1988–1989) analysed in the previous 
chapter, where it is the mother who stands centrally and whose face is vaguer.97 In an 
untitled piece from 1987–1989, sharing the same motifs (the photograph and the cover 
of Hundert Deutsche Fliegerbilder…), Bluma and Uziel are posited near the centre of 
                                                 
93 See: Griselda Pollock, “A Matrixial Installation: Artworking in the Freudian Space of Memory and 
Migration,” in: Art as Compassion, pp. 199-200. 
94 Some works with the motif of this photograph are discussed in Chapter 2, section: Aesth/ethical 
Encounter. In this chapter, I will explore different works (although the already used ones are still 
relevant and applicable) focusing on a different set of themes – those related to gender. 
95 Bracha L. Ettinger, The Eye of the Compass–Lapsus, ensemble I, drawing 4, 1990, Indian ink, 
xerography with photocopic dust, pigment and ashes on paper, 18.2x15.8 cm, in: Art as Compassion, p. 
58. See: Appendix, p. 233. 
96 Rosi Huhn writes more about this book and its implications; see: Rosi Huhn, “The Folly of Reason,” 
in: Art as Compassion, pp. 43-55. 
97 See: Bracha L. Ettinger, No Title-Sketch, 1988–1989, xerography with photocopic dust, pigment and 
ashes on paper, 22.3x24.9 cm, in: Art as Compassion, p. 207, discussed in Chapter 2. See: Appendix, 
p. 227. 
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the image, but this time their bodies are cropped.98 Moreover, their faces appear to 
fight for dominance with the letters comprising the title of the mentioned book, 
because of which it is difficult to grasp their expressions, while the mixture of red and 
purple forming a pattern partially covers the father’s body. The distortion goes in a 
peculiar direction in the untitled piece made in 1989.99 In this meeting of survivors 
with victims, Bluma and Uziel are hardly discernible while the bodies of women from 
Mizocz are unusually distinct (if one keeps in mind the later progress of the Eurydice 
series). The father’s face becomes almost invisible as it merges with the purple 
surroundings; the mother’s face, in turn, is as if obliterated with white smudges. It 
produces a paradoxical impression – even though Uziel’s face is less dim, it is the 
mother who attracts more attention. As can be seen in the above examples, blur is not 
a reliable trope in the case of Bluma and Uziel’s photograph for it is not permanently 
assigned to any of the figures. 
Another artistic “strategy” that touches both parents in Ettinger’s pieces is that 
of coverage initiated by the paint. In an untitled piece from 1986 in which the interplay 
of the photograph, the purple colour, and Hundert Deutsche Fliegerbilder… can be 
spotted again, Bluma and Uziel appear to be pushed to the left side by the expanding 
black surface.100 Their eyes and lips are made unavailable for the viewer, who can 
grasp only smears in their place. In Eurydice, No. 4 (1992–1994), the same happens 
again.101 The parents share the canvas with a page from a French-Hebrew dictionary; 
such entries as langage maternelle, vivante/morte, or languir are difficult to ignore 
                                                 
98 Bracha L. Ettinger, No Title, 1987–1989, Indian ink, xerography with photocopic dust, pigment and 
ashes on paper, 24x24.3 cm, in: Art as Compassion, p. 205. See: Appendix, p. 234. 
99 Bracha L. Ettinger, No Title, 1989 (detail), pastel crayon, xerography with photocopic dust, pigment 
and ashes on paper, 30.3x28.1 cm, in: Art as Compassion, p. 293. See: Appendix, p. 235. 
100 Bracha L. Ettinger, No Title, 1986, xerography with photocopic dust, pigment and ashes on paper, 
23x23.5 cm, in: Art as Compassion, p. 204. See: Appendix, p. 236. 
101 Bracha L. Ettinger, Eurydice, No. 4, 1992–1994, oil, xerography with photocopic dust, pigment and 
ashes on paper mounted on canvas, 36.8x27 cm, in: Art as Compassion, p. 95. See: Appendix, p. 237. 
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since their matrixial connotations are apparent. Frozen, purple and red machine-like 
movements have almost managed to cover Bluma and Uziel; their resistance has not 
been futile this time, but the spectator may be left with an impression that next time 
they may lose the battle. In both artworks, the bodies of Ettinger’s parents are under 
the threat of disappearance, and this threat may be considered equal for both of them. 
Hand in hand, they resist being removed from the canvas, arresting the painter’s 
gestures midway. 
Although Bluma and Uziel’s resistance is shared, it is indisputable that the 
father is never alone in the paintings – he appears either with his wife or not at all102 – 
while the mother becomes a recurring motif on her own. One of the photographs that 
function as the basis for this motif is that of Bluma during the war, in which she is 
captured while drinking from a vessel. According to Pollock, this image was supposed 
to let Uziel know she was alive.103 Ettinger repeats this gesture of affirming Bluma’s 
existence in, among others, her works on paper. In the images where she resurfaces, 
the future mother is a sole motif, not accompanied by the Eurydices or by her family 
members. In one of the works, she is as if sketched, almost invisible; we can recognise 
the shape of her body, but perhaps such an identification would not be easy if we knew 
nothing about the original photograph.104 This artwork is bright and delicate in contrast 
to another one, dominated by the purple colour.105 Here, the figure is even less clear – 
                                                 
102 Although it is impossible for me to check Ettinger’s whole oeuvre, so far I have not found any 
artwork in which the father is the sole figure, without Bluma by his side. 
103 Griselda Pollock, “Chapter 4. Resonance: The Consulting Room,” in: Griselda Pollock, Art in the 
Time-space of Memory and Migration: Sigmund Freud, Anna Freud, and Bracha L. Ettinger in the 
Freud Museum. Artwriting after the Event (Leeds: Wild Pansy Press, 2015), p. 68. 
104 Bracha L. Ettinger, Work on Paper (untitled), 1985, xerox and photocopic pigment and ashes, ink 
and chalk on paper, 25.2x22 cm. The artwork was featured at the exhibition Bracha Lichtenberg 
Ettinger: Eurydice – Pieta in Muzeum Śląskie, Katowice, 7 July – 2 September 2017. See: Appendix, 
p. 238. 
105 Bracha L. Ettinger, Work on Paper (untitled, no date), xerox and photocopic pigment and ashes, ink 
and chalk on paper, 23.5x24.5 cm. The artwork was featured at the exhibition Bracha Lichtenberg 
Ettinger: Eurydice – Pieta in Muzeum Śląskie, Katowice, 7 July – 2 September 2017. See: Appendix, 
p. 239. 
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the landscape of the photo is a combination of black and red spots with which the lower 
part of her body merges; the upper part, in turn, belongs to the purple background of 
the work on paper. The mother’s body thus becomes a hybrid of two surfaces, but it is 
hard to decide whether it exists on its own. Nevertheless, even if Bluma has almost-
disappeared from the examined works, a trace of her occupies them and brings her 
back to visibility. 
Re-workings of the photo of Ettinger’s mother, the abovementioned images 
may connote Roland Barthes’ Winter Garden Photograph, extensively studied in his 
Camera Lucida. The image of the author’s mother as a child becomes a vehicle for 
truth, long sought by him.106 This photograph is claimed to grasp the essence of the 
mother, even though it is not his mother yet – she is “the mother-as-child,”107 a child 
who “does not look ‘like’ her,” and whom Barthes “never knew.”108 One of the desires 
this image evokes in Barthes is that of exploring it further. We read:  
I look at it, I scrutinize it, as if I wanted to know more about the thing or 
the person it represents. Lost in the depths of the Winter Garden, my 
mother’s face is vague, faded. […] I want to outline the loved face by 
thought, to make it into the unique field of an intense observation; I want 
to enlarge this face in order to see it better, to understand it better, to know 
its truth […] [.] I decompose, I enlarge, and, so to speak, I retard, in order 
to have time to know at last. The Photograph justifies this desire, even if it 
does not satisfy it […].109 
Barthes, however, concludes bitterly that whatever actions he undertakes, in the end 
they are worthless since the photographic image is unable to communicate knowledge 
– it only shows the captured content.110 Ettinger’s relation with the mother – as read 
through the prism of her works on paper based on the image from 1941 – may be 
similar to that described by Barthes. Ettinger repeatedly works-through the image that 
                                                 
106 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida. Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard Howard (New York: 
Hill and Wang, 2010), pp. 67-71. 
107 Barthes, Camera Lucida, p. 71. 
108 Barthes, Camera Lucida, p. 103. 
109 Barthes, Camera Lucida, pp. 99-100. Emphasis in the original. 
110 Barthes, Camera Lucida, p. 100. 
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grasps her mother before maternity. No matter to what extent Ettinger manipulates the 
base picture, the figure of Bluma persistently remains on the verge of sight, revealing 
sometimes less and sometimes more; what is revealed, however, is hardly tangible for 
the viewer. What distinguishes the matrixial perspective from Barthes’ final remark 
on the nature of the image is the possibility of communicating information beyond the 
sole ability to see a captured object, even if this kind of content is not linguistic or fully 
comprehensible. 
What fragments of information do we receive when observing images based on 
the photo of Ettinger as a child with her mother and brother? Although the trope of 
blur and disappearance seems to be a dead end if considering Uziel Lichtenberg, in the 
case of Mordechai it arguably is more reliable. One of the early Eurydices – Eurydice, 
No. 3 (1992–1994)111 – is fully devoted to the maternal triad. All three persons occupy 
the frame; below them one can find the already mentioned excerpt from the dictionary, 
with the central position of phrases langage maternelle and vivante/morte. Even 
though Bracha, Bluma, and Mordechai are graspable, their faces are distorted or even 
deformed, which makes their expressions unnatural and ghostly. Still, it may be 
claimed that they are treated equally, all being arrested in vanishing. The situation 
changes in an untitled piece from 1984.112 Here, gradual disappearance is performed 
differently: the faces are not deformed, but instead they become more and more 
invisible, merging with the paper background. What is still distinctive are hair and 
elements of faces, including those of Ettinger’s doll held in her hands. Importantly, 
Bluma Lichtenberg’s and her daughter’s faces are notably clearer than Mordechai’s. 
                                                 
111 Bracha L. Ettinger, Eurydice, No. 3, 1992–1994, oil, xerography with photocopic dust, pigment and 
ashes on paper mounted on canvas, 28.7x23.4 cm, in: Art as Compassion, p. 84. See: Appendix, p. 240. 
112 Bracha L. Ettinger, No Title, 1984, xerography with photocopic dust, pigment and ashes on paper, 
23.9x18.5 cm, in: Art as Compassion, pp. 215, 279. There is a discrepancy concerning the date of 
making the artwork, as it is also dated 1986 in the same book (p. 279). See: Appendix, p. 241. 
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He accompanies them, but the process of disappearance is more advanced in his case. 
In turn, Matrix–Family Album, No. 3 (2003–2005) reduces the family unit to two 
figures.113 Even though the space for him is still kept, the brother is no longer there. 
The mother remains in the central position, and her face is the most visible: we still 
see a delicate smile and shapes of her eyes, whereas her skin merges with the 
background covered in mainly Hebrew words. Finally, her daughter is partly hidden 
by lines of purple paint; her mouth is covered, but her eyes are still focused on the 
viewer. As we can see, it is impossible to ignore the brother figure’s tendency to fade 
away from the view; nevertheless, although the mother–daughter connection is the 
main issue here, it seems to wend its way towards a breakdown. 
Let us explore further the relationship between the mother and daughter which 
resurfaces in the artworks with the above photo-motif, focusing on two themes – sight 
and silence. Grainy and fuzzy, Eurydice, No. 10 (1994–1996) draws attention to 
Bluma, who is as if full of comfort and peace of mind.114 When we seek Ettinger, we 
find her forehead and a ribbon, but the rest of her face seems to be gone. Yet, if we 
watch the painting closely, we discover her left eye, sharper than the rest of this figure. 
Not abandoning the image, Ettinger appears to keep it guarded against paint and other 
tools of distortion. Perhaps, she is also guarding the mother, shifting the usual roles. 
The question of protection – but also its connection with speech and its lack – becomes 
more significant if we take a look at an untitled artwork made between 1998 and 
1999.115 This time, the daughter’s eyes are smeared, and thus she is deprived of the 
                                                 
113 Bracha L. Ettinger, Matrix–Family Album, No. 3, 2003–2005, oil, xerography and photocopic dust, 
pigment and ashes on paper mounted on canvas, 39.5x26 cm, in: Art as Compassion, p. 219. See: 
Appendix, p. 242. 
114 Bracha L. Ettinger, Eurydice, No. 10, 1994–1996, oil, xerography with photocopic dust, pigment and 
ashes on paper mounted on canvas, 27.8x28.1 cm, in: Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger: Artworking, p. 104. 
Information about the work of art is taken from Art as Compassion, p. 270. See: Appendix, p. 243. 
115 Bracha L. Ettinger, Untitled, No. 2, 1998–1999, oil, xerography with photocopic dust, pigment and 
ashes on paper mounted on canvas, 29.7x23.1 cm, in: Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger: Artworking, p. 60. 
Information about the work of art is taken from Art as Compassion, p. 275. See: Appendix, p. 244. 
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ability to observe the viewer. Since one can still recognise fragments of Ettinger’s face, 
the mother is not left alone on the canvas. When one turns to Bluma, she, too, is made 
incomplete: her lips are covered by the purple line of paint. As a result of the painter’s 
gesture, she becomes a mother who cannot speak. This situation corresponds to 
Ettinger’s account of her parents’ refusal to talk about the Holocaust. She notes: “My 
parents are proud of their silence. It was their way of sparing others and their children 
from suffering. But in this silence all was transmitted except the narrative. In silence 
nothing can be changed in the narrative which hides itself.”116 The mother’s silence is 
associated with the wish to protect the children, that is, with the decision to try to limit 
their pain by not telling them stories of the war. The mother may have locked the 
“narrative,” but the traumatic information is shared nonetheless. It takes us back to the 
notions of the encounter, the matrix, and matrixial transconnectedness. Even if 
unconsciously, the mother delivers fragments of the hurtful message. The 
communication between the mother and her daughter may be marked by silence, but 
this act does not cease to carry a meaning. 
Another meaningful encounter takes place in the works of art that merge the 
post-war photograph with the pre-war one. In the foreground of Mamalangue–
‘Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism,’ ensemble V, No. 3 (1989–
1990), Bluma and Uziel walk the street of Łódź.117 If we compare them to other figures 
from photo-based images, they are rather visible and clear since we easily see their 
face expressions, postures, and clothes; we can even spot anonymous men standing 
                                                 
116 Bracha L. Ettinger, Matrix. Halal(a)–Lapsus. Notes on Painting, 1985–1992, trans. Joseph Simas 
(Oxford: Museum of Modern Art, 1993), quoted in: Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger: Artworking, p. 98. 
Emphasis mine. 
117 Bracha L. Ettinger, Mamalangue–‘Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism,’ ensemble 
V, No. 3, 1989–1990, Indian ink, xerography with photocopic dust, pigment and ashes on paper, 
22x21.7 cm, in: Art as Compassion, p. 209. The same theme is used, for instance, in: Bracha L. Ettinger, 
No Title, 1987–1989, Indian ink, xerography with photocopic dust, pigment and ashes on paper, 25.7x22 
cm, in: Art as Compassion, p. 206. See: Appendix, pp. 245, 246. 
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behind them in the original photograph. Yet, what is most interesting is the background 
as it interacts with the described figures. Namely, we can spot Ettinger’s faded face 
from the family photo. The face is posited in such a way that it converges with Bluma, 
whose head goes between the girl’s eyes and whose shoulders cover her smile. The 
mother–daughter line of communication appears to become the major theme of the 
piece; undeniably, the father does keep them company, but it is their bodies that 
intermingle whereas his is more radically separated. 
 
6. Perplexing Gender(lessness) 
Grounded upon the female corporeality and its events, the matrixial theory may 
appear to boldly reduce the male element. It is, however, an overly simplistic 
judgement, as this system is promising not only from the female perspective. Ettinger 
by no means suggests that the feminine body she proposes is universal or neutral; what 
she offers instead is a theorisation of an experience originating in the female body: an 
experience everyone has gone through. Although necessarily gendered, the matrixial 
feminine difference proposed by the theorist is applicable to both men and women. 
Women have a privileged position in this respect, but this does not mean that the matrix 
is closed for men; their access may be impossible “in that primary and radical real 
sense,” but they still have other paths, kept open because of the originary experience 
of being in the woman-mother’s body. Importantly, even though in this theory the 
emphasis is put on the female flesh and events with-in it (such as pregnancy, 
prenatality, and maternity), the matrix is far from being an essentialist concept, and 
Ettinger stresses that elements of this thought ought not to be used against women’s 
reproductive rights.  
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Men and women appearing in Ettinger’s oeuvre provide a crucial context in the 
discussion about gender, the matrix, and corporeal ethics. When the use of female and 
male figures in the matrixial theory is concerned, it is easy to assess who prevails: 
biblical and mythological women are the most significant “co-creators” of the system. 
Linked by their maternality, trust, and burdens they share with Others, these females 
provide a possibility of proto-ethical conjoining launched in their corporeality. In turn, 
such males as Isaac and Moses take the understanding of matrixial connectedness 
further, showing that while the origin of their matrixial structuring is a female body, 
such structuring goes beyond (having) it. Nevertheless, the main message resurfacing 
in Ettinger’s theoretical mythos concerns humanity, along with its positive and 
negative sides (even if the latter ones may be hard to conceive of and are often denied). 
When we turn to Ettinger’s artistic activity, we may note certain aesthetic strategies 
open to gender-based readings. The figures of her father and brother tend to 
occasionally haunt the paintings whereas the mother resides there on more permanent 
terms. All the family members equally struggle against gradual disappearance, but it 
is the mother who most frequently survives the strokes of paint and other artistic 
techniques. However, it seems that it is not a mere question of Bluma being a woman, 
and of Uziel and Mordechai being men. Rather, what proves to be most engaging is 
the very mother / daughter relation, intimate and convoluted, painful and intense. 
Almost-borderless and inherently corporeal, the humanising encounter between two 
becoming-Is does not cease to be the defining event of the matrixial subjectivising 
domain. 
 Part 2 
ENCOUNTERS IN COM-PASSION
 Chapter 4 
THROUGH / WITH / IN THE BODY 
THEOLOGICAL RESONANCES OF THE MATRIXIAL 
SPECIFICITY 
 
[A] virgin shall be with child, and shall 
bring forth a son.1 
 
Take, eat; this is my body.2 
 
[God] is “himself” the among: he is the 
with or the between of us.3 
 
1. Theological Resonances 
Eve, Isaac, Abraham, Sarah, Hagar, Moses, Saint Anne – the involvement of 
these figures in the previous part was crucial, as they testified to humanity, trust, 
compassion, and complexities of maternity. Above all, these men and women were not 
so much theological points of reference as – in a sense – embodiments of 
connectedness and other qualities that define the matrixial encounter. Believing that 
Bracha L. Ettinger’s theory and art can find allies in theological notions, in this chapter 
I am going to focus on theological resonances of the matrixial corporeality. In my 
view, these resonances are twofold: not only is it hard to ignore straightforward 
religious connotations of such terms as com-passion, covenant, or sacrifice, but it is 
also possible to provide theological readings of matrixial paradigms.  
                                                 
1 Matthew 1:23 (KJV); compare: Isaiah 7:14 (KJV). 
2 Matthew 26:26 (KJV). 
3 Jean-Luc Nancy, “In the Midst of the World,” in: Jean-Luc Nancy, Adoration. The Deconstruction of 
Christianity II, trans. John McKeane (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), p. 30. Emphasis in 
the original. 
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The aim of this chapter is to explore traces of the relationship between the 
matrixially understood body and theological tropes, and to face the question regarding 
the position of ethics at the intersection of these two. Although strictly theological 
interpretations of Ettinger’s thought are possible,4 this chapter does not aspire to take 
part in theological debates. Rather than theologians, philosophers engaged in 
theological reflections will be referenced for the sake of contextualising the matrixial 
body and examining its potential theological openings. The focus will be put on two 
religious traditions – Christianity and Judaism – as they form the two pillars of 
Ettinger’s entanglement in this field. As I will endeavour to prove, the matrixial 
aesth/ethics and the matrixial concepts entangled in or indebted to corporeality are 
abundant in biblical echoes which widen the scope of Ettinger’s oeuvre and thus open 
new paths for both strata – that of the matrix and that of theology. The chapter will 
begin with the study of theological patterns and modes that resurface in the matrixial 
theory. Such notions as incarnation, transcendence, separation, and (Lévinasian) 
encounter will be juxtaposed with the matrixial logic in order to trace possible 
interrelations and to highlight the points in which the matrix and discussed concepts 
diverge. In the next part, matrixial concepts will be treated as theology-based figures. 
Theological connotations of com-passion, covenant, and the matrixial interpretation of 
sacrifice will be explored with reference to such thinkers as Giorgio Agamben and 
Jacques Derrida. Finally, an artistic encounter – with a special emphasis put on an 
encounter with Ettinger’s Eurydices – will be evoked as an instance of revelation and 
messianism; a meeting with the women from Mizocz – who are simultaneously present 
                                                 
4 See: Mary Condren, “Relational Theology in the Work of the Artist, Psychoanalyst and Theorist 
Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger,” in: Through Us, with Us, in Us: Relational Theologies in the Twenty-first 
Century, eds. Lisa Isherwood and Elaine Bellchambers (London: SCM Press, 2010), pp. 230-263. 
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and absent in the paintings – will be portrayed as potentially revelatory and occurring 
in the messianic temporality. 
 
2. From Word to Flesh 
Emmanuel Lévinas’s ethics of an encounter provides us with a plethora of 
theological tropes which provoke an inspiring dialogue with Ettinger’s 
psychoanalysis. Before we proceed to a scrutiny of the notion of an encounter, let me 
briefly outline its religious entanglement, basing on Adam Lipszyc’s reading of traces 
of Judaism in this philosophical system. As Lipszyc observes, Lévinas identifies the 
religious dimension precisely in an encounter with the Other.5 We read that “[a]n 
encounter with the face is a real encounter with Otherness in a strong, religious sense, 
it is a ‘break in immanence’ and an opening on that which is truly transcendent.”6 Such 
an opening – an encounter with God, mediated by an “ethical gesture towards another 
human being”7 – is perceived as the only path to this dimension. Such aspects of the 
Lévinasian encounter as transcendence, separation, ethics, (lack of) dialogue, violence, 
and demand of the Other will be studied in detail in order to grasp the correspondences 
and dissonances between this notion and Ettinger’s revision of an encounter.8 
Lévinas’s analysis of the self / Other relation points to separation as a condition 
of ethics to emerge. In Totality and Infinity, radical alterity is supported by the notion 
of creation ex nihilo. “[T]he separated and created being” is posited here as “absolutely 
other” from its creator, or “a true other.”9 Necessarily transcendent and by no means 
                                                 
5 Adam Lipszyc, “Emmanuel Lévinas: Twarz za twarz,” in: Adam Lipszyc, Ślad judaizmu w filozofii 
XX wieku (Warsaw: Fundacja im. Prof. Mojżesza Schorra, 2009), p. 136. 
6 Lipszyc, “Emmanuel Lévinas,” p. 136. Translation mine. 
7 Lipszyc, “Emmanuel Lévinas,” p. 137. Translation mine. 
8 One of the integral elements of Lévinas’s ethics which corresponds to these terms – but which will not 
be discussed in this chapter – is the face. It is analysed in Chapter 5; as a consequence, some of the 
issues introduced in this chapter will return then. 
9 Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 63. 
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an alter ego,10 the Other ought to remain at a distance to produce a meaningful 
relationship with the I. Only in such a way can the I receive foreign knowledge, which 
has not originated in the I.11 Lévinas, therefore, strongly opposes the possibility of a 
more direct connection between two entities. We read: “[T]he Other cannot be 
contained by me: he is unthinkable – he is infinite and recognized as such.”12 
Containment would break the transcendence of the Other: it would blur the impassable 
boundary between the I and the non-I. Such an act connotes fusion, which blocks the 
formation of subjectivity. Also, the I cannot grasp the Other in his or her fullness: 
unconceivable, the Other can but be accessed fragmentarily and never becomes a part 
of the I. Still – as has been noted by Lipszyc – such an encounter breaches the 
immanent structure of the self and provides an opening to the transcendent Other. This 
opening, in turn, forms a basis of Lévinasian ethics, which involves embracing and 
taking responsibility for – but not appropriating or internalising – Otherness. As we 
can see, separation in this paradigm is linked to the creation of a space for a humanising 
encounter that breaks one’s immanence and is directed towards transcendence. 
An ethical encounter with the Other is marked by, on the one hand, nonviolence 
and, on the other hand, one’s inability to meet the Other’s demand. When coming upon 
the Other, one is supposed to “welcome”13 him or her in a hospitable manner. There is 
nothing to be afraid of when doing so, for the Lévinasian Other is portrayed by such 
terms as “peace” and “nonviolence.”14 Not only nonviolent, the radical Other also asks 
one to reject one’s own potential violence. To specify, the Other “arrests and paralyzes 
my violence”15 in his or her message requiring that I refrain from killing. Nevertheless, 
                                                 
10 See: John Wild, “Introduction,” in: Totality and Infinity, p. 13. 
11 See: Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 203. 
12 Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 230. Emphasis mine. 
13 Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 171. 
14 Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 203. 
15 Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 291. 
132 
 
it is not a request but an enforced demand. Although Lévinas insists on its pacific 
character, such an imposition is still a sui generis violation. The related problem is that 
even if such a demand is imposed (violently or not), it does not have to be satisfied. 
Lipszyc writes: “When it comes to helping our neighbour, or even respecting his 
otherness, […] we always fail a little, we continually suffer a defeat, and we resort to 
violence.”16 Thus, an ethical response that respects the Other’s demand is not 
necessarily a task that can be accomplished: we are instead inclined to lose in this frail 
endeavour. This issue is visible, among others, in Lévinas’s discussion of the will, 
along with fidelity and betrayal as two potentialities that govern it.17 It appears that an 
ethical gesture is forever insufficient and the threat of using force exists beside it. The 
encountered Other may be nonviolent and may call for the same attitude, but there is 
no certainty that the favour will be returned or that the peace will be kept. A Lévinasian 
encounter is, in a sense, trapped in the struggle with non-violence and un-fulfilment 
between the I and alterity. 
What the encounter in Lévinas’s philosophical system lacks are symmetry, 
partnership, and dialogue. The Lévinasian Other is a God-like creature: he or she is 
described as “my master,”18 who in his or her transcendence “approaches me from a 
dimension of height and dominates me.”19 A priori superior and good, the Other is 
posited higher in the hierarchy during an encounter. A being of radical alterity, the 
Other is impenetrable even though the I is open to a humanising meeting. Still, the 
Other demands; “the stranger, the widow, and the orphan, to whom I am obligated”20 
occupy a commanding position. It is, therefore, impossible to found this relationship 
                                                 
16 Lipszyc, “Emmanuel Lévinas,” p. 136. 
17 See: Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, pp. 226-232. 
18 Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 72. 
19 Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 214. 
20 Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 215. 
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on equality. Even if the Other is destitute or abased, he or she is still the one who lays 
down rules; furthermore, a declaration of equality willingly made by the Other is not 
a sufficient means to question the inherent hierarchy within an encounter.21 All these 
elements contribute to the asymmetry of the delineated covenant; this quality applies 
to both the level of the participants and that of the very space they occupy, since – as 
Lévinas adds – “[m]ultiplicity in being […] is situated in a ‘space’ essentially 
asymmetrical.”22 In such a realm, it would be inadequate to consider partnership, as 
one of the entities holds a privileged, pre-eminent position while another is called upon 
to meet an imposed demand. Similarly, this encounter is not grounded upon dialogue. 
Lévinas does identify the I / Other relation as Conversation, but he clarifies that in this 
sense conversation amounts to teaching,23 which – again – confirms the non-
interchangeable dichotomy of one who receives versus one who gives. Consequently, 
partnership and dialogue are the properties that in the Lévinasian proposition of an 
asymmetrical encounter have a limited scope. 
Lévinas’s reflections often correspond to Ettinger’s proposition, among others 
with regard to the asymmetrical nature of an encounter24; however, both theorists differ 
significantly when (non)violence is considered. The Lévinasian Other requires 
nonviolence of the I, but such an expectation, in a sense, leaves little space for the 
subject. In the matrixial paradigm, the emphasis is put on one’s readiness and decision 
to enter the sphere of encounter. Namely, one chooses “to abandon defences and 
become fragmented and fragile, to become open to sharing and absorbing and a further 
                                                 
21 See: Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 213. Still, as Lévinas adds, “Equality is produced where the 
other commands the same and reveals himself to the same in responsibility.” Lévinas, Totality and 
Infinity, p. 214. 
22 Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 216. Emphasis mine. 
23 See: Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, pp. 50-51. 
24 The issue of asymmetry of the matrixial encounter reappears in this thesis, but it is explicated in 
Chapter 1, section: Trans-subjective Matrixial Ethics. 
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redistributing of fragments of trauma.”25 Vulnerable and willing to participate, the 
subject can thus become engaged in a potential encounter. There is no violation of the 
boundaries of the I on the Other’s part, because it is the I who is – or is not – ready for 
a humanising trans-formation in severality.26 Still, even if the possibility of the 
entrance is based on a certain choice, the question of leaving the matrixial space is 
not27; once the matrix is accessed, it is not up to the subject to “disengage.” This lack 
of decision on leaving the matrixial sphere may be read through the prism of violence, 
but Ettinger instead links it to the assumption that since here the subject is not governed 
by the phallic logic of separation, he or she cannot simply cut himself or herself off 
from the encounter with the Other.28 Also, what is shared in this realm are fragments 
of trauma and pain, and the encounter itself is disturbing and even dangerous at it 
questions boundaries between the subjects; nonetheless, what is missing in Ettinger’s 
theorisation of this sphere is aggression. Violence and its ambiguous status are thus 
managed by Ettinger and Lévinas in two incompatible ways. 
If we turn to the questions of the Other who issues a demand, of the subject’s 
(im)possibility to satisfy this requirement, and of dialogue, the matrixial theory 
disagrees with Lévinasian ethics once again. The matrixial Other does not demand 
anything from the encountered subject; rather, the Other is in need of working-through 
but is unable to do it by himself / herself as the trauma proves to be too massive to be 
                                                 
25 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma and the Matrixial Gaze,” in: Bracha L. Ettinger, The 
Matrixial Borderspace, ed. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 
2006), p. 152. 
26 It does not, however, mean that the encounter happens every time when the subject is ready. We read: 
“A passage is expected but uncertain, the transport does not happen in each encounter and for every 
gazing subject, listening subject, touching or moving subject. We can look and observe, but it takes en-
duration in con-templation to see.” Bracha L. Ettinger, “Fragilization and Resistance,” Studies in the 
Maternal, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2009), p. 9, 
http://www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk/back_issues/issue_two/documents/Bracha1.pdf (access: 16 April 2013). 
27 See: Bracha L. Ettinger, “The With-In-Visible Screen,” in: The Matrixial Borderspace, p. 118. It is 
mentioned in Chapter 2, section: A Prototype for Connectedness. 
28 Ettinger, “The With-In-Visible Screen,” p. 118. 
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handled individually.29 This is where the subject who can remember and process traces 
of trauma for and instead of the Other becomes crucial. If undertaken, such an action 
has ethical consequences, as the subject can in part carry the burden of another person. 
Furthermore, not only can the subject carry the burden on his or her own, but also he 
or she can engage in a dialogue. As it has already been mentioned, there is a degree of 
communication within the matrix, but this communication precedes and transcends 
any linguistic exchange. The matrixial kind of dialogue is not language-based, and yet 
it reveals traces of information. Dialogue, the Other’s demand, and violence, these 
three issues are connected to another point of dissonance between the theories, which 
is expressly more fundamental – the (un)necessity of separation.  
While for Lévinas separation is one of the factors in producing ethical 
relationships, the position of this notion in the matrixial theory is less definite. Lévinas 
argues: “The same and the other at the same time maintain themselves in relationship 
and absolve themselves from this relation, remain absolutely separated. The idea of 
Infinity requires this separation.”30 A prerequisite for the occurrence of the humanising 
relation, a clear-cut division between two beings becomes the only way to grasp 
Infinity. The notion of separation also holds a theological association; namely, Lévinas 
affirms separation by means of a comparison to “[t]he distance between me and God,” 
described as “radical and necessary.”31 Ettinger, for one, theorises a borderspace in 
which separation is not relevant yet. In subjectivity-as-encounter, a minimal difference 
between becoming-subjects is maintained so that this relation does not fall into fusion. 
Still, it is not the split that defines the subjects – matrixial subjectivity is possible 
                                                 
29 It is discussed in Chapter 2, section: Knowledge in / of the Humanising Specificity. See: Bracha L. 
Ettinger, “Transcryptum: Memory Tracing in/for/with the Other,” in: The Matrixial Borderspace, pp. 
167-168. 
30 Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 102. Emphasis in the original. 
31 Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 48. 
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before and beyond the act of separation.32 Ettinger goes even further, suggesting that 
such a cut belongs to a set of phallic paradigms that are suspended in the matrixial 
model; we read that, as a result of metramorphosis, “a space of occasion and encounter 
is created that disables the pretense of an absolute separation between subjects in the 
pattern of a cut-split-castration from the Other-Thing – a separation that in fact is the 
pattern of elimination of the archaic m/Other-Event-Encounter.”33 In her writings, 
Ettinger does not categorically reject the split between subjects – after all, the matrixial 
sphere is that of jointness-in-separateness34 – but she notes its insufficiency in 
subjectivity formation and theorises a space in which this notion is not dominant. 
Similarly to separation, transcendence is another point in which Ettinger parts 
ways with Lévinasian ethics. Ettinger does not find what she calls “a radical 
transcendence”35 in the matrix, as this space is occupied by the border-Other instead 
of radical alterity. Furthermore, she notes that in the matrixial framework 
transcendence undergoes a change: ceasing to indicate separation, it becomes a 
threshold for the subjects.36 Transcendence in its theological sense is, however, seldom 
addressed by the matrixial theorist. She rather dwells on another meaning of the word 
– that of reaching beyond, or of non-negative transgression. For instance, she writes 
about “[t]he transcendence of the subject-object interval […] based on an a priori 
shareability in difference.”37 Here, the term embraces surpassing individual 
                                                 
32 The question of separation and the matrix is discussed in Chapter 1, section: Trans-subjective 
Matrixial Ethics. 
33 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist with-in the Matrixial Encounter-Event,” in: The 
Matrixial Borderspace, p. 183. 
34 This notion reappears in Ettinger’s writings; see, for instance, Bracha L. Ettinger, “The Matrixial 
Gaze,” in: The Matrixial Borderspace, pp. 85-86. See also: Griselda Pollock, “Thinking the Feminine: 
Aesthetic Practice as Introduction to Bracha Ettinger and the Concepts of Matrix and Metramorphosis,” 
Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 21, No. 1 (2004), pp. 5-9. 
35 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 148. 
36 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Copoiesis,” Ephemera, Vol. 5, No. X (2005), p. 710, 
http://www.ephemeraweb.org/journal/5-X/5-Xettinger.pdf (access: 16 April 2013). 
37 Ettinger, “The Matrixial Gaze,” p. 83. Emphasis in the original. 
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knowledge and cognition because of the matrixial capacity to share. Consequently, just 
as transcendence in Lévinas is necessary for the ethical encounter, transcendence in its 
other reading – as employed by Ettinger – contributes to transformation and the 
potentialities of receiving more than what is available for a singular subject. 
While Ettinger’s theory disagrees in various ways with Lévinas’s ethics of an 
encounter, there are theologically defined events that bear a striking resemblance to 
the matrixial logic, one of them being incarnation. In Christianity, Jesus Christ 
becomes simultaneously a human being and God. He descends to the Earth and takes 
up a human form, but without abandoning his deific nature since “it please[s] the 
Father that in him should all fulness dwell.”38 When exploring his relation with God 
the Father, Christ argues that they ought not to be conceived of as separate entities39; 
he emphasises the strength of their transconnectedness by saying: “[H]e that hath seen 
me hath seen the Father.”40 Also, he claims that it is only through him that one can 
reach God.41 The stable dichotomy of a divine being / a human being is, therefore, 
challenged here; what is offered instead is the logic of both / and similar to that 
proposed by Ettinger. Christ embodies the possibility of shattering binaries; he 
opposes ascribing the phallic logic of cut to his almost-complete affinity to the Father. 
Their interdependence is revealed in the access to God: one can access God only 
through his son, and one can cognise God only if one cognises his son. The metaphor 
of dwelling – with its homely / maternal connotations – is another accurate description 
of the matrixial structure of relations between the two personas; we can, however, 
assume that this structure goes in both directions, that is, not only does God dwell 
                                                 
38 Colossians 1:19 (KJV). All the biblical quotes are taken from the King James Version; unless stated 
otherwise, the emphasis is in the original. 
39 “I and my Father are one.” John 10:30 (KJV). 
40 John 14:9 (KJV). 
41 “[N]o man cometh unto the Father, but by me.” John 14:6 (KJV). Among others in the New American 
Standard Bible, “through” is used instead of “by” in this passage. 
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within Jesus, as the excerpt suggests, but also the Son inhabits the Father. 
Nevertheless, incarnation transcends the Father / Son relation as it applies also to that 
between humanity and God. As Matthew the Apostle reminds us, another name 
ascribed to Jesus is “Emmanuel,” meaning “God with us.”42 Apparently, Christ invites 
the humankind to a realm of inclusion and togetherness instead of rejection and 
separation; as it was shown in the previous chapters, matrixial subjectivity is modelled 
on the same logic. 
Along with the both / and logic, incarnation and the Ettingerian notion of 
subjectivity also share their root – the body. In the incarnation of Christ, the notion of 
corporeality has two meanings. Firstly, one of the attributes of “the mystery of 
godliness” in Jesus is that he “was manifest in the flesh.”43 Likewise, the etymology 
of “incarnation” sends us to Late Latin incarnari – “be made flesh.”44 Christ’s 
paradoxical status of an entity simultaneously divine and human is therefore tied to the 
question of him having a body, or even coming into possession of a body. In other 
words, the act of materialising himself in a mortal corporeal form is what makes Jesus 
truly human. Secondly, since Jesus took the same path as all the people, the beginning 
of it was marked in the female body. As announced by Isaiah and repeated by Matthew, 
“a virgin shall be with child, and shall bring forth a son.”45 Mary’s womb is thus the 
site where Christ’s human life commences: his first “earthly” home. The root of Jesus’s 
humanity, Mary’s corporeal space resembles that of the matrix. “[W]e are all born of 
woman,”46 and so is the Son of God; in both cases, this results in the formation of a 
                                                 
42 Matthew 1:23 (KJV). See: Isaiah 7:14 (KJV). 
43 1 Timothy 3:16 (KJV). Emphasis mine. 
44 Online Etymology Dictionary, available at: https://www.etymonline.com/word/incarnation (access: 
4 July 2018). 
45 Matthew 1:23 (KJV); compare: Isaiah 7:14 (KJV). 
46 Griselda Pollock, “Introduction. Femininity: Aporia or Sexual Difference?,” in: The Matrixial 
Borderspace, p. 29. 
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new paradigm, which above all emphasises an encounter between subjects, proximity, 
togetherness, and not distance or non-availability of a transcendent divinity. 
In “In the Midst of the World,” Jean-Luc Nancy reflects on tenderness and the 
logic of (corporeal) opening in Christianity; both issues correspond to Ettinger’s 
theoretical propositions and the above remarks on incarnation. Having introduced the 
convoluted inside / outside dichotomy of the world as posed by Christianity, Nancy 
characterises the Son of God by means of “the force and tenderness necessary to salute 
[saluer] another life in the midst of this one.”47 From the matrixial angle, the 
juxtaposition of tenderness and force becomes a quintessential pair as it refers us back 
to the notion of self-fragilisation.48 One needs a sufficient amount of agency, strength, 
and decisiveness to fragilise oneself for the sake of entering a relation with the 
matrixial border-Other; simultaneously, fragilisation incorporates the notion of 
tenderness – gentleness and compassion in tending to the non-I. The question of 
saluting is, however, the spot where Nancy and Ettinger diverge. While affirming the 
existence of the Other and facing him or her – implied in saluting – are crucial for both 
theorists, Nancy keeps his distance from the potentiality of “sav[ing]”49 the Other. 
Ettingerian psychoanalysis, in turn, outlines the possibilities of an encounter with the 
non-I in broader terms. The matrixial encounter operates on reciprocity, which 
includes also working-through the Others’ traumas for and instead of them when these 
wounds are impossible for them to handle on their own.50 This act cannot be identified 
as saving yet, which would be a far-fetched statement; however, what the matrixial 
encounter certainly offers is more than pure affirmation implied in the Nancean notion 
                                                 
47 Nancy, “In the Midst of the World,” p. 28. Emphasis in the original. 
48 See: Chapter 2, sections: A Prototype for Connectedness and Knowledge in / of the Humanising 
Specificity. 
49 Nancy, “In the Midst of the World,” p. 28. 
50 See: Ettinger, “Transcryptum,” pp. 167-168. It is discussed in Chapter 2, section: Knowledge in / of 
the Humanising Specificity. 
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of saluting. Returning to Nancy, in his reading Christ’s tenderness and his act of 
saluting embody the new type of logic – the logic of (corporeal) opening. We read: 
[T]he outside of the world in the world is not “outside” according to the 
logic of a divorce, a rift, but according to that of an opening that belongs 
to the world, as the mouth belongs to the body. Better still: the mouth is, 
or is what makes, the eating and speaking body, just as the other openings 
are what make it the breathing, listening, seeing, eliminating body. The 
outside traverses the body in all these ways, and this is how it becomes a 
body: the exposure of a soul. Our bodies are thus entirely, in their turn, 
openings of the world, and so are other open bodies, those of animals and 
plants. They can all salute.51 
This excerpt unmasks the bodily entanglement of the logic of opening. The openings 
of the human corporeality challenge the inside / outside dichotomy and contribute to 
the capabilities of the body itself. Drawing a line between these openings and the flesh 
is irrelevant as they are sui generis borderspaces of the flesh, mediating between the 
inside and outside “worlds.” The logic of cuts and separations is revealed as 
insufficient for there is a necessity to explore other – more tender – types of relation 
between the I and the non-I. 
It is exactly through this relation that – in Nancy’s proposition of Christian 
atheism52 – we should perceive God. As the philosopher observes, Christianity is not 
concerned with God that is remote but with one that is “the among: he is the with or 
the between of us.”53 Nancy defines the world by means of relations between its 
inhabitants; such relations between ones that “are near or neighboring one another”54 
are claimed to be the only relations that exist and matter. The question of relations is 
omnipresent in the matrixial theory as well; this issue resurfaces in severality, 
wit(h)nessing, metramorphosis, and subjectivity-as-encounter, to name a few notions, 
but in fact it is present in every matrixial concept. Most and first of all, however, it is 
                                                 
51 Nancy, “In the Midst of the World,” p. 28. Emphasis in the original. 
52 For the clarification of the notion of Christian atheism, see: Nancy, “In the Midst of the World,” pp. 
28-33. 
53 Nancy, “In the Midst of the World,” p. 30. Emphasis in the original. 
54 Nancy, “In the Midst of the World,” p. 30. 
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the woman that breaks the impassable distance and thus escapes the logic of 
remoteness and cut. As opposed to the phallic understanding of the woman as “either 
a subject in the masculine format or an object patterned on masculine desire” and as 
that “which can be reduced to nothing,” within the matrixial domain she oscillates 
“between subject and object and between center and nothingness, on the axis of 
heterogeneous severality.”55 A figure of in-between, the woman is not finite; rather, 
she stands for change and proximity. Furthermore, since the very model of the 
matrixial encounter is the prenatal / pregnancy child–mother union commencing in the 
motherly-feminine corporeality, the woman opens the path of connectedness and 
severality. Just as in Nancy “God is relation,”56 the Ettingerian female body is the site 
and the origin of (primary) relation. 
Both in Ettinger’s psychoanalysis and in the Bible, the relation is necessarily 
embodied despite its entanglement in language. In the gospel of John, we are informed 
that “the Word was made flesh.”57 Christ is presented here as Logos – the message of 
God. In order to be passed to the people, the Word became a corporeal entity: God 
“dwelt among us,”58 continuing to develop a relation with the believers. For this 
connection to gain in strength and significance, embodiment was necessary: God had 
to transcend the language with its limitations and take a human form to communicate 
more fully. The relation between the body and “word” is tackled by Ettinger in a 
twofold manner. First, principles of binarised language do not apply (yet) to the 
matrixial subjectivising sphere; linguistic structures are inexistent here and what reigns 
                                                 
55 Ettinger, “The With-In-Visible Screen,” p. 113. Emphasis in the original. 
56 Nancy, “In the Midst of the World,” p. 30. 
57 John 1:14 (KJV). 
58 John 1:14 (KJV). 
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are bodily sensations and experiences beyond linguistic cognition.59 The other issue – 
more significant at this point – is connected not so much to the theory as to Ettinger’s 
writing itself. Ettinger’s style is exhaustively playful: abundant in loops, neologisms, 
and descriptive vocabulary. Noting that “[i]t involves shifts, moves, repetitions, 
circlings and a poetic language of created terms,”60 Griselda Pollock links this kind of 
writing to Hélène Cixous’s proposition of écriture féminine, this time realised in the 
field of theory. In a sense, Ettinger’s texts share several similarities with her artistic 
technique, since her style seeks new modes of expression while trying to transcend 
inherent insufficiencies of the act of writing. Via its vocabulary and structures, this 
language constantly de-constructs and exercises itself. As a result, Ettinger’s écriture 
carries affect-oriented, performative, and corporeal aspirations; because of its 
preoccupation with rhythms and pulses of bodily articulations, it is placed near the 
margins of conventions imposed by the binary structure of language. To sum up, as 
for Ettinger Logos is an insufficient figure, her writing also endeavours to be “made 
flesh” – to materialise itself and thus grasp the complexities of relationships between 
embodied beings. 
 
3. Com-passionate Covenants 
Ettinger uses the word covenant not so much as another concept for her 
psychoanalytical system as the term that further clarifies the status of an encounter in 
severality in reference to the matrix itself and to art. Ettinger notes that in the matrixial 
                                                 
59 The questions of language, knowledge, and non-linguistic data in Freudian-Lacanian and Ettingerian 
psychanalytic systems are discussed in detail in Chapter 2, section: Knowledge in / of the Humanising 
Specificity. 
60 Griselda Pollock, “Mother Trouble: The Maternal-feminine in Phallic and Feminist Theory in 
Relation to Bracha Ettinger’s Elaboration of Matrixial Ethics/Aesthetics,” Studies in the Maternal, Vol. 
1, No. 1 (2009), p. 13, http://www.mamsie.bbk.ac.uk/back_issues/issue_one/GriseldaPollock.pdf 
(access: 29 November 2013). See: Hélène Cixous, “The Laugh of the Medusa,” trans. Keith Cohen and 
Paula Cohen, Signs, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1976), pp. 875-893. 
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borderspace, an encounter with the non-I – occasioned by metramorphosis – is 
considered a covenant.61 Although the theorist does not explain how the two notions 
are connected, the link between them is more evident once we turn to the etymology 
of the covenant. In Old French, covenant embraces an “agreement, pact, promise,” and 
originally it points to the Latin verb convenire, which means, among others, to “come 
together” (com- – “together” and venire – “come”), to “unite,” and to “agree.”62 A 
matrixial covenant is, therefore, a union or a pact agreed upon between at least two 
becoming subjects. Described as “an alliance” and “an anonymous intimacy,”63 this 
encounter is necessarily based on decisiveness. Simultaneously, such an arrangement 
does not have to be symmetrical; it can be based on a need or request and a 
compassionate response to it – a promise of a kind. Can this promise be broken, or can 
we decide to dissolve the union? Ettinger asserts that the answer is negative: if one 
commits oneself to the matrixial connection, one “cannot choose when to terminate 
the covenant, or how, or to what extent, if at all. Because the phallus cannot master the 
Matrix.”64 Whereas all the issues addressed above are related to the matrix, it ought to 
be emphasised that Ettinger frequently raises the question of the covenant in the 
context of aesthetics. In her reading, traces of the prenatal-intrauterine encounter are 
shared by means of “matrixial covenant(s) assembled by art.”65 Art thus becomes the 
space hospitable for a covenant to occur, and even perhaps the privileged space in 
terms of its possibility to unfold such an encounter; what is also unmasked in such a 
take on the covenant is the close relation between the intrauterine, aesthetic, and 
                                                 
61 Ettinger, “The With-In-Visible Screen,” pp. 102-103. 
62 Online Etymology Dictionary, available at: https://www.etymonline.com/word/covenant (access: 19 
July 2018). 
63 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 150. 
64 Ettinger, “The With-In-Visible Screen,” p. 118. The issue of decision has already been tackled in the 
previous section and in Chapter 2, section: A Prototype for Connectedness. 
65 Ettinger, “The With-In-Visible Screen,” p. 108. 
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matrixial spheres. Still, apart from Ettinger’s hints and the etymological insight into 
the covenant, one cannot deny the biblical connotation of this figure, which opens the 
matrixial theory for a wider range of meanings. 
In the Bible, the Last Supper, followed by the death and resurrection of Jesus 
Christ, marks the new covenant between God and the humankind, grounded upon 
promise and reconciliation, and not upon regulations or restrictions. During the 
Supper, Jesus first offers his apostles the bread: “Take, eat; this is my body.”66 Then 
he proceeds to the wine; he hands it round, saying: “Drink ye all of it; For this is my 
blood of the new testament” – or “covenant” – “which is shed for many for the 
remission of sins.”67 These two gestures of sharing are supposed to seal the contract 
between the Son of God and his disciples, but the deal is also extended to the humanity 
in general; Christ makes a promise that people’s sins will be forgiven as a result of his 
sacrifice. The Supper also stands for reconciliation; on the one hand, Christ reconciles 
with Peter, who is bound to deny knowing him, and with Judas, who has betrayed him. 
On the other hand, the Son of God appears to accept the painful task he has been given. 
Yet, the covenant – as it has been mentioned – is not only a promise or a union, but 
also a pact: a codified agreement. When the question of laws is concerned, the 
covenant Jesus agrees upon with his disciples is interpreted by Paul as “the new 
testament; not of the letter, but of the spirit.”68 Giorgio Agamben observes that it is not 
a covenant based on regulations and prohibitions, like the Mosaic law. The new 
covenant invalidates that of the commandments for it is, instead, “written with the 
                                                 
66 Matthew 26:26 (KJV). 
67 Matthew 26:27-8 (KJV). “Covenant” is used instead of “testament” in this passage among others in 
the New American Standard Bible. 
68 2 Corinthians 3:6 (KJV). 
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breath of God on the hearts of the flesh.”69 Grounded upon hope that Messiah will keep 
his word rather than a set of rules to follow in “servitude”70 of a kind, the covenant of 
Christ in a sense refreshes the I / Other relationship. 
How can the logic of covenant as presented above apply to the encounter 
between the becoming-I and the becoming-non-I? To begin with the question of a 
promise, Ettinger makes it clear that what the matrixial borderspace cannot offer are 
“peace and harmony”71; these two constitute a wish impossible to fulfil in such an 
utterly traumatic space.72 This sphere carries a different promise; we read: 
When metramorphosing with the artwork, you may unexpectedly find 
yourself in proximity to an event, as if you had always been potentially 
sliding on its margins. You are threatened by this potential proximity, yet 
at the same time compelled by a mysterious […] promise to refind in 
jointness what had faded away and been dispersed, but on the condition of 
accepting matrixial vulnerability to the non-I, since your own desire is the 
effect of borderlinking to others’ trauma.73 
In the matrix, there is a promise involved: if in severality, the subject may grasp 
partialised and non-cognitive knowledge, which – as suggested in the excerpt – was 
reachable once. Simultaneously, the covenant is by no means one-sided; the terms are 
set for both partners, one of whom is made a promise but needs to get ready to become 
vulnerable and open. Similarly to the covenant of Christ, the act of reaching the mutual 
agreement is linked to the ability to share: food and wine in the biblical sense and 
traces of information in the matrixial one. Although not directly, the matrixial covenant 
also embraces reconciliation; after all, Latin reconcilare means “to bring together 
again” and to “regain.”74 What is regained here is the intimate relation grounded upon 
                                                 
69 Giorgio Agamben, The Time that Remains. A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. Patricia 
Dailey (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 122. See: Agamben, The Time that 
Remains, pp. 121-122. 
70 Agamben, The Time that Remains, p. 122. 
71 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 147. 
72 It is commented upon in Chapter 2, section: Knowledge in / of the Humanising Specificity.  
73 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 148. Emphasis in the original. 
74 Online Etymology Dictionary, available at: https://www.etymonline.com/word/reconcile (access: 20 
July 2018). 
146 
 
that between the becoming-I and the mother within her corporeality: the space where 
the law of the Father is not yet observed. The related issue is that the matrixial sphere 
is not preoccupied with regulations or commandments of any kind as it only upholds 
affective shareability and extreme togetherness. However, the major difference 
between Christ’s covenant and the matrixial one that needs to be pointed at regards 
varying temporalities. The covenant of the New Testament is viewed as a universal 
and constant one, applying to the whole humanity. The matrixial covenants, in turn, 
are “temporary, unpredictable, and unique,” but “[e]ven in the process of dissolving”75 
they still influence ones involved in them. Despite this discrepancy, the dialogue 
between these two types of covenant is in numerous ways constructive. 
It is the body that lays the ground for both the covenant of Christ and the 
Ettingerian covenant. In this respect, the former one occupies a paradoxical position. 
On the one hand, the corporeal entanglement of the Last Supper is evident – the Son 
of God invites his disciples to consume his body and blood, which is meant to solidify 
their arrangement. The apostles agree to let Christ’s body inside their organisms in 
order to enter the most intimate union that goes beyond them: the union that embraces 
the humanity as a whole. Consequently, the success of the covenant depends on one’s 
ability to open oneself to the Other, and such an opening is utterly corporeal. On the 
other hand, this is a covenant of “the Spirit,” and not – as Paul notes – of “the flesh.”76 
To specify, Paul reminds us of the biblical situation of Abraham, who has a son with 
Hagar, a slave, and another son with Sarah, his wife. The slave’s son is “born after the 
flesh,” whereas Sarah’s child – “by promise.”77 Agamben points out that while the 
former, Mosaic covenant corresponds to Hagar’s status and is built on abiding by the 
                                                 
75 Ettinger, “The With-In-Visible Screen,” p. 111. 
76 Galatians 4:29 (KJV). 
77 Galatians 4:23 (KJV). 
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law in “servitude,” the new covenant – as has been discussed – is governed by a 
different set of values. Basing on the above remarks, one can observe that the covenant 
of Christ is viewed as simultaneously bodily – since it requires a corporeal union and 
an act of sharing – and non-bodily – because it breaks the previous covenant 
symbolised by Hagar. The matrixial encounter, in turn, is bodily in a more 
straightforward manner. Still, the body’s shareability and its openness to the non-I are 
the qualities that unite both kinds of covenants. 
The qualities mentioned above are also components of the matrixial notions 
revolving around compassion; Ettinger makes a distinction into primary compassion 
and com-passion, and explores how these two concepts are related to, among others, 
homeliness and empathy. Com-passion is defined as “an effect within the 
transubjective sphere.”78 This effect goes beyond and before the scope of sensorial 
perception; since it belongs to the matrixial realm, it is not restricted to the Symbolic, 
constantly breaching the boundaries of this order.79 Most importantly, it is comprised 
of transformational affects; Ettinger enumerates three of them: primary fascinance, 
primary awe, and primary compassion.80 Primary compassion functions prior to the 
notions of abjection and abandonment, which are necessary in the subjectivising 
process from the phallic viewpoint; what is more, it may “counter-balance”81 their 
workings. It does so, because it “links the non-strangeness-in-anonymous-intimacy of 
the other and the Cosmos to the subject.”82 The Other thus occupies the position of a 
non-stranger, simultaneously unknown and close; he or she is not objectified, 
becoming rather a co-subject for the I. Such a structure refers us back to homeliness 
                                                 
78 Ettinger, “Fragilization and Resistance,” p. 1. 
79 Ettinger, “Fragilization and Resistance,” p. 3. 
80 Ettinger, “Fragilization and Resistance,” p. 1. 
81 Ettinger, “Fragilization and Resistance,” p. 1. 
82 Ettinger, “Fragilization and Resistance,” p. 2. 
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and hospitality of the prenatal / pregnancy encounter between the subjects that are 
becoming-together. That is why Ettinger argues that this transformational affect, 
arousing and influencing com-passion, is “a Home-affect – Heimlich.”83 Finally, the 
theorist stresses that com-passion and compassion do not equal empathy, whose 
involvement appears to be less extensive. Ettinger goes as far as to claim that if one is 
empathetic to the non-I but not compassionate and respectful towards the non-I’s 
intimate Other(s), such “empathy-without-compassion” is not so much insufficient as 
even “malignant.”84 Now, the terms rooted in “compassion” are portrayed as homely, 
hospitable, and beyond-empathetic, but how specifically are they ethical? 
Ettinger links compassion with ethics by means of the notions of wit(h)nessing, 
sharing, and non-objectifying. This issue is broadly commented upon in the following 
excerpt:  
The effects of com-passion and the affects of primary compassion and 
primary awe are the proto-ethical edges of the aesthetic sphere […]. They 
might be sublimated and embodied in artistic artifact; they can also be 
transformed into mature ethics. They inform Ethics from a very particular 
angle. They announce wit(h)nessing since they signal the impossibility of 
non-sharing. The ethical implications of wit(h)nessing are accessed if a 
subject that reverberates “its” I – non-I transubjective strings takes 
responsibility for them […].85 
Ettinger observes the potential of art as a site of ethics provided that it involves com-
passion / primary compassion: an effect and an affect that carry the possibility to go 
further than proto-ethical aesthetics and reach the ethical mode. As we read above, the 
                                                 
83 Ettinger, “Fragilization and Resistance,” p. 2. See also: Bracha L. Ettinger, “The Heimlich,” in: The 
Matrixial Borderspace, pp. 157-161. Interestingly enough, since primary compassion and other enlisted 
affects belong to the category of Home-affects, they also provoke anxiety. We read: “Anxiety 
accompanies their emergence into the surface, and thus, as we receive the same signal as that evoked 
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we are in contact with some horrible instances from an unremembered past.” Ettinger, “Fragilization 
and Resistance,” p. 10. 
84 Ettinger, “Fragilization and Resistance,” p. 19. 
85 Ettinger, “Fragilization and Resistance,” p. 2. 
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two types of compassion are the harbingers of wit(h)nessing,86 which incorporates 
opening oneself to the non-I and – as a result – facing unremembered traces of the non-
I’s trauma in the sphere where one cannot choose not to share. It is also the sphere of 
responsibility: one needs to be responsible for the traces one carries in order to reach 
the ethical potential of the matrix; as Ettinger notes further on, responsibility also 
entails not turning the Other into an object, but instead treating the Other as one’s co-
subject, or a “transubject.”87 Moreover, the mode in which com-passion and 
wit(h)nessing conjoin their forces in a struggle towards ethics can be accessed only in 
so far as the subject is able to restrain himself or herself from the acts of shaming or 
abandoning the Other and from other “paranoid tendencies.”88 If the subject cannot 
achieve that, a retreat to his or her “own paranoid abjectivity and narcissistic passive-
agressivity”89 is inevitable. Only when willing to share and com-passionately open to 
Otherness can the subject take part in a deeply humanising covenant. 
Although it is not mentioned by Ettinger directly, a theological reference in 
com-passion is apparent. The prefix com- is certainly one of the reasons for dividing 
the term, but the very word “passion” carries a number of thought-provoking 
implications. Most significantly – in the light of our previous investigations – it 
signifies Christ’s final days, which reach their climax in agony and crucifixion leading 
in Christian thought to the salvation of humanity. The word “passion” is based on Late 
Latin passionem – “suffering” and “enduring” – and Latin pati, which adds the activity 
of experiencing to the overall meaning of the term.90 The meaning added later is that 
                                                 
86 Ettinger goes as far as to note that in the circumstances when “fascinance meets primary compassion, 
com-passion leads to wit(h)nessing and wit(h)nessing is already also a com-passion.” Ettinger, 
“Fragilization and Resistance,” p. 16. 
87 Ettinger, “Fragilization and Resistance,” p. 2. 
88 Ettinger, “Fragilization and Resistance,” p. 3. 
89 Ettinger, “Fragilization and Resistance,” p. 4. 
90 Online Etymology Dictionary, available at: https://www.etymonline.com/word/passion (access: 28 
July 2018). 
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of a “predilection,” or fondness. All the mentioned elements are to a greater or lesser 
degree reflected in the Ettingerian notion of com-passion. Taking responsibility for the 
people, Jesus dies on the cross for – and instead of – them. Similarly, com-passion is 
tightly linked to the responsible act of caring for the Other, and such an act includes 
tending to the fragmentary and non-remembered trauma – trauma that originates in the 
Other, yet is transferred and shared in the matrixial connection. Such a gesture of 
taking care is necessarily perilous for the subject in a twofold manner – because of the 
weight of partial knowledge conveyed in the encounter and because of the inherently 
traumatic value of the matrixial sphere itself – but the Other is partly unburdened as a 
result of it. Com-passion is, then, a state in which suffering and love for the Other are 
conjoined; it is an ethical act in which pain and trauma are shared in a way that is 
beneficial for the non-I, who is not turned into an object or an abject, and who is not 
left to suffer alone.  
It is impossible to think passion outside of the notion of sacrifice, since via his 
death Christ offers himself in order for all the people to gain salvation. Sacrifice is a 
trope that resurfaces in two main contexts in Ettinger’s thought. One of them joins 
together Jacques Derrida’s notion of sacrifice, Abraham and Isaac, and Laius and 
Oedipus; Ettinger posits herself against the idea of sacrifice that emerges from such a 
combination. The other context can be found in the structurings of the matrix itself. 
Yet, before we proceed to the identification of sacrifice in the matrixial theory, we will 
turn to Derrida’s proposition and Ettinger’s response to it. 
One of the characteristics of religion in Derrida’s reading is the simultaneity of 
putting life first and demanding sacrifice. In “Faith and Knowledge,” Derrida observes 
the value and respect ascribed to life, reflected in, among others, “the ‘Thou shalt not 
kill’ […], the ‘fundamentalist’ prohibition of abortion, of artificial insemination, of 
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performative intervention in the genetic potential.”91 While the protection of – 
especially human – life is a principle of unquestionable significance, it is as if 
counterbalanced by means of the position of sacrifice. Derrida outlines this paradox as 
follows: “[L]ife has absolute value only if it is worth more than life.”92 An entity of a 
higher status is required in order for life to be acknowledged as inviolable and worthy. 
Importantly enough, such an entity ought to exceed not only “the bio-zoological”93 but 
also humanity. Human life is thus posited as valuable provided that it somehow attests 
to the force that surpasses it. That is why, even though there is a long tradition of 
offering animals to a deity, it is human life that is recognised by Derrida as sacrifice 
proper.94 Such paradoxical “excess above and beyond the living, whose life only has 
absolute value by being more than life, more than itself,”95 is a mode within which 
Derrida identifies a certain inclination towards death. “[A]uto-immune and self-
sacrificial”96 tendencies are claimed to be inevitable: all the religious communities are 
affected by them, which, ultimately, makes these communities last. Seemingly distinct 
and yet intertwined, life and sacrifice serve as the foundations of religion; although the 
former is presented as a value that needs to be protected, the imminence of the latter 
cannot be denied or fought. 
The notion of sacrifice is developed by Derrida on the example of Abraham 
and Isaac, with a special emphasis put on Abraham and his relation with God. 
Abraham’s God is a transcendent being, the radical Other who does not allow his 
worshipper to grasp his plans; despite that, Abraham responds with allegiance. He is 
                                                 
91 Jacques Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge: The Two Sources of ‘Religion’ at the Limits of Reason 
Alone,” trans. Samuel Weber, in: Religion, eds. Jacques Derrida and Gianni Vattimo (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1998), p. 50. 
92 Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge,” p. 50. Emphasis in the original. 
93 Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge,” p. 51. 
94 Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge,” pp. 50-51. 
95 Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge,” p. 51. 
96 Derrida, “Faith and Knowledge,” p. 51. 
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required to make the “most cruel, impossible, and untenable gesture: to offer his son 
Isaac as a sacrifice,”97 but the mission is not revealed to him. As a result, he is supposed 
to keep the secret he himself does not know or understand, and so, he is left alone with 
the painful and fearsome conundrum. This is the moment in which the question of 
responsibility cannot be ignored. As Derrida notes, Abraham is trapped between two 
notions: “responsibility in general and absolute responsibility.”98 While he ought to 
put Isaac’s security and well-being first (which is an obvious and right position from 
the ethical perspective of a father), he instead answers to God, who is, therefore, higher 
in the hierarchy than familial bonds. “[B]eyond ethics, beyond duty qua duty,” 
Abraham testifies to “the absolute relationship to the absolute,”99 to use John D. 
Caputo’s words. It does not mean, however, that he does not love his son – quite the 
contrary. Derrida explicates: 
If I put to death or grant death to what I hate it is not a sacrifice. I must 
sacrifice what I love. I must come to hate what I love, in the same moment, 
at the instant of granting death. I must hate and betray my own, that is to 
say offer them the gift of death by means of the sacrifice, not insofar as I 
hate them, that would be too easy, but insofar as I love them. […] Hate 
wouldn’t be hate if it only hated the hateful […]. It must hate and betray 
what is most lovable. Hate cannot be hate, it can only be the sacrifice of 
love to love.100 
Love is a prerequisite for Abraham’s offering of his son. Only if Abraham loves Isaac 
can he give the boy the gift of death; simultaneously, only then can such a gift be 
bestowed upon God. In this “story of father and son, of masculine figures, of 
hierarchies among men,”101 sacrifice becomes an inconceivable mixture of affection, 
cruelty, and twisted paternal ir-responsibility.  
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Ettinger finds Derrida’s notion of sacrifice – and sacrifice in general – 
problematic in several ways. The matrixial theorist identifies Abraham’s action as 
sacrifice without sacrifice: a situation in which “a son is lost then saved by the 
father.”102 It is the father who condemns the son to death and then spares his life; the 
father, thus, takes up a domineering subject position in which he can decide on the 
Other’s existence. Ettinger notes that such a sacrifice is not so much “a men’s only 
affair” (which is Derrida’s suggestion) as “[a] kind of père-version (father-
version),”103 as Jacques Lacan would have it, in the sense that the non-I is deprived of 
his or her subjectivity and treated as the I’s object. Partly similar to the Abrahamic 
one, yet more extreme in its execution and consequences, another père-verse sacrifice 
discussed by Ettinger is that of Laius, introduced in the previous chapter.104 Compared 
to Abraham’s choice, which in the end leads to the rescue of the son, Laius’s deeds are 
described as “a secret sacrifice per se: the perfect crime,”105 for the child is doomed 
never to be saved even if he survives, that is, he will never be able to cope with the 
father’s betrayal. It is precisely betrayal – inherent in paternal sacrifice – that Ettinger 
postulates to resist. In order to do so, one needs to become self-aware of one’s 
possibility of betraying the Other; such awareness, however, does not come over time 
– instead, it can be “awaken[ed]”106 from the deeply encrypted residues of matrixial 
subjectivity. Ettinger explicates it by means of referring to motherhood; mothers are 
claimed to be  
fragilized by the force of a sudden unexpected love, by sudden and 
irremediable response-ability and responsibility, by the enormous trust 
directed toward them by the infant, by the shock, sorrow, and jouissance 
of their care-carry mode of com-passion. Vulnerable, they are facing a new 
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104 See: Chapter 3, section: Ettingerian Mythos. 
105 Ettinger, “Laius Complex and Shocks of Maternality,” p. 280. Emphasis in the original. 
106 Ettinger, “Laius Complex and Shocks of Maternality,” p. 284. 
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reality, realizing their deep transconnectedness to the vulnerable other. The 
weight of this carriance-and-trust estranges them in a world lacking the 
language to account for it […]; a world where trust already expects a 
betrayal.107 
Motherhood is thus a position via which one can acknowledge one’s potential to 
sacrifice the Other and then resist it. Having embraced the Other’s fragility and 
reliance, one can follow the ethical path paved with re-discovered carriance108 and 
response-ability, and thus restrain oneself from père-verse betrayal and objectification 
engrained in sacrifice. 
Derridean sacrifice (influenced among others by the reading of Abraham’s 
impossible obedience) and Laius’s impulse to kill his son – these are the types of 
sacrifice Ettinger considers père-verse. The question that arises is: can we also think 
of a mère-version of sacrifice in the matrixial domain? As I believe, the answer is 
affirmative if we rethink the very meaning of the term and focus not on offering the 
(loved) Other to the more radical and transcendent Other, but on self-sacrificing for 
the sake of the close – even if unknown – non-I. The primary matrixial self-sacrifice 
we can take into consideration is that of bodily boundaries in the prenatal / late 
pregnancy encounter. However, it ought not to be mistaken for complete sacrifice 
because such full rejection of borders would lead to the fall into symbiosis. What 
follows is partial relinquishment of integrity and self-security: once the subject partly 
surrenders his or her boundaries in order to engage in an encounter with the Other, his 
or her “defence systems” operating in accordance with phallic rules recede. Basing on 
the above remarks, we can note that matrixially understood sacrifice does not equal 
loss: rather, it encompasses partial losing whose result is the prospect of gaining 
knowledge of and from the Other. Nevertheless, even though the matrixial sacrifice is 
                                                 
107 Ettinger, “Laius Complex and Shocks of Maternality,” pp. 283-284. Emphasis mine. 
108 Carriance is discussed with reference to Eve in Chapter 3, section: Ettingerian Mythos. 
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partial and is not based on the logic of loss, it is still an offering directed at the Other. 
Risky and potentially painful for the subject involved, such an offering has ethical 
resonances. Namely, it forces us to rethink the notion of Otherness and the I / non-I 
covenant. The matrixially informed subject needs to recognise and bear responsibility 
for the Other. Moreover, aware of his or her potential to breach the gained trust, the 
subject has to resist this possibility, prioritising the Other with whom he or she has 
established a bond. It is the capability to perform partial self-sacrifice that places the 
Other in the position of a co-subject. Only when one’s boundaries and safety are 
sacrificed can the Other enter and co-occupy the shareable space, and – as a 
consequence – only then can the ethical I / non-I relation which involves becoming-
in-togetherness take place. 
 
4. Revelation, Messianism, and the Artistic Encounter 
We can claim that if one’s boundaries and safety are sacrificed, one is revealed 
before the Other. Although appearing infrequently in the matrixial theory, the notion 
of revelation casts light on both Ettinger’s theoretical reflections and her artistic 
activity. Revelation can be defined as a singular divine act of disclosure of knowledge 
usually related to humans; this act of communication tends to take place between God 
and one person, a prophet. A secret pertaining to human existence is thus revealed, 
from Latin revelare: “reveal, uncover, disclose,” and “unveil.”109 In Jewish 
philosophy, as Lipszyc argues, the uniqueness of the human / God relationship can be 
portrayed precisely by revelation, which temporarily suspends the transcendence of 
the divine being. We read:  
The aspect of God’s absence in the world, inscribed in the idea of creation, 
is balanced here by means of the aspect of presence, of God’s conditional 
                                                 
109 Online Etymology Dictionary, available at: https://www.etymonline.com/word/reveal (access: 7 
August 2018). 
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exposure in front of the human being. The whole Jewish philosophy is 
grounded upon the paradox hidden in this idea. The exposure that takes 
place in revelation cannot annul separation. Presence needs to be 
incomplete, marked by absence.110 
Revelation, then, is accompanied by the partial suspension of an otherwise impassable 
border; still, even though the Other appears, this presence is conditional. The status of 
absence remains unchanged: it neither recedes nor loses relevance in the whole 
occurrence. What we witness here is a play of pres-absence, traceable also in 
Ettinger’s thought. While metramorphosing, the becoming-subjects are argued to 
participate in an exchange of linkages “on the borders of presence and absence, in the 
in-between sphere of matrixial pres-absence.”111 This condition of being in-between 
is what connotes revelation: the subject’s Other is simultaneously absent and partially 
– or almost – present, suspended between these two states; despite that, communication 
of a kind occurs, which results in mutual transformation and in formation of trans-
subjectivity. Following this lead, we may come to the conclusion that the Ettingerian 
female body is a space of revelation; namely, within the feminine-motherly 
corporeality, binaries such as I / non-I, inside / outside, and presence / absence are 
temporarily arrested. Such a suspension is, therefore, the condition for the matrixial 
flow of traces of knowledge to be shared. 
Jean-Luc Nancy proposes a different approach to revelation than that 
delineated by Lipszyc, but his reading may prove to be valid in the context of an 
encounter with art, including an encounter with Ettinger’s Eurydices. Nancy 
summarises revelation succinctly as “[c]all and response” and adds that it embraces 
                                                 
110 Adam Lipszyc, “Wprowadzenie: Parę głównych pojęć,” in: Ślad judaizmu w filozofii XX wieku, p. 
15. Translation mine. 
111 Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 181. Emphasis mine. As Ettinger points out in the footnote 
to this excerpt, the term has originated in conversations with Ghislaine Szpeker-Benat and is related, 
among others, to “the between-presence-and-absence status of the matrixial partial-subject.” Ettinger, 
“Weaving a Woman Artist,” p. 225n.12. 
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“the responsibility to respond”112 as well. Let us delve into the mentioned pair. The 
Other necessarily utters a call for without it a response is virtually impossible. If there 
is, in turn, no response to the call, the call remains empty and meaningless: no relation 
is established, and nothing is revealed. To take place, revelation needs (at least) two 
responsive – or rather responsible – subjects; only then can they become involved, that 
is, only then can something be shared, perhaps forwarded. At this point, it ought to be 
emphasised that for Nancy it is the very response that is imparted via revelation: “What 
is revealed is not concerned with content-based principles, articles of faith, and 
revelation does not unveil anything that is hidden: it reveals insofar as it addresses, 
and this address constitutes what is revealed.”113 Normativity and implementation of 
rules are not the points of interest of Nancean revelation114; instead, the philosopher 
focuses on the value of the act of addressing the Other. On the one hand, a few aspects 
of Nancy’s reading of revelation apply to Ettinger’s understanding of an artistic 
experience. As Pollock observes, “Ettinger directs us aesthetically away from content 
towards gesture.”115 Indeed, in her oeuvre it is not precisely content that plays the most 
important role but rather an encounter in togetherness and com-passion made possible 
by the artistic activity. Moreover, from the matrixial angle art can be safely considered 
a call; such a call originates in the artist, but also in the artist’s Others, the latter 
possibility being especially relevant when Ettinger’s aesthetic practice is read through 
the prism of her experiences as a daughter of Holocaust survivors. The viewer, in turn, 
is one who affectively answers such a call. On the other hand, as it has already been 
                                                 
112 Nancy, “In the Midst of the World,” p. 41. 
113 Nancy, “In the Midst of the World,” p. 41. 
114 At this point Nancy is in dissonance with Lipszyc’s view on revelation. As Lipszyc observes, Jewish 
theology focuses on the dualism of revelation, which embraces both the truth and the law; of these two, 
the law is claimed to be a more significant aspect of revelation. See: Lipszyc, “Wprowadzenie,” p. 16. 
115 Griselda Pollock, “Introduction: Trauma and Artworking,” in: After-affects / After-images. Trauma 
and Aesthetic Transformation in the Virtual Feminist Museum (Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2013), p. 3. Emphasis in the original. 
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discussed on numerous occasions, one should not deprive the matrix of the potentiality 
of carrying and (re)distributing a certain kind of knowledge. Not “content” per se, such 
knowledge does surpass the gesture of “salut[ing] one another”116 Nancy advocates. 
Still, what does not cease to unite the two approaches is the recognition of revelation 
– after all, an exposure – as never a one-sided deal: while one of the subjects addresses 
the other, the other needs to accept the invitation and, by that, partly expose himself or 
herself, too. 
Ettinger’s Eurydice series can be characterised by means of the “[c]all and 
response” dualism, especially if one takes the images with the woman who looks away 
in the viewer’s direction into account. While the whole series may be considered a call 
of the Mizocz women, it is the mentioned woman who addresses the viewer almost 
directly. The original photograph captured, as we can assume, a desperate plea for 
help, that is, for her life to be spared. Looking away, the woman seemed to be trying 
to find anyone who could stop the injustice – these women were going to die in the 
name of collective responsibility, and not because of their own actions.117 The 
injustice, however, did not cease. The woman returns in Ettinger’s paintings over and 
over again, as if haunting these canvases. Eurydice, No. 17 (1994–1996)118 is crowded 
with female bodies, but the woman who looks away somehow attracts our attention as 
her gaze is hard to be ignored. In this artwork, she is striving to come to the surface 
and to find the potential viewer: she wishes to be seen and heard. The need to be 
acknowledged can be also identified in Eurydice, No. 37 (2001),119 but in this image 
                                                 
116 Nancy, “In the Midst of the World,” p. 41. 
117 The historical context is given in Chapter 2, section: Aesth/ethical Encounter. 
118 Bracha L. Ettinger, Eurydice, No. 17, 1994–1996, oil, xerography with photocopic dust, pigment and 
ashes on paper mounted on canvas, 26x52 cm, in: Art as Compassion: Bracha L. Ettinger, eds. Catherine 
de Zegher and Griselda Pollock (Brussels: ASA Publishers, 2012), p. 82. It is discussed in Chapter 2. 
See: Appendix, p. 228. 
119 Bracha L. Ettinger, Eurydice, No. 37, 2001, oil, xerography with photocopic dust, pigment and ashes 
on paper mounted on canvas, 28.3x21.4 cm, in: Art as Compassion, p. 154. It is discussed in Chapter 2. 
See: Appendix, p. 229. 
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her call goes in two directions. Her primary addressees are Ettinger’s parents, whom 
she faces in the space of the canvas. Since they are the survivors, she as if asks them 
to remember for her, or rather instead of her, in the most brutally literal sense of this 
expression. The other potential interlocutors are, again, viewers, who are asked to 
shelter the knowledge of these women’s history; they are asked not to remain 
indifferent to their pain, fear, and imminent fate. What used to be a call for mercy is 
now a call for attentiveness to the memory that cannot be carried by its owners 
anymore. It is the viewer’s ethical duty to respond once he or she experiences such a 
call. 
The mentioned acceptance of the invitation and the response that follows need 
to be marked by involvement for the aesthetic revelation to occur. Created between 
2006 and 2012, Eurydice, The Graces, Demeter is one of Ettinger’s more recent 
paintings.120 It is dominated by the bright grey colour, which is occasionally disturbed 
by purple shades. The painting can be easily distinguished from the early Eurydice 
artworks as the Mizocz women seem to be absent from it; also, because of its 
brightness, the image does not directly recall the late Eurydices, which usually oscillate 
between red and purple. At first glance, the painting appears to be an abstract 
combination of non-specific shapes. However, every now and then, a face may appear 
on the canvas. Perhaps the purple shades constitute two women standing in a row 
before the execution; perhaps there is a female face just beneath the darkest shade on 
the right, or just above the brightest, elliptical smear of paint. Perhaps there are more 
faces waiting to be noticed between the strokes of paint. In the image, there is 
severality – and not multiplicity – of potential faces, yet their existence is not 
                                                 
120 Bracha L. Ettinger, Eurydice, The Graces, Demeter, 2006–2012, oil on canvas, 50x41 cm. The 
artwork was featured at the exhibition Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger: Eurydice – Pieta in Muzeum 
Śląskie, Katowice, 7 July – 2 September 2017. See: Appendix, p. 247. 
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dependent on the painting per se but on the viewer. When and if such a face emerges 
(or a few of them do), the viewer is captured in a “momentary revelation”121 – a sudden 
instance and connectedness and communication. When it happens, one “cannot choose 
when to terminate the covenant”122 for one necessarily becomes deeply involved. 
Otherwise inaccessible or absent from one’s perception, these faces are now 
temporarily and conditionally present, and the condition is as follows, using Brian 
Massumi’s words: “The ‘feminine’ […] is accessible to any body – on the condition 
that it surrender itself to the several.”123 The subject has to make himself or herself 
vulnerable and give in to the severality encountered in the image, no matter whether 
this severality includes one face or more of them. The aesthetic revelation can thus be 
experienced only in so far as the subject becomes fully committed to the artwork. 
The response in revelation is inextricably linked both to the im-possibility of 
rejection and to the impossibility of not-sharing. From the phallic perspective, one can 
easily ignore the Other’s call, the Other being an entirely separate, inaccessible entity; 
furthermore, even if one does not, the matrixial type of connectedness and involvement 
is still an aspiration that cannot be satisfied. In this set of paradigms, the subject is 
doomed to reject the Other and, as a result, to remain within the seemingly impassable 
borders of his or her individual self. Within the matrixial realm, the subject struggles 
with, as I propose, the im-possibility of rejection. The potential of ignoring or even 
abandoning the Other is constantly present in the subject’s psyche.124 As it has been 
mentioned in the examination of com-passion, it is the subject’s responsibility to fight 
                                                 
121 Ettinger, “The With-In-Visible Screen,” p. 118. 
122 Ettinger, “The With-In-Visible Screen,” p. 118. 
123 Brian Massumi, “Afterword. Painting: The Voice of the Grain,” in: The Matrixial Borderspace, p. 
212. 
124 Abandonment is a recurring question in Chapter 2, section: Ettingerian Mythos, especially in 
discussions on Abraham, and Antigone and Jocaste. It is also significant in Ettinger’s reading of the 
Laius figure. 
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such a tendency. Only if he or she prevails, the ethical encounter can take place, and 
then rejection becomes indeed impossible. Revelation, however, comes with not only 
the im-possibility of rejection, but also the impossibility of not-sharing.125 Ettinger 
contrasts the phallic realm and the matrixial one as follows: “In the phallus, we 
confront the impossibility of sharing trauma and phantasy, whereas in the matrix, to a 
certain extent, there is an impossibility of not sharing them.”126 One of the 
consequences of the matrixial understanding of shareability is that art is no longer seen 
as strictly individual for it may be informed by the artist’s Others. This, in turn, can be 
applied to Ettinger’s usage of the historical document as the background resurfacing 
in her oeuvre – if we take the above argument into account, it becomes clear that her 
artistic gesture is not that of appropriating someone else’s work, but that of welcoming 
the Other’s contribution.127 Ettinger observes: “It is art that leads us to discover our 
share of response-ability in transmissible events whose source is not inside One-
self.”128 Response to the Other’s call, also – or perhaps especially – in art, necessarily 
embraces the act of sharing the transferred knowledge. When one hears the call of the 
women from Mizocz, it is not enough to just listen; one is ethically obliged, on the one 
hand, not to turn one’s back these females and their message, and, on the other hand, 
to transmit the painful knowledge further. 
In order to be answered, the women from Mizocz need to be seen, and this is 
not always a simple task for the viewer, since in Ettinger’s artworks they are engaged 
in the play of pres-absence. In some of the paintings the female bodies are easily 
graspable. Sometimes it is the original photograph that remains largely unaltered, just 
as in Ettinger’s No Title-Sketch (1988–1989), where the parents are juxtaposed with 
                                                 
125 It is mentioned in Chapter 2, section: Knowledge in /of the Humanising Specificity. 
126 Ettinger, “The Matrixial Gaze,” p. 90. Emphasis in the original. 
127 Appropriation is a recurring theme of Chapter 5. 
128 Ettinger, “The Matrixial Gaze,” p. 90. 
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the Eurydices, but both parts of the work of art remain rather photography-like instead 
of being covered by multiple layers of paint.129 The other way to maintain the women’s 
visibility is that of highlighting their shapes with strokes of paint, the example of which 
is Eurydice, No. 17, where the original photograph is hidden by means of the artist’s 
painterly gestures. In both cases, the women occupy the canvas with vigour and 
persistence. In other images, such as Eurydice, No. 14 (1994–1996), their presence – 
or indeed existence – is more dependent on the viewer.130 The women are visible 
provided that the spectator is already acquainted with the series or with the background 
for most images and thus is able to identify otherwise unclear shapes. Their presence 
becomes conditional: they are striving towards it but may nevertheless remain unseen. 
Finally, paintings from the late Eurydice series leave the viewer defenceless, with no 
visible clues to follow, but it does not mean that the Mizocz women are absent there. 
Images such as Eurydice, No. 47 (2001–2006) or Eurydice, No. 50 (2006–2007)131 
testify to the ongoing struggle of pres-absence: even though the original photograph is 
no longer traceable, the women tirelessly endeavour to enter the domain of visibility, 
shades of their faces resurfacing on the canvas every now and then. This complexity 
of Ettinger’s Eurydice series connotes the mythical situation of the eponymous 
woman. At the precise moment Orpheus looks back, Eurydice simultaneously appears 
and vaporises: she affirms her presence and becomes absent. By that, she shatters the 
presence / absence binary opposition, oscillating between the two poles and not being 
reducible to one of them during the momentary encounter with her beloved. Similarly, 
                                                 
129 Bracha L. Ettinger, No Title-Sketch, 1988–1989, xerography with photocopic dust, pigment and ashes 
on paper, 22.3x24.9 cm, in: Art as Compassion, p. 207. It is discussed in Chapter 2. See: Appendix, p. 
227. 
130 Bracha L. Ettinger, Eurydice, No. 14, 1994–1996, oil, xerography with photocopic dust, pigment and 
ashes on paper mounted on canvas, 25x52 cm, in: Art as Compassion, p. 86. See: Appendix, p. 248. 
131 Bracha L. Ettinger, Eurydice, No. 47, 2001–2006, oil on paper mounted on canvas, 23.3x27.7 cm, 
in: Art as Compassion, p. 169. Bracha L. Ettinger, Eurydice, No. 50, 2006–2007, oil on paper mounted 
on canvas, 25.3x31.1 cm, in: Art as Compassion, p. 175. The late Eurydice series is discussed in Chapter 
1. See: Appendix, pp. 221, 224. 
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the women in Ettinger’s artworks are lost and found at the same time. Already dead, 
the Eurydices become conditionally present only to disappear again; even though they 
reveal themselves and call the viewer, they are never complete or fully available for 
they are forever stuck between presence and absence. 
The matrixial theory and art seem to be preoccupied with spatiality: issues such 
as the bodily space, the matrixial stratum, boundaries, and presence / absence of 
women and their representations in the canvas have been resurfacing throughout the 
whole argument. The question that needs to be raised at this point is: what about time? 
To begin with the matrixial theory, Ettinger’s notion of subjectivity is not a type of 
pre-subjectivity: as we already know, it is not concerned with chronology or 
temporality per se, and it is not posited before the subjectivity “proper.”132 Going 
further, we can look at time in Ettinger’s art, which may prove to be messianic in the 
sense that corresponds to Giorgio Agamben’s understanding of the term. Although it 
neither contradicts nor is outside of the chronological time, the messianic time is 
posited as that of exception; here, the logic of exception suspends and opens the law, 
completing rather than overthrowing the prevailing order. The messianic time is, in 
Agamben’s words, “the time that contracts itself and begins to end,” or “the time that 
remains between time and its end.”133 Just as an abstract and momentary albeit real 
operational time is needed so that one can “translate” the actual flow of time into its 
mental representation, as Agamben reminds us after Gustave Guillaume, the messianic 
time breaches and occurs in the chronological time even though this instant is hardly 
graspable.134 Hence, kairos meets chronos: it seizes and contracts the flow of the latter, 
                                                 
132 The notion of subjectivity is explored in Chapter 1, section: Trans-subjective Matrixial Ethics, while 
the meaning of “before” is tackled in Chapter 3, section: Femininity and Universality. 
133 Agamben, The Time that Remains, p. 62. 
134 Agamben, The Time that Remains, p. 66. 
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opening it to its potentiality and affirming the chance within it.135 If we apply 
Ettinger’s understanding of subjectivity found in her theoretical writings and 
Agamben’s messianism to the question of an encounter with art, the relation between 
the two philosophical systems becomes most apparent. A meeting with the Mizocz 
Eurydices can happen by chance, and if it does, it is sudden and irruptive. This 
encounter is hard to conceive of in linear terms for it punctures chronology and 
suspends the viewer between his or her present and the Eurydices’ paradoxical 
temporality. The momentariness of the meeting makes it almost ungraspable, perhaps 
even impossible to convey in binary linguistic structures. Still, the messianic-like 
encounter with the Mizocz women remains a valuable ethical potentiality, for it may 
result in humanising transmission and transformation. 
 
5. Through / with / in the Body 
Even though theology is not a central issue in Ettinger’s thought and artistic 
practice, its tropes often constitute refreshing points of reference which complement 
and widen the meaning of the matrix. Both in Ettinger’s theory and in theology, body 
and ethics occupy a significant position; for this reason, when the two systems are 
juxtaposed, new potentialities emerge. When collated with Emmanuel Lévinas’s 
encounter with the Other, the matrixial covenant turns out to concur with it in in terms 
of asymmetry and more general assumptions, such as the humanising character of an 
encounter with the non-I. Yet, when such issues as transcendence, separation, 
inevitable failure, violence, demand, or dialogue are tackled, the theorists are at odds 
with each other; still, even though Lévinas’s and Ettinger’s approaches divert, it is 
                                                 
135 Agamben, The Time that Remains, p. 69. Agamben also makes a clear distinction between 
messianism and prophecy, the former being directed towards disciples and the present time, the latter 
belonging to prophets and the future. See: Agamben, The Time that Remains, pp. 60-61. 
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impossible to ignore the ethical potential of both of them with regard to the subject / 
Other relationship. Such a relation becomes the key concept in discussions on 
incarnation and on Nancy’s reflections on Christianity. Incarnation appears to follow 
the logic similar to the matrixial one, in the sense that it is derived from corporeality, 
breaks with separation, and turns towards togetherness, (trans)connectedness, and 
interdependence. Nancy’s notes on tenderness and the logic of opening, as well as his 
reading of “God [a]s relation,” are also in proximity to Ettinger’s proposition. 
Importantly enough, the matrixial relation is implicitly bodily, which finds an ally in 
the gospel of John. 
Resonances between the matrixial theory and theology can be also traced in 
specific matrixial notions. A covenant complements Ettinger’s definition of an 
encounter by means of its association with Christ’s covenant agreed upon during the 
Last Supper; preoccupied with promise and reconciliation, both types of covenants are 
also connected by corporeality – their shared origin. Primary compassion and com-
passion carry a theological reference as well; passion adds the quality of simultaneous 
suffering and love to compassionate homeliness and its humanising potentiality. As 
far as sacrifice is concerned, it occupies a twofold position. On the one hand, Ettinger 
criticises Derrida’s take on sacrifice, finding it père-verse; on the other hand, in the 
matrix we can identify a mère-verse kind of sacrifice – a partial offering of one’s bodily 
and psychic integrity that can result in helping assuage the Other’s pain. If we, 
however, look at the field of aesthetics and an artistic encounter, the notions of 
revelation and messianism become relevant. Ettinger’s Eurydices can then be read 
through the prisms of pres-absence, the viewer’s commitment, and two “im-
possibilities”; an encounter with them can be portrayed with Nancy’s “[c]all and 
response” and Agamben’s messianic time. 
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This chapter is by no means an exhaustive account of theological traces in 
Ettinger’s oeuvre. Ettinger herself turns to biblical tropes, taking a special interest in 
Hebrew phrases and words: their etymology and potential matrixial implications.136 
Instead of providing an all-embracing study of potential Ettingerian theology, I 
focused on openings that Judeo-Christian theology provides for both the matrixial 
notions related to the body and Ettinger’s art. As I believe, the revealed connections 
between the two spheres contribute to the deeper understanding of the corporeal 
aesth/ethics of Bracha L. Ettinger. Some of the issues addressed here will return in the 
final chapter, devoted to the Holocaust in the context of Ettinger’s work. Sacrifice, 
violence, the (female) body, Lévinas’s notion of the face of the Other (directly linked 
to his reading of an encounter), and a few other concepts will be used to examine the 
possibility of ethics in the post-Holocaust reality. 
                                                 
136 See, for instance, Brigit M. Kaiser and Kathrin Thiele, “If You Do Well, Carry! The Difference of 
the Humane. An Interview with Bracha L. Ettinger,” philoSOPHIA: A Journal of Continental Feminism, 
Vol. 8, No. 1 (2018), pp. 101-125, where Ettinger scrutinises numerous etymological tropes in the Bible 
and links them to her theoretical reflections. 
 Chapter 5 
IN-APPROPRIATE(D) 
ART, HUMANISM, AND THE BODY AFTER AUSCHWITZ 
 
We are carrying, at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, enormous traumatic 
weight, and aesthetic wit(h)nessing in art 
brings it to culture’s surface.1 
 
Too late to help, utterly impotent, we 
nevertheless search for ways to take 
responsibility for what we are seeing, to 
experience, from a remove, even as we try 
to redefine, if not repair, these ruptures.2 
 
To write poetry after Auschwitz is 
barbaric.3 
 
1. In-appropriate(d) Bodies and Art 
Is it appropriate to gaze at the bare bodies of women from the Mizocz ghetto 
just before their imminent execution? Or is it inappropriate to look away once we face 
them? If we respond to this image by becoming vulnerable and experiencing 
something of the pain (en)crypted within its frame, then do we not appropriate the 
suffering of the women observed? In other words, do we not usurp what should belong 
exclusively to them? Can we break this chain of inappropriateness / appropriation, or 
– perhaps – can we try instead to conceive of an ethics of encountering these women, 
but in the borderspace where “such a catastrophe is unimaginable”?4 
                                                 
1 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma and the Matrixial Gaze,” in: Bracha L. Ettinger, The 
Matrixial Borderspace, ed. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 
2006), p. 147. 
2 Marianne Hirsch, “Nazi Photographs in Post-Holocaust Art,” in: Marianne Hirsch, The Generation of 
Postmemory. Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2012), p. 138. 
3 Theodor W. Adorno, “Cultural Criticism and Society,” in: Theodor W. Adorno, Prisms, trans. Samuel 
and Shierry Weber (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1983), p. 34. 
4 Griselda Pollock, “Introduction. Femininity: Aporia or Sexual Difference?,” in: The Matrixial 
Borderspace, p. 11. 
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This chapter aims at exploring the interrelations between humanism, (female) 
corporeality, and Ettinger’s artistic activity in the context of the Shoah. It will begin 
with outlining the background for a discussion concerning the female experience of 
the Holocaust. Having examined the etymological intricacies of the term “holocaust,” 
I will turn to femininity and victimhood, putting an emphasis on the necessity to 
investigate the feminine perspective on these tragic events. Thereafter, Ettinger’s art 
and theory with regard to the Holocaust will become the main point of interest. 
However, what is going to be addressed is not only the potential of Ettinger’s oeuvre 
(including the possibility of changing the Nazi gaze), but also ethical objections and 
doubts that might be raised when the viewer is confronted with it. The chapter will 
continue with a reading of Giorgio Agamben’s figure of homo sacer and its application 
to the photograph of the women from Mizocz found in Ettinger’s art. Having asked 
about them as instances of bare life and about the possibility of ethics when confronted 
with zoē, I will move on to the women’s faces, employing the Lévinasian category and 
the philosopher’s study of responsibility for the Other. Thereafter, the reflections on 
responding to the horror of the Shoah will be supplemented with Ettinger’s theoretical 
propositions and Derridean hauntology. Finally, the ethical demand of the spectral 
women of Mizocz – as found in their face(s) – will be considered along with the 
psychoanalytical take on the gaze and its implications. As I will attempt to prove, even 
though Ettinger’s art may be perceived as ethically risky in certain Shoah-related 
points, the combination of her artworking and theoretical considerations – supported 
by such thinkers as Giorgio Agamben, Emmanuel Lévinas, and Jacques Derrida – can 
delineate a path towards humanism based on compassion, response-ability, 
attentiveness, trust, tenderness, and capacity to be deeply affected without 
appropriation. 
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It is not accidental that certain notions and categories hinted at above have 
already appeared in the previous chapters. This final chapter returns to the chosen 
artistic and theoretical tropes in Ettinger’s oeuvre in order to confront them with the 
Holocaust-related issues. The Shoah is inherent in Ettinger’s work; not only does it 
pose a recurring theme in her artworks, but it is also implicit in her matrixial 
psychoanalysis – she seldom tackles it directly, yet it remains one of the foundations 
of this system. For these two reasons, both aspects of Ettinger’s work are considered, 
but it is art that becomes the privileged theme of the chapter. While the Holocaust is 
an extremely important issue in the analysed work, it provokes various questions as 
well. Because of that, Ettinger’s artistic and theoretical activity is going to be 
juxtaposed with the abovementioned thinkers and other Holocaust scholars, and 
potential doubts will be scrutinised. We can, therefore, identify this chapter as a space 
for a meeting, or a juncture of tropes and themes united by the Shoah: a tragedy 
impossible to be passed over in silence when speaking of Bracha L. Ettinger and her 
massive, multi-layered oeuvre. 
 
2. Feminine Experiences of the Shoah 
When one examines the issues linked to the Holocaust, it is hard to ignore the 
constant play of in-adequacy hidden in the sacrificial roots and implications of the very 
term. “Holocaust” is a translation of the Hebrew noun ʿolah, which means “that which 
goes up [in smoke]” and stands for a burnt offering: a sacrifice of an animal appearing 
in the Bible.5 The English term originates in Greek holokauston and Late Latin 
                                                 
5 Baruch J. Schwartz, “Burnt Offering,” in: The Oxford Dictionary of the Jewish Religion, second 
edition, ed. Adele Berlin (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 154. Interestingly 
enough, while a burnt offering in most cases refers to a sacrifice of animals, it is also Isaac that is 
described in the Bible as ʿolah. See: Genesis 22:2 (KJV for the English translation and WLC for the 
Hebrew version). 
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holocaustum, meaning “a thing wholly burnt.”6 After the Second World War, it begins 
to be associated with the Nazi genocide of European Jews. Bruno Bettelheim, for one, 
finds the word “holocaust” an improper name for the genocide of the majority of the 
nation, observing that “this artificial and highly technical term” has not been chosen 
by the persecuted groups themselves but by “the Americans.”7 In his opinion, such an 
external decision is harmful from the religious point of view as it produces the 
otherwise inexistent linkages between the Nazi crimes and the Jewish faith and 
tradition. Bettelheim goes on to argue that  
[u]sing a word with such strong unconscious religious connotations when 
speaking of the murder of millions of Jews robs the victims of this 
abominable mass murder of the only thing left to them: their uniqueness. 
Calling the most callous, most brutal, most horrid, most heinous mass 
murder a burnt offering is a sacrilege, a profanation of God and man.8 
Undoubtedly, Bettelheim has a point when recognising such threats as ascribing 
dangerous qualities to the religious term and as diminishing both the gravity and the 
singularity of the Nazi murder machine. However, it is simultaneously difficult to 
reject certain similarities that a burnt offering and the Shoah share. I will briefly 
mention the three most evident correspondences, connected with the following 
aspects: what is traditionally sacrificed during the religious ritual are animals, they are 
killed for a higher purpose, and they are supposed to be devoured by fire. Firstly, one 
of the strategies Nazi propaganda employed was the animalisation of the Jews; such 
an act of ascribing animal qualities to the nation facilitated the process of their 
dehumanisation.9 Secondly, the conceptualisation of the greater good was also 
                                                 
6 Online Etymology Dictionary, available at: 
https://www.etymonline.com/word/holocaust#etymonline_v_12103 (access: 10 September 2018). 
7 Bruno Bettelheim, “The Holocaust – One Generation Later,” in: Bruno Bettelheim, Surviving and 
Other Essays (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 91. 
8 Bettelheim, “The Holocaust,” p. 92. 
9 The psychological aftermath of dehumanisation is explored, among others, in: Johannes Steizinger, 
“The Significance of Dehumanization: Nazi Ideology and Its Psychological Consequences,” Politics, 
Religion & Ideology, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2018), pp. 139-157. 
171 
 
involved, which could be found in the anti-Semitic propaganda. Finally, the appalling 
correspondence between the animals consumed by flames and Auschwitz incinerators 
ought not to be left unsaid. Paradoxically, if we read the word “holocaust” through its 
sacrificial connotations, it proves to be both potentially detrimental and gruesomely 
accurate.  
A sacrifice requires a victim; in her scrutiny of popular Holocaust images and 
their artistic post-productions, Marianne Hirsch notes that femininity and the 
representation of victimhood tend to go side by side. Even though such an association 
should not be thought to reflect the death toll of the actual war victims,10 Hirsch 
observes the mechanisms of feminisation, infantilisation, and masculinisation in 
depictions of the Second World War, which is an especially important issue in the 
context of Ettinger’s art, whose most common background photo is that presenting 
precisely women- and children-victims. To begin with, children – who are figures of 
innocence – frequently appear in widespread Holocaust photographs, but in various 
artistic re-workings they are taken out of their original context: their surroundings and 
perpetrators are often absent, which leads to universalisation of the child-victims.11 
Universalisation makes it possible – and indeed easy – to identify with the victim, 
particularly if he or she is “the only [subject] position available”12 for the actual 
perpetrator has been erased from the image. As Hirsch suggests, the same children are 
                                                 
10 While it was not the Jewish people’s gender that was a decisive factor in the context of their 
extermination, we should nevertheless take into account, for instance, different strategies, treatments, 
or power mechanisms of the perpetrators that contributed to differing Holocaust experiences and 
testimonies of men and women. See, for instance: Myrna Goldenberg and Amy H. Shapiro, eds., 
Different Horrors, Same Hell: Gender and the Holocaust (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 
2013); Nechama Tec, Resilience and Courage: Women, Men, and the Holocaust (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 2003); Lisa Pine, “Gender and Holocaust Victims: A Reappraisal,” Journal of Jewish 
Identities, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2008), pp. 121-141. 
11 Hirsch, “Nazi Photographs,” p. 140. Hirsch comments upon the well-known photo of a boy in the 
Warsaw ghetto with his hands raised and, among others, its artistic reproduction by Samuel Bak in 
Landscapes of Jewish Experience. 
12 Hirsch, “Nazi Photographs,” p. 144. 
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also subject to feminisation in a twofold sense: on the one hand, they are portrayed as 
vulnerable and fragile, and on the other – they are sometimes contrasted with newly 
added “hyper-masculinized” figures of perpetrators, who are, in turn, “represented as 
the ultimate in phallic, mechanized, supra-human evil.”13 As a result of their hyper-
masculine representation, perpetrators are depersonalised and devoid of agency, which 
– as mentioned above – renders their perspective and subject position inaccessible.14 
Of course, the Holocaust imagery is also abundant in depictions of females, an 
example of which is the picture of the women from the Mizocz ghetto. As Hirsch 
argues, women tend to be eroticised in artistic remakes of historical photographs in 
order to draw the viewer’s attention to “sexual humiliation”15 inflicted by the 
perpetrators. Yet, during the war “the opposite seems to have been the case: the victims 
were dehumanized precisely by being desexualized”16; this strategy of the perpetrators 
is in accordance with, among others, Nazi propaganda’s endeavour to ascribe animal 
features to the Jewish people. All in all, in the Holocaust representations, women and 
children – both of whom are culturally associated with defencelessness – become as if 
transparent figures, comfortable to identify with and prone to projection. 
In her account of feminist and gender readings within the Holocaust studies, 
Aleksandra Ubertowska postulates that the feminine perspective on the Shoah needs 
to be highlighted and developed because of the specificity of the women’s experience 
of the war period (marked, among others, by appropriation of the female body) and its 
divergence from that of males.17 This issue has begun to gather scholarly attention, 
                                                 
13 Hirsch, “Nazi Photographs,” p. 144. The example of hyper-masculinisation of perpetrators Hirsch 
provides us with is Judy Chicago’s Im/Balance of Power. 
14 Hirsch, “Nazi Photographs,” p. 144.  
15 Hirsch, “Nazi Photographs,” p. 148. When analysing sexualisation of women, Hirsch refers to Mein 
Kampf by David Levinthal. 
16 Hirsch, “Nazi Photographs,” p. 148. Emphasis mine. 
17 In the feminist context, I believe we should not ignore the situation of pre-war Nazi Germany women, 
whose function was also biologically determined as a result of the workings of Nazi ideology and policy. 
Although it would be superfluous for my thesis to provide an all-embracing study of women in Nazi 
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but, as Ubertowska notes, gendered perspectives on the war and the Shoah are still a 
relatively recent phenomenon, emerging around the mid-seventies; before that, 
“women were not perceived as a separate group of victims, as a specific historical 
subject,”18 which resulted in a universalised, homogenous portrayal of men’s and 
women’s suffering. Because of its wide-ranging methodological standpoints, feminist 
historiography is identified as the path that makes it possible to successfully combine 
the study of gender and the Holocaust. Basing on the research of Joan Wallach Scott, 
Ubertowska points to possible approaches in the field; one of them consists in 
supplementing the seemingly universal – but in fact male-centred – history, the second 
one is herstory, and the last one is a gender studies path aiming at conceptualising 
                                                 
Germany and I am aware of the ethical doubt that may arise when discussing Jewish and German women 
next to each other, I believe that German women’s situation provides a significant context without which 
it is hard to discuss women’s bodies, the Holocaust, and ethics. As Leila J. Rupp delineates, the position 
of women in Nazi Germany was by no means unequivocal. Most of all, they were praised as potential 
mothers and encouraged to bear more children, which was arguably not supposed to render them inferior 
to men but biologically different from them and, thus, destined to have a different role in the society 
(See: Leila J. Rupp, “Mother of the Volk: The Image of Women in Nazi Ideology,” Signs. Journal of 
Women in Culture and Society, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1977), p. 364). Giving birth to – but also raising and 
educating – children was portrayed as an important and estimable duty serving the common good. It 
was also reflected in Nazi policies: on the one hand, women were persuaded by propaganda and social 
programmes to leave their jobs and concentrate on the household tasks, on the other – there were more 
and more restrictions and prohibitions that made it almost impossible for women to pursue a 
professional career, including the career in the National Socialist party (for Nazi strategies and policies 
in this respect, see: Rupp, “Mother of the Volk,” pp. 370-371). As Rupp notes, also among Nazi 
supporters there were women who opposed such a treatment; they postulated equality and significance 
of women in politics and in structures of the National Socialist party but were not successful in their 
endeavours (see: Rupp, “Mother of the Volk,” pp. 364-369). It does not mean, however, that women 
ceased to work, especially the working-class ones, who often had no other choice; also, when it was 
necessary for economic reasons, the policy was adjusted in order for women to be re-employed, which 
was read as “a woman’s sacrifice for her people” (Rupp, “Mother of the Volk,” p. 374). It is crucial not 
to forget that numerous women were not forced into such thinking but were instead attracted among 
others by the vision of a woman who is appreciated for her domestic life and for devotion to her children, 
that is, a woman who fulfils her “natural” destiny (see: Rupp, “Mother of the Volk,” p. 379). As we can 
see, the status of women in Nazi Germany was formed in accordance with the principles of biological 
determinism; recognised primarily for achievements related to childbearing and maternity, German 
women faced the reality in which they were defined through their bodily capacities. For more insightful 
analyses of the position of women in Nazi society, see, for instance, Jill Stephenson’s thorough and all-
embracing study: Jill Stephenson, Women in Nazi Germany (Harlow: Pearson Education Limited, 
2001). For the concise characteristics of the ideal woman in Nazi society, see: Jill Stephenson, Women 
in Nazi Germany, p. 18. 
18 Aleksandra Ubertowska, “Niewidoczność, sprawczość, podmiot. Perspektywa feministyczna i 
genderowa w badaniach nad Holokaustem,” in: Aleksandra Ubertowska, Holokaust. Auto(tanato)grafie 
(Warszawa: Instytut Badań Literackich PAN, 2014), p. 113. Translation mine. 
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history anew.19 Despite having various drawbacks that Ubertowska succinctly 
summarises, these methodologies are significant in regaining the woman’s position, 
previously omitted in the discussed period. 
Although some of its concepts can be used to study the Shoah-related issues, 
Bracha L. Ettinger’s theory rarely refers to the Holocaust directly. That is to say, the 
matrixial paradigm helps rebuild the feminine perspective and experience, but the 
Holocaust is present there mainly as a potential topic to be viewed through the affective 
prism or as an inherent – but veiled – inspiration for certain notions. However, Ettinger 
mentions art as the medium that carries the traces of the Holocaust trauma: 
We are carrying, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, enormous 
traumatic weight, and aesthetic wit(h)nessing in art brings it to culture’s 
surface. […] The beautiful as accessed via artworks in our era – and I 
emphasize again in our era, since we are living thorough the massive 
effects of transitive trauma that different artworks capture and shed light 
upon – the beautiful carries new possibilities for affective apprehending 
and produces new artistic effects where aesthetics converges with ethics 
even beyond the artist’s intentions or conscious control.20 
As if a shelter, art is the space that stores fragments of the Holocaust trauma; these 
fragments can resurface and become accessible for the subject provided that he or she 
is able to become a wit(h)ness. As Ettinger argues, we are now all affected by the 
trauma of war, which makes it particularly important to become involved in the 
matrixial experience of art – it thus becomes a humanising act. Interestingly enough, 
the matrixial theorist in a sense diminishes the agency of the artist in producing 
aesth/ethical artworks. Still, while Ettinger does not overuse the Shoah as a point of 
reference in her psychoanalysis, in her artistic activity she deliberately chooses the 
                                                 
19 Ubertowska, “Niewidoczność, sprawczość, podmiot,” pp. 116-122. See: Joan Wallach Scott, Gender 
and the Politics of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); Joan Wallach Scott, 
“Rewriting History,” in: Behind the Lines: Gender and the Two World Wars, eds. Margaret Randolph 
Higonnet, Jane Jenson, Sonya Michel, and Margaret Collins Weitz (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1987), pp. 19-30. 
20 Bracha L. Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma and the Matrixial Gaze,” in: The Matrixial Borderspace, 
pp. 147-148. 
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Holocaust theme and reworks it countless times, creating images whose “enormous 
traumatic weight” is hard to be denied. 
Burdened with traumatic content, the images hosting the Mizocz women can 
nevertheless be considered ethically dubious. First of all, the bodies of the women are 
decontextualised. Their surroundings are absent, but also – depending on the artwork 
– particular women are chosen to appear on the canvas while others are cut out; some 
of the women present in the historical photograph never reach the surface of the 
paintings. Furthermore, the appearances of the females are artistically manipulated 
with the usage of such techniques as, among others, cropping, putting layers of paint, 
or juxtaposing their bodies with other images. In some paintings, the females are 
altered to such an extent that they become as if ahistorical, extracted from their tragic 
moment of being on the verge of death. Also, if we return to the strategy of 
feminisation of victims, the women from Mizocz can be considered easy to identify 
with, which leads us to the issue of potential appropriation. At this point, it may prove 
useful to refer to Dominick LaCapra’s term of empathic unsettlement, introduced to 
characterise a reaction of secondary witnesses to trauma.21 He notes that it is a valuable 
reaction, since empathy is a “virtual experience through which one puts oneself in the 
other’s position while recognizing the difference of that position and hence not taking 
the other’s place.”22 Simultaneously, LaCapra argues that if the clear-cut boundary 
between the actual witness touched by the trauma and the secondary witness is not 
maintained, the secondary witness may falsely identify himself or herself with the 
victim, which can result in an appropriation of the pain of the Other.23 For LaCapra, it 
                                                 
21 The notion of emphatic unsettlement is used repeatedly in LaCapra’s book, yet it is mentioned for the 
first time in: Dominick LaCapra, “Preface,” in: Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma 
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001) p. xi. 
22 Dominick LaCapra, “Trauma, Absence, Loss,” in: Writing History, Writing Trauma, p. 78. For 
Ettinger’s take on empathy and compassion, see: Chapter 4, section: Com-passionate Covenants. 
23 LaCapra, “Trauma, Absence, Loss,” pp. 78-79. 
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is necessary to be empathetic and open in order to grasp the Other’s trauma, but one 
has to both affirm the distance between oneself and the Other, and be careful not to 
appropriate the Other’s position.24 In this context, the situation of the Mizocz women 
in Ettinger’s paintings becomes even more complex. The question that remains is: are 
these females appropriated, or are they retrieved? 
As I propose, although it is marked by the Nazi gaze, the original photograph 
may be viewed differently when being subject to Ettinger’s artistic reworking. 
Marianne Hirsch postulates that the information about the author of the Holocaust 
photo is by no means irrelevant as it is made in particular circumstances and thus 
contributes to a specific viewing experience.25 A kind of image Hirsch finds herself 
most interested in – as it is the most accurate example of the Nazi gaze – is one in 
which the victims and the perpetrators face each other, but also “in which the 
photographer, the perpetrator, and the spectator share the same space of looking at 
the victim.”26 This description is partly true if the image of the Mizocz women is 
considered. We cannot be certain where exactly the soldiers are (there are only two 
soldiers within the picture frame); most of the women standing in the row look ahead 
or at other women, and it is impossible to guess from the image alone whether the 
soldiers are in front of them or near the anonymous photographer. As we should 
remember, one of the females is looking in a different direction, and because of that 
she seems to respond to the Nazi gaze in the most striking manner. Still, as viewers we 
have to come to terms with the fact that most probably the photographer is also the 
                                                 
24 LaCapra also argues that if one has not experienced the traumatic event directly, one cannot 
experience trauma, as it would be an abuse. Dominick LaCapra, “Holocaust Testimonies: Attending to 
the Victim’s Voice,” in: Writing History, Writing Trauma, p. 102. I discuss the differences between 
LaCapra’s approach and Ettinger’s matrixial theory in more detail in my article: Anna Kisiel, “Uraz – 
bliskość – nie-pamięć. Psychoanalityczny dyskurs traumy od Freuda do Ettinger,” Narracje o 
Zagładzie, No. 2 (2016), pp. 115-132 (in Polish). 
25 Hirsch, “Nazi Photographs,” p. 133. 
26 Hirsch, “Nazi Photographs,” p. 134. Emphasis mine. 
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perpetrator, and – consequently – we occupy the executioner’s position. Having 
realised the place we are in, we are claimed to react as follows: “Too late to help, 
utterly impotent, we nevertheless search for ways to take responsibility for what we 
are seeing, to experience, from a remove, even as we try to redefine, if not repair, these 
ruptures.”27 Ettinger’s artworking deals with the Nazi gaze for she manipulates the 
image taken presumably by one of the perpetrators. Nevertheless, if we look at her 
activity through the matrixial lens, we may come to the conclusion that the gaze 
undergoes a change here. As I would like to argue, in the case of Ettinger’s art, the 
gaze we can engage in is rather a com-passionate gaze28: a gaze that can be portrayed 
as hospitable and respectful, responsible and engaging. Such a gaze involves 
wit(h)nessing and makes it impossible to objectify the intimate Other; finally, it entails 
suffering in the experience of trauma that the Other cannot work-through. Ettinger’s 
Eurydices open the space in which the viewer can gaze at the women’s bodies in com-
passion, acknowledging the perpetrator’s position but going beyond it in order to reach 
the women’s fragility and shards of trauma. 
Even if the gaze is com-passionate, it can still be considered “barbaric,” to use 
Theodor W. Adorno’s expression. In Prisms, Adorno famously proclaims that “[t]o 
write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric”29; he returns to the issue in Negative 
Dialectics, noting that while it is not accurate to ask about the capacity to write poems 
after the Shoah, there is a more fundamental issue that can be tackled, namely, 
“whether after Auschwitz you can go on living.”30 Being the daughter of the Holocaust 
survivors, Ettinger most probably has faced the latter dilemma. Still, when examining 
                                                 
27 Hirsch, “Nazi Photographs,” p. 138. Emphasis mine. 
28 The notion of com-passion is analysed in Chapter 4, section: Com-passionate Covenants. 
29 Adorno, “Cultural Criticism and Society,” p. 34. 
30 Theodor W. Adorno, “Meditations on Metaphysics,” in: Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 
trans. E. B. Ashton (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 363. 
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her art, we can – or even ought to – ask questions about its potential “barbaric” 
qualities.31 To begin, Ettinger has not experienced the Holocaust personally, being 
rather a secondary witness; as has been noted, LaCapra warns us about secondary 
witnesses’ over-identification with the victims, leading to potential appropriation. 
Moreover, Ettinger’s parents are the survivors, having been able to establish a family 
and to deal with the new reality; her position is, therefore, different from that of 
relatives of survivors who could not manage to “go on living.” When we, in turn, 
consider the photo used in Ettinger’s art, we need to keep in mind that it may – or may 
not – present someone from her parents’ family; we bear no actual knowledge of 
Ettinger’s relation with the women.32 Last but not least, the author of this picture is 
probably a Nazi photographer, capturing the women’s bodies without their agreement; 
as Ettinger cannot obtain it in any way, the question of consent applies to her as well. 
Perhaps the above remarks and doubts cannot be addressed with certainty. I will put 
them aside for the sake of contextualising Ettinger’s thought and art with Giorgio 
Agamben and Emmanuel Lévinas, as they may help define the ethics of Eurydices. 
 
                                                 
31 Griselda Pollock rejects the possibility of reading Ettinger’s art through the prism of “barbarism,” or 
potential ethical doubts. We read: “[C]ontemporary critics, who look too quickly and with prejudice, 
are liable to make mistaken judgments about the ethics of the use of historical photographs from the 
Holocaust or the family album, when the nature of this project involves no use at all. Bracha Lichtenberg 
Ettinger’s work depends upon the potentiality of Painting – the category – and painting, the activity of 
a repeating bodily activity that encodes the duration of its making in the archaeology of its own surface 
and enshrines the time taken to create the space of ‘almost missed encounter’.” Griselda Pollock, 
“Nichsapha: Yearning/Languishing. The Immaterial Tuché of Colour in Painting after Painting after 
History,” in: Bracha Lichtenberg Ettinger: Artworking 1985-1999 (Ghent and Amsterdam: Ludion, 
2000), p. 52. Emphasis in the original. While, indeed, the question of the use of historical and personal 
photographs is rethought by Ettinger (in both theory and art), I believe one cannot close the discussion 
on possible “barbaric” qualities of Ettinger’s art, as such a discussion contributes to a broader set of 
reflections: those on the capacity to “go on living” in the post-Shoah reality. In this context, clear-cut 
judgements that do not take the arguments of the other side into consideration are reductive. 
32 See: Chapter 2, section: Aesth/ethical Encounter. 
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3. Facing the Bare Life 
Next to the sacrifice, homo sacer – in Giorgio Agamben’s reading – is another 
figure that casts light on the position of women photographed in Mizocz and then 
employed by Ettinger in her art. However, before we turn to these females, we shall 
focus on the term itself, including its relation to zoē and exclusion. In Homo Sacer, 
Agamben begins with commenting upon the dual understanding of “life” in ancient 
Greece. Bios stands for life existing in or through language and social structures; it is 
“political existence”33 included in society. Yet, in order to be included, one needs to 
exclude one’s zoē, understood as “bare life,”34 or material, natural existence prior to 
any norms; Agamben elucidates: “There is politics because man is the living being 
who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same 
time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion.”35 As we 
can see, bios and zoē are by no means separate terms – a human being is comprised of 
both of them, but in order to enter society he or she has to renounce bare life.36 This 
act of an inclusive exclusion brings us closer to the macro-version of this dyad, that is, 
the relation between the sovereign power and homo sacer. A figure that “may be killed 
and yet not sacrificed,”37 homo sacer is subject to a twofold exclusion – from the order 
of the secular and that of the divine.38 It is the sovereign that performs such an 
exclusion; the sovereign suspends the law, providing the space for an exception and – 
as a result – reducing homo sacer to bare life, prone to violence without punishment. 
Beyond law, homo sacer nevertheless functions within the bounds of society, thus 
                                                 
33 Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 8. 
34 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 4, passim. 
35 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 8. 
36 We ought to keep in mind that, in this context, bare life is also a political entity as without its 
exclusion, the mentioned inclusion is impossible. This correlation will be further explored in reference 
to homo sacer. 
37 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 8. Emphasis in the original. 
38 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 82. 
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remaining a political entity. Finally, homo sacer’s relation to death is defined as “an 
intimate symbiosis”39: he or she has not died yet, but aggression – as well as murder – 
is an unceasing potentiality that can come at any time and with no consequences for 
the perpetrator. 
The photograph of the women from Mizocz points to their position of homines 
sacri and hence evades the sacrificial interpretation. Undressed, the women captured 
by the camera are dehumanised and humiliated. They are waiting for an execution 
which is simultaneously beyond the law (being a mass killing that will not be 
penalised) and within the law (allowed by the sovereign as an exception). This 
genocide is made possible precisely by the gesture of reducing these women to zoē. 
As a result, at the moment of taking the picture, these women are in “an intimate 
symbiosis” with their imminent death. The status of these women mirrors that of the 
Jewish nation during the war. As Giorgio Agamben notes, the Jew is the twentieth 
century homo sacer figure: “exterminated not in a mad and giant holocaust but exactly 
as Hitler ha[s] announced, ‘as lice,’ which is to say, as bare life.”40 In such a reading, 
there is a dissonance between homo sacer and the notion of sacrifice implied in the 
etymology of the Holocaust. Although – as we have observed – the resonances 
between the sacrificial associations and the fate of the Jews tend to be temptingly 
accurate, for Agamben this word choice is “an irresponsible historiographical 
blindness.”41 The women from Mizocz – and the Jews in general – are by no means 
                                                 
39 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 100. 
40 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 114. 
41 Agamben, Homo Sacer, p. 114. Dominick LaCapra provides an interesting critique of Agamben’s 
refusal to employ the notion of “Holocaust.” He notes that, in Agamben, “[t]he intolerability of the term 
‘Holocaust’ derives from its ambiguity as a euphemism and an intimation that the events in question 
could possibly have sacred meaning,” while, in fact, “no term is unproblematic for ‘the events in 
question’”; in other words, there is no adequate name that can be ascribed to such incomprehensible, 
inhuman, and tragic circumstances. LaCapra proposes that one needs to “recognize that there are no 
pure or innocent terms […] and to avoid fixating on one term as innocent or as taboo.” Therefore, 
LaCapra stands for using various names rather than focusing on one, and simultaneously for being aware 
of potential problematic implications of the chosen terms. Dominick LaCapra, “Approaching Limit 
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sacrificed since being homines sacri makes such an act impossible; instead, they are 
downgraded and killed with the consent of the sovereign power. Still, assuming that 
these women are diminished to zoē, can we revive the ethical aspect of their bodies? 
More specifically, what can Ettinger’s art and theory “do” with this photograph to 
make it humanising? 
The bodies of women from Mizocz are incomprehensible, but, matrixially 
speaking, artistic practice is one of the means capable of producing the ethical relation 
with them. In the matrixial paradigm, there is no clear-cut opposition between the I 
and the non-I. Such a binary, however, is cherished in Nazi ideology, which places the 
Jewish nation in the position of the radical Other, depersonalised and reduced to bare 
– hence killable – life. These circumstances, in a sense, resulted in the Shoah, “a 
catastrophe [which] is unimaginable”42 within the matrixial mode. Along with its 
atrocious historical context and the Nazi gaze indispensably attached to it, the Mizocz 
photograph cannot be accepted in its original form; yet, as it has already been 
discussed, Ettinger works-through this image in an attempt to alter the experience of 
the spectator. As Ettinger notes, “Aesthetic production already carries ethical 
aspects”43; an artist is – even unconsciously – capable of responding to the Other’s call 
and establishing a canvas-space for an aesthetic encounter which can transform into a 
humanising one. Interestingly enough, what is encountered in this instance is – as I 
argue – zoē, provided that zoē is understood as material, non-linguistic existence, not 
governed by the phallic norms. To specify, an encounter with zoē can be ethical 
because – within the matrix – language is not a condition for ethics whereas meaning 
                                                 
Events: Siting Agamben,” in: Dominick LaCapra, History in Transit: Experience, Identity, Critical 
Theory (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 169. 
42 Pollock, “Introduction. Femininity: Aporia or Sexual Difference?,” p. 11. It is discussed in detail in 
Chapter 2, section: Knowledge in / of the Humanising Specificity. 
43 Ettinger, “Wit(h)nessing Trauma,” p. 151. 
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can be conveyed outside of it. While in the photograph these women’s bodies may 
exist as zoē, matrixially – and aesth/ethically – speaking, they can turn into the carriers 
of sense and knowledge. Via art, their corporeal spheres become the sites of painful 
shareable experience; having been reduced by Nazi perpetrators to bare lives, these 
women are affectively re-subjectified, but they are able to “speak” precisely – and only 
– by means of their bodies, captured and transformed in the canvas by the artist. 
Interestingly enough, the linguistic incomprehensibility of the message of the Mizocz 
women and their bareness – both literal and that related to recognising them as zoē – 
are the qualities that link Agamben’s study of homo sacer to Emmanuel Lévinas’s 
ethics of the face, which I am going to explore below.44 
The Lévinasian category of the face of the Other is marked by nakedness and 
vulnerability. Nakedness of the face stands for “the absolute openness of the 
Transcendent.”45 The Other is open to the I, nevertheless remaining a radically separate 
entity. Such an openness makes it possible for the ethical relation to commence. 
However, it also results in exposure, which – in turn – makes the Other fragile. The 
face of the Other is, as we read, “exposed, menaced, as if inviting us to an act of 
violence.”46 When encountering the I, the Other is thus extremely vulnerable, prone to 
aggression or even death. In the above context, the correspondence between Agamben 
and Lévinas is apparent; yet, Ettinger in part reverses the situation delineated by the 
theorists. Namely, while both Agamben and Lévinas render the Other vulnerable to 
                                                 
44 Similarly to Ettinger, Lévinas rarely comments upon the Holocaust in his writings in a straightforward 
manner. Still, this tragedy has had a considerable impact on his life and work, which is why his 
reflections often prove useful in discussions concerning the Shoah. In his article, Jacob Meskin explores 
the main arguments for thinking Lévinas and the Holocaust together. See: Jacob Meskin, “The Jewish 
Transformation of Modern Thought: Lévinas and Philosophy after the Holocaust,” CrossCurrents, Vol. 
47, No. 4 (1997-1998), pp. 505-517. 
45 Emmanuel Lévinas, Totality and Infinity. An Essay on Exteriority, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh: 
Duquesne University Press, 1969), p. 199. 
46 Emmanuel Lévinas, Ethics and Infinity. Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. Richard A. Cohen 
(Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1995), p. 86.  
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dangers originating in the subject, within the realm of subjectivity-as-encounter it is 
the subject that is unprotected. Fragile and open, the subject surrenders to the non-I, 
thus giving consent to the potential pain and trauma to come. Of course, one cannot 
ignore the differences between the discussed types of threats; most of all, among the 
gravest possible consequences of an encounter that the Lévinasian Other may face, 
there is death at the hands of the subject-perpetrator. Still, both positions – that of the 
Lévinasian Other and that of the Ettingerian subject – are ethically meaningful and 
convergent, equally emphasising the significance of openness to the point of 
defenceless vulnerability. 
Vulnerable and bare, the Lévinasian face does not belong to the realm of vision. 
In a conversation with Philippe Nemo, Lévinas explicates his stance on the appearance 
of the face:  
I do not know if one can speak of a “phenomenology” of the face, since 
phenomenology describes what appears. So, […] I wonder if one can speak 
of a look turned toward the face, for the look is knowledge, perception. I 
think rather that access to the face is straightaway ethical. You turn 
yourself toward the Other as toward an object when you see a nose, eyes, 
a forehead, a chin, and you can describe them. The best way of 
encountering the Other is not even to notice the color of his eyes! […] The 
relation with the face can surely be dominated by perception, but what is 
specifically the face is what cannot be reduced to that.47 
Once its appearance is described, the face is objectified, and the primary ethical 
relationship cannot be formed. Furthermore, the face cannot be grasped by means of 
vision, since vision – as well as touch – ensures the lack of transcendence in the created 
relation and reduces the Other to the accessible sameness.48 For these reasons, Lévinas 
postulates that it is not perception that should govern the encounter with the face but a 
direct experience instead. Revealed affectively rather than phenomenologically, the 
Lévinasian face exists precisely “in its refusal to be contained,”49 remaining 
                                                 
47 Lévinas, Ethics and Infinity, pp. 85-86. Emphasis mine. 
48 See: Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 191. 
49 Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 194. 
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incomprehensible for the subject. This comment takes us back to the notion of nudity: 
the face is necessarily naked, for any countenance is a form of visual camouflage, 
which prevents the humanising covenant that requires a radical exposure; hence, the 
Lévinasian face does not need a mask for it “is meaning all by itself,”50 and it can only 
be encountered as such. Still, even if it does not belong to the field of visibility and is 
thus impossible to be comprehended in visual terms, the face carries the ability to 
commence a dialogue with the subject. 
Although defenceless, the face utters an ethical demand. It is claimed to say 
“[T]hou shalt not kill”51 even if one is incapable of abiding by this commandment. 
Lévinas admits that “the ethical exigency is not an ontological necessity”52; murder is 
common despite being legally and socially forbidden, and despite moral awareness of 
the “malignancy of evil”53 inherent in this act. To return to the words of Adam Lipszyc 
quoted in the previous chapter, when facing the Other and his or her demand, “we 
always fail a little, we continually suffer a defeat, and we resort to violence.”54 Even 
though failure is imminent and it is relatively easy to kill the vulnerable Other, the 
Other nevertheless poses his or her requirement. The prohibition to kill is described as 
“primordial expression” and “the first word”55 – it becomes the primary ethical 
principle, because of which the encounter is subjectifying and humanising by design. 
The act of speech the Other engages in marks also the entrance to discourse: “Face and 
discourse are tied. The face speaks. It speaks, it is in this that it renders possible and 
begins all discourse.”56 Through its speech, the face offers the subject an invitation to 
                                                 
50 Lévinas, Ethics and Infinity, p. 86. 
51 Lévinas, Ethics and Infinity, p. 87. 
52 Lévinas, Ethics and Infinity, p. 87. 
53 Lévinas, Ethics and Infinity, p. 87. 
54 Adam Lipszyc, “Emmanuel Lévinas: Twarz za twarz,” in: Adam Lipszyc, Ślad judaizmu w filozofii 
XX wieku (Warsaw: Fundacja im. Prof. Mojżesza Schorra, 2009), p. 136. Translation mine. 
55 Lévinas, Totality and Infinity, p. 199. Emphasis in the original. 
56 Lévinas, Ethics and Infinity, p. 87. 
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a dialogic relation, or – more specifically – to a reaction. Affirming the Other’s 
existence is not sufficient: it is a response that is expected during such an encounter. 
Inextricably linked with the capacity to respond to the Other, responsibility is 
the foundation of Lévinasian ethics. Lévinas aptly observes that “the authentic 
relationship with the Other” is grounded upon “response or responsibility,”57 thus 
suggesting that these two terms are synonymous. The act or responding to the non-I 
appears to entail being responsible for him or her. Moreover, this ability – or 
“challenge”58 – is recognised as primary for it comes before the subject’s liberty and 
decisiveness. Originary and proto-discursive, responsibility also initiates and shapes 
the community. To be specific, one of the premises of humanising responsibility is that 
the I recognises the absolute difference between him or her and the Other while not 
becoming unsympathetic or detached; this intimate relationship – “the non-
indifference of responsibility,”59 to use Lévinas’s words – is claimed to build the inter-
subjective community. Finally, this aspect of responsibility also connects the notion to 
solidarity; as Lévinas argues, the two terms coincide, both stemming from the rejection 
of selfishness inherent in the subject.60 For these reasons, responsibility becomes the 
predominant aspect of a humanising encounter with alterity. 
Unlike in the matrixial theory, in Lévinasian ethics one ought not to associate 
responsibility with mutuality. The encounter with the face does not provide symmetry; 
instead, “I am responsible for the Other without waiting for reciprocity, were I to die 
for it. Reciprocity is his affair. […] The I always has one responsibility more than all 
                                                 
57 Lévinas, Ethics and Infinity, p. 88. 
58 Emmanuel Lévinas, Humanism of the Other, trans. Nidra Poller (Urbana and Chicago: University of 
Illinois Press, 2006), p. 64. 
59 Lévinas, Humanism of the Other, p. 6. Emphasis mine. 
60 Emmanuel Lévinas, “The Trace of the Other,” in: Deconstruction in Context. Literature and 
Philosophy, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 353. 
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the others.”61 The subject, therefore, ought to assume the altruistic position regardless 
of the possibly non-reciprocal nature of the dialogic exchange. Although responsible 
for the Other, the subject is not responsible for the Other’s decision to engage further. 
At this point, let us return to Chapter 2, in which Ettinger’s reading of responsibility 
is introduced. Proposing the notion of response-ability, Ettinger emphasises its 
dialogical character and postulates the possibility of mutual – although not 
symmetrical – circulation of non-linguistic data.62 Simultaneously, Ettinger by no 
means denies the primary significance of the act of caring for the Other in a 
compassionate and committed response. As Ronald T. Michener puts it in his scrutiny 
of Lévinas’s ethics of the face,  
An encounter with the other cannot be reduced to my own analysis, nor 
assimilated into my understanding or reasoning. The other with whom I 
am standing face to face beckons me to moral obligation. The call of the 
other precedes my own will and initiative. It ruptures my own ordered life 
of being (ontology) and morally obliges me to radical “corporeal” 
responsibility with sensitivity to embodied persons who become weary, 
experience pain and have physical and emotional needs.63  
With his or her face, the Other requires a tender and caring response that precedes a 
conscious decision; this is why response-ability becomes embodied, just as the Other 
is “embodied” per se. The final remark in this excerpt takes us back to the question of 
the Shoah, pointing to the significance of responsibility when one faces the Other in 
agony. 
A response is expected as a primary reaction to the horror of the Shoah. As 
Lévinas observes, the twentieth century is marked by unimaginable and pointless pain, 
                                                 
61 Lévinas, Ethics and Infinity, pp. 98-99. Emphasis in the original. In his article, Ronald T. Michener 
comments upon this excerpt as follows: “Levinas calls for a disinterested, unconditional, asymmetrical 
relationship without mutuality or the expectation of equal exchange.” Ronald T. Michener, “Face-to-
face with Levinas: (Ev)angelical Hospitality and (De)constructive Ethics?,” European Journal of 
Theology, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2010), p. 157. Emphasis in the original. 
62 See: Bracha L. Ettinger, “Weaving a Woman Artist with-in the Matrixial Encounter-Event,” in: The 
Matrixial Borderspace, p. 190. 
63 Michener, “Face-to-face with Levinas,” p. 156. Emphasis in the original. 
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and – because of that – “the suffering for the useless suffering of the other person, the 
just suffering in me for the unjustifiable suffering of the Other, opens upon suffering 
the ethical perspective of the inter-human.”64 Suffering makes sense in so far as one 
suffers for the Other who experiences pain; only then can it become a humanising 
process since it offers an interpersonal relation within which one attends to the Other. 
Such careful attentiveness also applies to the generations that follow – ones who have 
not experienced the incomprehensible tragedy personally. Georges Didi-Huberman 
argues for the necessity of trying to conceive of the unconceivable. In the context of 
photographs taken in Auschwitz, we read:  
In order to know, we must imagine for ourselves. We must attempt to 
imagine the hell that Auschwitz was […]. Let us not invoke the 
unimaginable. Let us not shelter ourselves by saying that we cannot, that 
we could not by any means, imagine it to the very end. We are obliged to 
that oppressive imaginable. It is a response that we must offer, as a debt to 
the words and images that certain prisoners snatched, for us, from the 
harrowing Real of their experience.65 
The next generations are required to respond compassionately, and such responses 
should incorporate an attempt to see through the eyes of the Other, in order not to usurp 
the pain, but to grasp at least the fragment of it by means of becoming involved. When 
facing the suffering Other, one ought not to protect oneself because such an attitude is 
not open for the ethical – and thus meaningful – encounter; one is in a sense indebted 
to the Other, and the only way to repay is to answer the call.  
The recognised necessity of facing the Holocaust victims corresponds to 
Jacques Derrida’s hauntology. We shall begin with an endeavour to identify the figure 
of the ghost in Derrida’s thought. One of the characteristics of the spectre is its 
constantly displaced position on the verge or at the intersection of different 
                                                 
64 Emmanuel Lévinas, “Useless Suffering,” trans. Richard Cohen, in: The Provocation of Levinas. 
Rethinking the Other, eds. Robert Bernasconi and David Wood (London and New York: Routledge, 
1988), p. 159. 
65 Georges Didi-Huberman, Images in Spite of All. Four Photographs from Auschwitz, trans. Shane B. 
Lillis (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), p. 3. Emphasis in the original. 
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temporalities; such a mixture of timelines that the ghost occupies at once is best 
described in the following passage: “Before knowing whether one can differentiate 
between the specter of the past and the specter of the future, of the past present and the 
future present, one must perhaps ask oneself whether the spectrality effect does not 
consist in undoing this opposition, or even this dialectic, between actual, effective 
presence and its other.”66 As Aleksandra Ubertowska summarises, the ghost is also 
prone to such mechanisms as repetition, duplication, manipulation, translation, and 
other serial re-doings. A twofold relation of the spectre to language thus emerges; on 
the one hand, the two bear a striking resemblance to each other for they are liable to 
the above types of transformations, and – on the other – language becomes the space 
in which the spectre may be conjured up.67 This duality, I believe, is not reducible to 
the field of language for it can be also transferred to the field of art, which – especially 
if we consider Ettinger’s “Eurydicial” art – is governed by a similar set of rules. When 
encountering the spirits is considered, one is claimed to be given a unique chance of 
“learning to live”68 from these evanescent figures suspended between life and death. 
Counterintuitively, the dialogue is supposed to take place despite their doubtful 
presence; after all, “this, the spectral, is not,” or it “is never present as such.”69 
Emphatically, gaining knowledge concerning life embraces the movement towards 
positive change and justice. For this reason, “talk[ing] with or about some ghost”70 
becomes an essential activity of a human being even if the faced ghost is not 
comprehensible. Unintelligibility is, in fact, an inescapable trait of an apparition. 
                                                 
66 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York and London: Routledge, 2006), 
p. 48. Emphasis in the original. 
67 Aleksandra Ubertowska, “Rysa, dukt, odcisk (nie)obecności. O spektrologiach Zagłady,” Teksty 
drugie, No. 2 (2016), pp. 107-108. 
68 Derrida, Specters of Marx, p. xvii. 
69 Derrida, Specters of Marx, p. xvii. Emphasis in the original. 
70 Derrida, Specters of Marx, p. xvii. Emphasis in the original. 
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Inspired by William Shakespeare’s Hamlet and the spectral figure of the protagonist’s 
father, Derrida introduces the visor effect – the spirit cannot be seen in its entirety, thus 
resisting identification, and yet it sees the subject. The subject, in turn, is left with 
nothing but trust. Nevertheless, he or she is demanded to obey, that is, to respond to 
the encountered spirit by taking an oath.71 In the context of the Shoah, the basic 
elements of the pledge given to the spectral victims are compassion, responsibility, 
memory, attentiveness, and radical, fragilising openness despite potential suffering. 
 
4. Responding to the Mizocz Women 
Keeping in mind the above remarks on Derrida’s hauntology, one can conclude 
that the spectre corresponds to the Mizocz women as conjured up in Ettinger’s art. If 
temporality is concerned, the females – historically speaking – belong to the bygone 
past, but in Ettinger’s aesthetic working-through they become Eurydices: figures of 
varying temporalities who resist being confined to one of the times. Trapped between 
presence and absence on the one hand, and between the past, present, and future on 
the other, the Eurydices from Mizocz are ghostly entities haunting the canvas. Their 
confinement – along with their possibility to be grasped – is directly connected to 
artistic techniques employed by Ettinger. The Eurydice series incorporates a 
multiplicity of canvases, repetitiveness of themes, and manipulation of the background 
photograph(s); the very series, therefore, becomes not only a haunted borderspace, but 
also a haunting one: a spectral, serial, ceaselessly becoming oeuvre. Returning to the 
women from Mizocz, they follow the Derridean logic of conjuration. As Derrida notes, 
the French term carries several meanings. One of them is conspiracy, associated with 
an act of vowing, undertaken possibly under a veil of secrecy.72 Another understanding 
                                                 
71 See: Derrida, Specters of Marx, pp. 6-7, 34. 
72 Derrida, Specters of Marx, pp. 49-50. 
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embraces “the magical incantation destined to evoke, to bring forth with the voice, to 
convoke a charm or a spirit.”73 Finally, conjuration also signifies the opposite of the 
second meaning; “conjurement,” as Derrida observes, stands for an exorcism that aims 
at expelling the ghost once and for all.74 Similarly to that with the spectre, the 
relationship with the Mizocz women made possible via Ettinger’s art is, indeed, an 
ambiguous alliance. By means of various artworking techniques, these females are 
convoked and cast out at the same time; when appearing in art, they call the viewer to 
conspire with them, that is, to enter a more intimate relation than the merely aesthetic 
one with the spectator. Occupying Ettinger’s works, the Mizocz women are spectres 
haunting both the viewer and – arguably – the artist herself.  
The spectral pres-absence of the women from the Mizocz ghetto poses an 
ethical demand, whose aspects can be portrayed by means of two major tendencies in 
the Eurydice series and other images employing the analysed theme. Emphatically, we 
cannot draw a line between the two tendencies as they constantly overlap in this 
nonlinear and mostly unchronological oeuvre. Still, as I have argued, we can make a 
tentative distinction into the early and the late Eurydice series for the sake of 
examining varying artistic interventions and their effects on viewers. The first aspect 
of the demand is that of being attentive towards the Other, which can be portrayed by 
means of Ettinger’s early paintings and sketches. As it is mentioned in Chapter 2, 
artworks such as No Title-Sketch (1985)75 – not belonging to the series but united with 
it by means of the background image – are ethical in Lévinas’s understanding of the 
word; the canvases host the women along with their almost uncovered bodies, and thus 
                                                 
73 Derrida, Specters of Marx, p. 50. Emphasis in the original. 
74 Derrida, Specters of Marx, p. 58. 
75 Bracha L. Ettinger, No Title-Sketch, 1985, xerography with photocopic dust, pigment and ashes on 
paper, 27.3x23.1 cm, in: Art as Compassion: Bracha L. Ettinger, eds. Catherine de Zegher and Griselda 
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the spectator is expected to gaze in a non-voyeuristic and non-aggressive way, and to 
respond to the females’ painful position. The question of gazing and responding 
returns also in the review of theological tropes in Ettinger’s works. There, revelation 
is presented in a twofold way: as a condition marked by pres-absence and as “[c]all 
and response.”76 The former take on revelation involves, among others, the problem 
with seeing (on the viewer’s part) or being seen (on the Eurydices’ part). What both 
portrayals of the theological notion share is the question of responsibility and attention 
when encountering the evanescent, hardly graspable figure(s). The other aspect of the 
abovementioned demand is that of trust. Interacting with the late Eurydice series, 
explored in Chapter 1, is based entirely on the viewer’s trust. One is required to 
surrender to the image and follow it beyond its quality of representation – towards 
disruptive un-intelligibility. If one is unable to do so, that is, if the spectator cannot 
trust that which cannot be fully comprehended, the women’s desire to be 
acknowledged cannot be fulfilled and the posed ethical demand remains not answered. 
Trust and attentiveness are two inextricably linked – yet distinct – qualities that the 
potential viewer needs to possess to respond to the Other. 
What makes the viewer respond to Ettinger’s Eurydices? One of the most 
captivating themes connected to the Mizocz women is the recurring face of one of 
them in semi-profile, looking away77; what seems to grab the attention of the viewer 
is her disruptive, ambiguous gaze, which cannot be reduced to one interpretation 
because of Ettinger’s various artistic reworkings. The notion of the gaze has already 
appeared in the context of Hirsch’s notion of the Nazi gaze, in which the com-
passionate way of observing the artwork has been proposed. Here, the issue will be 
                                                 
76 Jean-Luc Nancy, “In the Midst of the World,” in: Jean-Luc Nancy, Adoration. The Deconstruction of 
Christianity II, trans. John McKeane (New York: Fordham University Press, 2013), p. 41. For the 
discussion on revelation, see: Chapter 4, section: Revelation, Messianism, and the Artistic Encounter. 
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taken up again in order to be approached from a psychoanalytical angle; thereafter, the 
gaze in the Eurydice series will be explored.  
Referring to Jacques Lacan’s proposition, Ettinger reconsiders the notion of the 
gaze. In short, the Lacanian gaze is a split- and loss-based type of objet petit a, the 
unsatisfiable object of one’s desire; Lacan defines the term as follows: “In our relation 
to things, in so far as this relation is constituted by the way of vision, and ordered in 
the figures of representation, something slips, passes, is transmitted, from stage to 
stage, and is always to some degree eluded in it.”78 The gaze is precisely this 
“something” which – when encountered – is doomed to be missed and ungraspable. 
Nevertheless, as Lacan notes, the fragments of it remain in the visual field, so to a 
degree the gaze can be accessed.79 Putting the aesthetic experience at the centre of her 
reflections, Ettinger provides us with a non-phallic, supplementary re-reading of the 
psychoanalytical notion. The relation between the viewer, the gaze, and the work of 
art is explicated as follows: 
The visual artwork attracts, shifts, or originates a desire for a subjective-
object that is mysteriously embodied in the artwork as a gaze. The gaze 
calls to the viewer to follow it into a space beyond, yet inside the visible, 
to abandon defenses and become fragmented and fragile, to become open 
to sharing and absorbing and a further redistributing of fragments of trauma 
– all this on the condition of weaving into the artwork one’s own matrixial 
threads and letting the artwork penetrate one’s own psychic sphere of 
severality.80 
The matrixial gaze is grounded not upon separation or loss but upon fragilisation, 
transformation, and sharing. “Touched” by the gaze, one is claimed to give in to its 
power in order to reach partial traces of the Other’s trauma; however, what takes place 
is not only a change, but also an exchange – the gaze itself within the work of art is 
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also transformed in the process. When the impact of the gaze on the viewer is 
considered, Ettinger elucidates that “[t]he matrixial gaze thrills us while fragmenting, 
scattering, and joining grains together, turning us into participatory witnesses; it 
enchants and horrifies us, attenuating us into connected particles that participate in a 
drama wider than that of our individual selves.”81 Within the matrixial realm, the gaze 
is marked by vulnerability, involvement, and openness to the traumatic information 
originating in the Other. Emphatically, what the gaze as a psychoanalytical notion and 
the gaze as a potentially com-passionate mode of viewing discussed earlier share are 
participation and response-ability without objectification, but also the experience of 
the Other’s trauma without appropriation.  
When found, the abovementioned woman from Mizocz returns the viewer’s 
gaze, which is an act rich in matrixial implications. In Eurydice, No. 35 (1994–2001),82 
the central part of the image seems to have disappeared to a great extent; the sand-like 
beige occupies the middle of the canvas, but it is by no means only a colour, pattern, 
or texture with no other data covered. Almost-invisible and yet present, the phrases 
recurring in Ettinger’s art resurface in the upper part of this area: maternelle and, 
slightly below, vivante/morte.83 This time, language – langage – is absent, or perhaps 
simply irrelevant; it is the maternal connotation of the state between life and death that 
plays a major role in the artwork. Above the desert of grainy colour and letters, a face 
of the woman is placed. While in the original photograph she is looking towards the 
perpetrator – and thus viewer – but does not meet the camera’s eye, here it is 
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82 Bracha L. Ettinger, Eurydice, No. 35, 1994–2001, oil, xerography, photocopic pigment, and ashes on 
paper mounted on canvas, 40x27 cm. The artwork was featured at the exhibition Bracha Lichtenberg 
Ettinger: Eurydice – Pieta in Muzeum Śląskie, Katowice, 7 July – 2 September 2017. See: Appendix, 
p. 249. 
83 In fact, the majority of the canvas is covered with words and phrases from a French-Hebrew 
dictionary, but it is these two entries that are most easily decipherable. Also, the lower part of the 
artwork seems to carry a sketch-like image, but I am unable to identify it. 
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impossible to argue with certainty whether the woman looks away or exactly at the 
potential spectator. Moreover, if we assume that she does look at the viewer, we may 
go further in our reading; then, indeed, her gaze may be claimed to invite one “into a 
space beyond, yet inside the visible”: the space within which her tragic fate is reworked 
and the traces of the Holocaust trauma are carried on. The matrixial gaze, in this 
context, is undeniably feminine and humanising, and these two qualities are 
inextricably linked. It is feminine for it belongs to the anonymous woman and its 
maternelle nature is hinted at in the canvas. In turn, it becomes ethical since it guides 
the viewer to the motherly-matrixial sphere, makes him or her vulnerable, and does 
not allow him or her to forget the past and move on; instead, it poses a demand of 
passing the history on to others and of being transformed by the newly acquired non-
linguistic knowledge.  
Attentiveness, trust, the capacity to be influenced by the Other’s painful history 
and to share it, these qualities boil down to the Lévinasian ethical message: respond 
without killing. The historically hopeless request – considering the woman’s fate – 
becomes a potentially humanising one in artistic practice, since the spectator, unlike 
the perpetrator, may “glean something of the hidden gaze if s/he refrains from any 
conscious attempt to capture it, if – to use Lacan’s expression – s/he lays down her/his 
weapons at the painting’s threshold and gives in.”84 Should the viewer surrender to 
the gaze and renounce violence or appropriation, he or she may grasp the partial 
imprints of trauma encrypted within the space of the artwork, but beyond its 
representational aspect.85 At this point of an encounter, it is necessary to remain non-
                                                 
84 Ettinger, “The With-In-Visible Screen,” p. 100. Emphasis mine. 
85 As it has already been noted, “Ettinger directs us aesthetically away from content towards gesture.” 
Griselda Pollock, “Introduction: Trauma and Artworking,” in: After-affects / After-images. Trauma and 
Aesthetic Transformation in the Virtual Feminist Museum (Manchester and New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2013), p. 3. Emphasis in the original. 
195 
 
aggressive: to refrain from turning one’s back at this knowledge and from objectifying 
or abjectifying the Other. Rather, one is asked to process the information, to respond 
to it with com-passion, and to remember it for / instead of the non-I. The Mizocz 
Eurydices – and among them the woman from Eurydice, No. 35 – beseech us to look 
back but without killing them again; already dead and yet relentlessly present in 
Ettinger’s artworks, they seem to hope that fragments of their trauma will be embraced, 
worked-through, and imparted further. 
 
5. Living after Auschwitz 
The question that still has been left unanswered is whether Ettinger’s art is 
“barbaric” or not, given all the delineated circumstances. One cannot deny the inherent 
danger of including the Holocaust-related themes and documents in art; similarly, there 
are certain qualities of Ettinger’s art that render it perilously close to barbarism, that 
is, the artist’s position of a secondary witness to the experiences of her parents-
survivors, the dubious nature of her connection with the photo from Mizocz, and the 
issue of (missing) consent. These properties may be used as arguments portraying 
Ettinger’s artistic activity as ethically questionable, and it would be ignorant to reject 
them straightaway; quite the contrary, numerous subtleties and threads in Ettinger’s 
art make an unequivocal judgement for any side impossible. Nevertheless, if this art is 
read through the prism of the matrixial theory alongside with Emmanuel Lévinas’s 
humanism, Giorgio Agamben’s philosophy, and Jacques Derrida’s hauntology, its 
proto-ethical potential is uncovered. 
If one puts aside the questions of appropriateness and appropriation in 
Ettinger’s artistic and theoretical oeuvre while still keeping in mind their mentioned 
inevitability and validity, one can discover numerous emerging ethics-related tropes. 
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When the question of femininity and the Holocaust is concerned, it is not sufficient – 
or adequate – to posit women as universal victims since such a subject-position reduces 
the scope of their experiences. As I believe, one of the strategies to prevent or change 
such a status of women is to de-objectify them; in this chapter, Bracha L. Ettinger has 
been claimed to have achieved this goal by means of artistically protecting the Mizocz 
women from the Nazi gaze inherent in the original picture and thus opening the 
potential path towards a more com-passionate encounter with them. Interestingly 
enough, such an encounter transcends linguistic structures and norms, making it 
possible to gain partial access to the Other’s experiences even if they are 
incomprehensible. Although for a number of reasons the women from Mizocz may be 
identified as Agamben’s homines sacri, art in its matrixial understanding makes it 
possible to communicate with them despite their burden of being diminished to zoē. 
Nevertheless, when we employ Lévinas’s categories of the face and responsibility, we 
learn that these women do utter a call: “thou shalt not kill.” Despite their 
defencelessness and nudity, these spectral figures wish the reader to respond 
compassionately and openly to their painful position. As I have endeavoured to 
demonstrate basing on the “Eurydicial” images, this demand includes not only 
attentiveness and trust, but also a different – matrixial and maternelle – gaze. All in 
all, in the world that has witnessed, participated in, and survived the failure of 
humanity, one’s hope can be found – perhaps only – in a devoted humane response. 
 CONCLUSION 
 
The body is a dynamic force. The body not only is, or is had; it also does, or 
even makes. The body is a feel-know-seeing entity – it is affected by an encounter or 
an event, it remembers, and thus it becomes a bearer of knowledge. Bearing, however, 
is not sufficient; the body needs to pass the knowledge on, even if the transfer is 
painful, and even if the transmitted information is not entirely comprehensible. This 
transfer is communication of sorts, but the language of such communication is 
corporeal, that is, governed by the body’s capacities and flows. The body is lively; 
among its movements, we can distinguish an embrace – a hospitable gesture of caring 
for or of taking care of another body. When it embraces, the body can venture to carry 
another body, but this activity transcends and precedes conscious decision as it is 
inscribed within the body’s archaic potential. To specify, the body is capable of 
carrying because it remembers being carried; the first encounter – that with the female-
motherly body – is originarily inscribed within it. Interestingly, what the maternal body 
encounters already becomes part of it – an influential, becoming, intimate border-
Other. The becoming-bodily-entity and the maternal-female body, the two cherish 
their linkages and mutual transformations despite still being anonymous to each other. 
A site of a tender covenant and its source, the (female) body is more than dynamic; 
rather, it becomes the core of human(e)ness. 
This dissertation aimed at developing and examining the project of the 
matrixial corporeal aesth/ethics. One of its underlying assumptions revolved around 
the close relation between Ettinger’s theory and art; as I endeavoured to show, these 
two areas of Ettinger’s activity ought not to be treated separately as the constant 
interplay between them makes it possible to provide a more comprehensive picture of 
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the matrixial corporeality. Another founding assumption of this thesis pertained to the 
underdeveloped status of the body in Ettinger’s writings as well as matrixial criticism. 
Building upon these two assumptions, I attempted to prove that corporeality, inherent 
in Ettinger’s oeuvre, and humanism are inextricably conjoined since the (female) body 
is the primary space and source of a proto-ethical encounter. Provided that it is rooted 
in the intrauterine / pregnancy phase (an event that ultimately binds several entities 
together), an encounter becomes the first and elementary mode of subjectivity, and 
thus redefines the position of the subject in the world. Such a shift of emphasis from 
radical separation to co-existence and mutual metamorphosis leads to further ethical 
implications. In other words, when the maternal body becomes a psychoanalytical 
model of relationships, the hospitable acts of caring for and carrying the Other testify 
to the foundational bond that challenges the stability of borders between subjects and 
their seeming individuality.  
In this dissertation, Ettinger’s theoretical propositions were proved to be 
indebted to and immersed in the body. One cannot deny the direct link between the 
notion of the matrix and the female corporeality: the matrix is inspired by the qualities 
of the womb and pregnancy. The matrixial womb-like sphere is a non-passive realm 
governed by severality instead of binary oppositions, and yet it is neither psychotic nor 
symbiotic. The matrix introduces an-Other subjectivising process, subjectivity-as-
encounter, characterised by the act of becoming-together. Consequently, the female 
body becomes a prototype for the structure of connections in a psychoanalytic model 
and is identified as the space of the first encounter the subject participates in.  
It is exactly the capacity to produce and partake in connections that constitutes 
the basic ethical promise of the motherly-feminine body, but this does not mean that 
such a capacity belongs to women only. Grounded upon the relation between the 
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becoming-mother and the becoming-infant, an embodied encounter is marked by 
hospitality. In this covenant, the two subjects not only meet, but also share traces of 
information – they communicare. Their convoluted exchange can be adequately 
described by the notion of co-naissance, embracing knowledge, birth, togetherness, 
affirmation, and mutual comprehension. Nevertheless, the very fact that this model is 
based on the female body does not reduce its scope; namely, the matrix is a universal 
human(e) potentiality as every person has already experienced being with-in the 
maternal body in his or her prenatal period. Moreover, the possibility to transmit and 
share information gains particular significance when the Holocaust issues are 
considered; in this context, the transmissibility of knowledge becomes a chance to 
preserve the partial memory of a traumatic event and work-through it when those who 
were directly affected are not able to do so anymore. This is where Ettinger’s art comes 
in; her “Eurydicial” artworks can be argued to carry an affective load that consists of 
traces of disruptive data originating in the women from Mizocz, Ettinger’s parents, 
and the artist herself. While the female body is an archaic prenatal experience, art 
becomes one of postnatally accessible spaces of humanising proximity to the Other. 
Inspired by the events with-in the female body, the category of an encounter 
reveals its humanising potential not only in the matrixial psychoanalysis and Ettinger’s 
art, but also in dialogues with Judeo-Christian theology and the Holocaust studies. In 
the course of this thesis, an encounter with the Other was affirmed as humanising, and 
the priority of relation, togetherness, and openness over detachment and individuality 
was portrayed from various angles. The covenant’s bodily nature and meetings with 
the actual bodies pointed to a twofold entanglement – or even inseparability – of the 
body and the notion of an encounter. Interestingly, regardless of the type of the said 
entanglement, an encounter remains asymmetrical and poses requirements such as 
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commitment, attentiveness, decision, and trust; also, there are two prevailing needs of 
the matrixial covenant – compassion and a response to a call. What is more, the 
delineated type of an encounter cannot take place if the Other is recognised as an 
object, so de-objectification of the Other gains the status of a humanising strategy. The 
category directly linked to a compassionate encounter is that of sacrifice. An 
Ettingerian, mère-verse sacrifice is a partial offering of oneself for the sake of the 
Other, inspired by the prenatal / pregnancy encounter: one chooses to abandon one’s 
security and borders, and expose oneself to suffering, motivated by the prospect of a 
humane reciprocal relation. 
Even though the potential of theorising the proto-ethical dimension of the body 
is considerable, the matrixial theory and Ettinger’s art raise problematic gender-related 
questions that could not be left unnoticed. When scrutinising the notion of universality 
of the matrixial realm, I concluded that this theory does not aspire to present an all-
embracing and neutral notion of corporeality; instead, it portrays a universal 
experience – that of having encountered the maternal body. Similarly, the matrixial 
feminine difference is undeniably gendered, but because of the above assumption it 
applies to both males and females; women have a privileged access to it, nonetheless. 
We ought to keep in mind that despite the fact that her theory takes inspiration from 
such encounter-events as prenatality, pregnancy, or maternity, Ettinger disagrees with 
the possibility of essentialist and biologically determined readings, or interpretations 
that undermine women’s rights; we cannot, however, reject the rhetorical appeal of 
certain matrixial notions. When we turn to Ettinger’s use of male and female figures 
in her works, other curious implications resurface. In her psychoanalysis, mainly the 
biblical and mythical women contribute to the structure of the matrixial domain, but 
there are also males – such as Isaac and Moses – who prove that the matrixial bodily 
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connection transcends gender divisions. In Ettinger’s art, it is female family members 
who prevail (especially Bluma Lichtenberg); yet, as I suggested, it is rather the 
question of a mother / daughter relation than that of a gender bias of a kind. 
Gender issues are not the only potentially problematic aspect of Ettinger’s 
oeuvre; when her artistic activity is scrutinised, it is hard not to consider the threats 
related to the usage of the Holocaust themes. In other words, one cannot ignore such 
questions as appropriation and appropriateness when analysing artworks based on the 
historical photo of the naked women and children which was taken moments before 
their execution. Additional reasons for raising doubts include Ettinger’s status of a 
secondary witness, her unknown relation to the Mizocz women, and the inevitable lack 
of consent of the photographed people. These questions are necessary, and hence they 
cannot be shunned; still, as I endeavoured to prove, the matrixial theory and Ettinger’s 
art, when combined, can contribute to a trans-formation of ethics through, with, and in 
corporeality. 
The promises of the project of the matrixial corporeal aesth/ethics go beyond 
the threshold of this dissertation. To begin with, the system I developed may be 
considered beneficial for the theoretical approaches the matrixial domain was 
juxtaposed with, especially psychoanalysis – the area grounded primarily upon the 
male corporeality. Similarly, the matrixial humanism of / from the body may be 
considered a chance for feminism to regain the feminine body, exercise its 
potentialities, and affirm the maternal-female corporeality outside the essentialist or 
biologically determined frames. For literary studies, in turn, the proto-ethical matrixial 
space may be used as a methodology or an interpretative strategy that helps unmask 
and explore trans-subjective relations within the practices of writing and reading.1 
                                                 
1 Of course, the matrixial theory is used to read literature and poetry even by Ettinger herself (see, for 
instance: Bracha L. Ettinger, “Fascinance and the Girl-to-m/Other Matrixial Feminine Difference,” in: 
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Also, the delineated system appears to be especially significant in the context of the 
need to preserve the memory of the Shoah – the memory that is indevitably fading 
over time. With no alive eye-witness to possess the knowledge and experience of the 
Holocaust, these seem doomed to be lost soon; yet if we apply the matrixial paradigm 
concerning the shareability of traces of trauma and other information originating in the 
non-I, this situation may not be hopeless. To use Paul Celan’s words often referred to 
by Ettinger herself, “The world is gone, I have to carry you”2 – now, in the dusk of the 
era of direct witnesses, we need to accept the responsibility to take over the burden 
and, consequently, work-through the trauma of the Holocaust for and instead of those 
who cannot do it anymore. The proposed project tried to theorise a space for such a 
possibility. 
There are certain aspects of Bracha L. Ettinger’s thought and activity that could 
not be analysed in detail in this thesis but can take the proposed research into new 
territories and thus expand its scope. One of the paths that can be broadened is the 
Ettingerian mythos. As I pointed out in Chapter 3, Ettinger’s oeuvre is abundant in 
diverse female and male characters; while I decided to focus on biblical and 
mythological figures, expanding this mythos into other fields can certainly provide a 
plethora of enriching perspectives and contexts. Art is another sphere of Ettinger’s 
activity that deserves a further exploration. The theme of Eurydice, recurring in this 
dissertation, is merely the tip of the iceberg as Ettinger not only touches upon a variety 
of other motifs or figures (such as water and fire, Medusa, Ophelia, or Ettinger’s own 
                                                 
Psychoanalysis and the Image: Transdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Griselda Pollock (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2006), pp. 60-93; Bracha L. Ettinger, “Demeter–Persephone Complex, 
Entangled Aerials of the Psyche, and Sylvia Plath,” English Studies in Canada, Vol. 40, No. 1 (2014), 
pp. 123-154). Still, I believe that the matrixial aesth/ethical dimension as a tool for literary studies is yet 
to be discovered. 
2 Paul Celan, “Great, Glowing Vault,” in: Paul Celan, Breathturn, trans. Pierre Joris (Los Angeles: Sun 
& Moon Press, 1995), p. 233. 
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maternity), but also reaches for various media (installations, video works) which 
transcend the capacities of the discussed images. Finally, it is difficult to ignore the 
anthropocentrism of Ettinger’s system. Even though the matrixial theory is first and 
foremost a psychoanalytical model, perhaps it is possible to open it onto the discussion 
of non-human persons. One of the means to do so may be to combine Ettinger’s 
thought with new materialism, given the shared interest of the two realms in Deleuzian 
/ Guattarian rhizomatic connections. Hopefully, more potentialities are still in the 
process of becoming.
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 SUMMARY 
 
Corporeal Aesth/ethics: The Body in Bracha L. Ettinger’s Theory and Art is a 
study on the rich and multileveled notion of the body, the position it occupies in Bracha 
L. Ettinger’s oeuvre, and the potentiality of (female) corporeality as a root of ethics. 
Ettinger is a clinical psychologist, psychoanalyst, theoretician, visual artist, and 
member of the Second Generation after the Holocaust. In the dissertation, I investigate 
primarily her matrixial theory and art in search of the body – the notion which is 
ceaselessly present in these areas and yet is virtually inexistent in Ettingerian criticism. 
As I am convinced, the status of the matrixial notion of corporeality requires a more 
thorough examination since it may be read as an origin and a site of (proto-)ethics.  
This dissertation is comprised of two parts. Divided into three chapters, the first 
part is devoted to an in-depth reading of Ettinger’s works. The general aim of this part 
is to delineate the project of the Ettingerian corporeal aesth/ethics, to contextualise it, 
and to respond to the doubts it may raise. The second part, composed of two chapters, 
focuses entirely on the dialogic encounter of Ettinger’s oeuvre with theology and the 
Holocaust studies. 
The notion of the matrix and the related concepts are central to the first chapter, 
which examines the basic assumptions of the matrixial theory in the context of 
Sigmund Freud’s, Jacques Lacan’s, and Julia Kristeva’s postulates. Furthermore, I 
explore Ettinger’s chosen paintings with regard to their womb-associations and the 
notion of hospitality. The result is the twofold discovery pertaining to Ettinger’s 
theoretical propositions and artworks: on the one hand, they teem with ethical 
connotations, and – on the other – their origins are identified as bodily. 
251 
 
Chapter 2 goes further with the above discovery, trying to respond to the 
question whether the body can be perceived as the source of the matrixial ethics. 
Referring to schizoanalysis and Emmanuel Lévinas’s humanism, I reflect on the 
female flesh as the first space of an encounter, and as a potential carrier of non-
linguistic – and yet shareable – knowledge and sense. In an attempt to trace ethical 
implications of the above postulate on the feminine body, I also turn to the chosen 
artworks and the bodily meetings that take place within their frames. 
The third chapter tries to respond to questions and doubts that may have arisen 
in the previous chapters; these include, among others, the universal character of the 
matrixial theory, its applicability to males, essentialist or biologically determined 
interpretations, and a possible gender-bias in Ettinger’s works. Additionally, the 
chapter develops the notion of the “Ettingerian mythos” and looks into its two aspects 
– the theoretical mythos (the role of biblical and mythological characters in the 
discussed oeuvre) and the private mythos (Ettinger’s family members in her works of 
art) – through the prism of gender patterns.  
Judeo-Christian theology becomes the central context in Chapter 4. Here, the 
twofold entanglement between the matrixial theory and theology is identified: not only 
can theological notions (such as incarnation) correspond to the matrixial corporeal 
logic, but also the matrix-related concepts (for instance, com-passion or covenant) can 
be shown as indebted to theology. Emphatically, the matrixial theory is not the only 
theologically-engaged Ettingerian domain, as exemplified by tropes of revelation and 
messianism found in her paintings. 
A daughter of Holocaust survivors, Ettinger does not avoid the Holocaust 
themes in her artistic practice; simultaneously, the Shoah is rarely tackled directly in 
her psychoanalytical writings, but it remains a significant point of reference for them. 
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The final chapter of the dissertation proposes an ethics-oriented reading of Ettinger’s 
art and theory, focused on such questions as appropriation / appropriateness, Marianne 
Hirsch’s Nazi gaze, Giorgio Agamben’s homo sacer, Lévinas’s face of the Other, and 
Jacques Derrida’s hauntology. Although it takes note of the dangers inherent in the 
kind of art Ettinger practices, this chapter also intends to prove that, when combined, 
Ettinger’s art and theory can transcend these threats and, instead, testify to an 
opportunity to rethink ethics by means of the body and the relationships corporeality 
may enter. 
 STRESZCZENIE 
 
Korporalna est/etyka: ciało w teorii i sztuce Brachy L. Ettinger poświęcona 
jest niezwykle pojemnemu i wielopoziomowemu rozumieniu ciała, miejscu jakie 
zajmuje ono w pracach Ettinger oraz koncepcji (kobiecej) cielesności jako źródła 
etyki. Ettinger, należąca do drugiego pokolenia po Holokauście, jest psycholożką 
kliniczną, psychoanalityczką, teoretyczką oraz artystką wizualną. W niniejszej 
dysertacji podejmuję przede wszystkim badania sztuki oraz teorii macierzy jej 
autorstwa w poszukiwaniu tropów ciała, które, choć istotne dla dzieła i myśli artystki, 
są niemal nieobecne w tekstach krytycznych poświęconych Ettinger. Jestem 
przekonana, że cielesność w perspektywie teorii macierzy wymaga głębszego 
namysłu, ponieważ może być postrzegana jako źródło oraz przestrzeń (proto)etyki. 
Niniejsza praca składa się z dwóch części. Pierwsza z nich, podzielona na trzy 
rozdziały, poświęcona jest uważnej lekturze prac Ettinger. Tym samym stawia sobie 
ona za cel nakreślenie i kontekstualizację Ettingeriańskiego projektu est/etycznego, a 
także próbę odpowiedzi na wątpliwości, jakie ta teoria może budzić. Część druga, 
obejmująca kolejne dwa rozdziały, prezentuje dialogi, w jakie działalność teoretyczna 
i artystyczna Ettinger może wchodzić z teologią oraz studiami nad Holokaustem. 
Opisane w kontekście prac Zygmunta Freuda, Jacques’a Lacana oraz Julii 
Kristevej podwaliny teorii macierzy i powiązane z nią pojęcia konstruują oś rozdziału 
pierwszego. Nakreślony rys teoretyczny poparty zostaje analizą wybranych obrazów 
Ettinger, ukazującą jej powiązania z reprezentacjami macicy oraz kategorią 
gościnności. W tym rozdziale przedstawione zostają dwie cechy teorii i sztuki 
Ettinger: z jednej strony, są one pełne etycznych tropów, z drugiej – cielesność leży u 
ich źródeł. 
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Rozdział drugi łączy powyższe cechy w próbie odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy 
rzeczywiście ciało może być postrzegane jako źródło etyki macierzy. Podążając za 
schizoanalizą oraz humanizmem w rozumieniu Emmanuela Lévinasa, ukazuję kobiece 
ciało jako przestrzeń pierwszego spotkania, a także jako potencjalny nośnik wiedzy 
oraz sensu, które mogą być współdzielone, mimo że wymykają się językowemu 
poznaniu. Próba nakreślenia etycznych implikacji powyższego odczytania kobiecej 
cielesności sprawia, że zwracam się ku wybranym obrazom Ettinger oraz 
ucieleśnionym spotkaniom, które mają miejsce w ich ramach. 
W rozdziale trzecim skupiam się na próbie odpowiedzi na krytykę i 
wątpliwości, jakie mogły narodzić się w toku poprzednich moich rozważań. Obejmują 
one, między innymi, kwestię uniwersalności teorii macierzy, jej związki z męskością 
i mężczyznami, pokusy esencjalistycznych i biologicznie zdeterminowanych 
interpretacji, a także pytanie o możliwą genderową charakterystykę prac Ettinger. Co 
więcej, rozdział ten proponuje pojęcie „Ettingeriańskiej mitologii” i przygląda się z 
perspektywy genderowej jej dwóm płaszczyznom: mitologii teoretycznej 
(obejmującej role mitycznych i biblijnych postaci w omawianej twórczości) oraz 
mitologii prywatnej (skupiającej się na obecności rodziny Ettinger w jej sztuce). 
Kluczowym sojusznikiem dla twórczości autorki serii Eurydice w rozdziale 
czwartym stają się wpływy judeochrześcijańskiej teologii. Uściślając, teoria macierzy 
oraz teologia zostają uwikłane w podwójną relację: nie tylko tropy religijne (na 
przykład wcielenie) okazują się odzwierciedlać ucieleśnioną logikę macierzy, ale 
również tropy wyrosłe z samego systemu teoretycznego Ettinger (takie, jak współ-
czucie/pasja czy przymierze) mogą zostać odczytane jako pojęcia zakorzenione 
właśnie w myśleniu teologicznym. Co istotniejsze, teoria macierzy okazuje się 
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główną, choć nie jedyną, sferą działalności Ettinger uwikłaną w teologię, co ukazują 
ślady objawienia oraz mesjanizmu obecne w jej malarstwie. 
Bracha L. Ettinger jako córka ocalałych z Holokaustu Żydów w swojej 
działalności artystycznej nie unika odwołań do Zagłady. Mimo że Shoah rzadko 
pojawia się w jej tekstach z dziedziny psychoanalizy, to właśnie Zagłada pozostaje dla 
nich istotnym punktem odniesienia. Bazując na tym założeniu, ostatni rozdział 
niniejszej dysertacji podejmuje wysiłek etycznego odczytania sztuki i teorii Ettinger, 
podnosząc pytanie o zasadność i stosowność obecnych w niej wpływów Shoah, a także 
o możliwość zawłaszczenia przez nie tego wydarzenia. W tych poszukiwaniach 
sięgam do takich kategorii, jak spojrzenie nazisty Marianne Hirsch, homo sacer 
Giorgia Agambena, twarz Innego Emmanuela Lévinasa oraz widmontologia Jacques’a 
Derridy. Mimo że w tym rozdziale zostają wykazane pewne niezbywalne zagrożenia, 
jakie sztuka Ettinger może nieść za sobą, podjęte zostają również próby ukazania, iż 
malarstwo i teoria Ettinger, potraktowane jako komplementarne sfery jej działalności, 
zdolne są do przekroczenia tych niebezpieczeństw. Na przekór tym zagrożeniom mogą 
stanowić one szansę ponownego przemyślenia etyki zarówno z perspektywy ciała jak 
i relacji, w które ono wchodzi. 
 
